Chaos Theory: NEADS and ZBW; strange attractors, indeed

In an initial article we established that the words ‘chaos’ and ‘chaotic’ were often used to describe events on 9-11. In a second article we began an inquiry into whether or not chaos theory could even be used to analyze events of the day. The answer for now is yes, metaphorically, and perhaps, theoretically. In this article we will continue on the metaphorical track and use the language of chaos theory, specifically strange attractors, to begin exploring the nation’s response.

Sensitivity to Initial Conditions and Strange Attractors

Chaos theory tells us we can never know in advance the initial conditions to which events are sensitive. However, in the case at hand we can, retrospectively, describe the conditions that led to NEADS and ZBW being the two focal points—strange attractors–around which key information of the morning flowed. Two organizations and four people—Colin Scoggins, Maureen Dooley, Shelly Watson and Stacia Rountree–became the self-organizing loci for action.

At all higher echelons–all the way to the White House–entities charged with the national level response failed to manage the flow of information.

More linear processes that did not work

In a previous article I listed four linear processes that were ineffective on 9-11.  We can now add four more processes used that day that were also ineffective.  The four are: the Air Threat Conference Call; the FAA’s Primary Net; the NOIWON conference; and Clarke’s own SVTS conference.  Commission Staff notes from an interview with an NMCC staff officer show that Clarke’s SVTS (Secure Video Teleconference System) conference and the Air Threat Conference Call were actually counterproductive.

Richard Clarke’s instinct was to try and command the attention of the highest level person he could find in each relevant organization. It is hard to fault that approach, even in retrospect, but, in hindsight,  it was exactly the wrong way to proceed when managing chaotic events.  The better approach and perhaps an important lesson learned was to find the highest echelon at which real time information was flowing between FAA and DoD; to identify the strange attractors. Enter, stage center, ZBW and NEADS.

ZBW and Colin Scoggins

ZBW had a problem. It knew where AA 11 was geographically, it did not know where it was spatially. When Mohammed Atta turned the transponder off at 8:20 ZBW lost all technical capability to determine the altitude of an aircraft gone astray. From that moment forward the last known altitude, 29,000 feet, would be a given.

Despite air traffic control observations that the aircraft was descending and despite very real information held at American Airlines that the plane was way too low, the much higher altitude would prevail as people sought to understand what happened in the immediate aftermath of the 8:46 collision of AA 11 with the World Trade Center north tower. Both the Otis and Langley scramble orders, nearly 45 minutes apart, specified an altitude of 29,000 feet.

One person at ZBW knew that NEADS could determine altitude from primary only radar returns, Colin Scoggins. Colin was on break off the operations floor (edited Nov 4, 2009) when events first unfolded but as soon as he learned that altitude was an unknown he went immediately to the operations floor; he had important information. Despite Colin’s best efforts and the effort of other personnel at ZBW and at New York Center (ZNY) NEADS was unable to identify and track AA 11.

NEADS and the Identification Technicians

The professional life of identification technicians–in this case Maureen Dooley, Shelly Watson, and Stacia Rountree–is measured in minutes that can be counted on one hand. That is the time they have to identify unknowns when tasked. The NEADS tapes capture them as a non-stop whirlwind as they worked to get a grip on the facts of the day. No one came closer to managing chaos that day. Right or wrong, they shared information they had in near real time with those who they believed needed to know. During a single hour they made or received at least 26 calls to four different air traffic control centers and one to their Canadian counterparts. Not one of those calls was to a third strange attractor, the FAA’s Air Traffic Control System Command Center (ATCSCC or, simply, Herndon Center).

Herndon Center, a Strange Attractor with no partner

The Herndon Center was buried so deep in the FAA organization chart that it was well nigh invisible.  The Center’s job was to manage air traffic flow; it had no role or place in the ossified FAA Region/Headquarter structure to manage everything else, including crises.  Yet most relevant real-time FAA information was held at or flowed to the Herndon Center.   Even when Herndon communicated accurate information concerning UA 93 to FAA Headquarters as it  was receiving a blow-by-blow account from Cleveland Center it made no difference at the national level.  Herndon may as well have been talking to itself.  So what was different here as opposed to ZBW?

Herndon, including the embedded military Air Traffic Services Cell,  had no operational DoD partner to talk to, no one to partner with to fight the battle that morning.  It wasn’t going to make any difference for the northern attack against New York City.  The element of surprise achieved by Mohammed Atta simply overwhelmed NEADS, ZBW and ZNY.  But soon after UA 175 struck the south tower Herndon knew a criticial piece of information:  “he said planes, as in plural.”  Yet the nation’s response to the southern attack against the nation’s capital never organized around the Herndon Center.

Linearity gave way to non-linearity as the southern attack developed and the nation’s response its self  became chaotic.  No extant linear structure was capabable of dealing with the situation.  In the absence of any effective government structure or process the response self-organized and NEADS and ZBW for a short time became  the strange attractors.  No one at any higher echelon had personal, organizational, or situational awareness to capitalize.  Ultimately, the NEADS/ZBW nexus was transient and the nation’s response rapidly devolved and self-organized around the only people that could make a difference, the passengers and crew aboard United Airlines flight 93.