Category: UA 93

On September 11, 2001, the fog of war concerning United Airlines flight 93 settled on the President’s Emergency Operations Center, Vice President Cheney, Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta, Federal Aviation Administration Administrator Jane Garvey and her Acting Deputy, Monte Belger, and the Secret Service.

Simply put, that fog increased significantly the higher up the chain of command and the closer United 93 apparently got to the nation’s capital. Ultimately, the National Command Authority was flying blind with no coherent picture of events as they were occurring.

Information, however, was precise on board United 93 as captured by the cockpit voice recorder and the flight data recorder, both recovered and readable.

United States Air Force and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) radar also provided precise data concerning United 93. That precise information was clear to air traffic controllers and was passed up the chain of command with clarity via two open telephone lines.

Cleveland Center established an open line to the FAA’s Air Traffic Control System Command Center, hereafter Command Center. Command Center maintained an open line to the FAA’s Washington Operations Center (WOC).

None of that precision and clarity survived the next step, informing the National Command Authority. This article documents the precision and clarity and explains the confusion of the fog of war.

The Precision

No one had more precise information than the passengers and remaining crew aboard United 93. They had complete situational awareness, knew their fate, and knew what they had to do. And they did it; individual and collective bravery forced United 93 to the ground well short of its intended target, the capital building.

Here is the United 93 seating chart as depicted on the United 93 memorial website.

The flight data recorder preserved precise documentation. Recorder parameters started oscillating at 9:58 when the aileron and rudder sensors began fluctuating. Two minutes later the autopilot turned off and the pressure altitude fluctuated upward. By 10:00 United 93 was unstable in the air.

The cockpit voice recorder also provided precise documentation. Seconds after United 93 became unstable someone in the cockpit said, “Is that it? Shall we finish it off?” “No, not yet” was the answer. That changed in the next half-minute. Beginning at 10:00:29, someone, presumably Ziad Jarrah, said, “Up, down. Up down. Up, down. Saeed, up, down.” Saeed al Ghamdi was one of the hijackers that had commandeered United 93 a half-hour earlier.

In that same time frame an, observer, a visual flight rules plane, sighted United 93 and first reported, “Northwest bound, waving wings,” and then, “back towards the East, 80 heading, erratic.”

At 10:01:09, someone in the cockpit said, “Yes, put it in it, and pull it down.” A forensic analysis of Air Force radar depicted that United 93 ceased to fly and began a plummet to earth at about that time.

By 10:02, the flight data recorder readout showed that pressure altitude was decreasing and air speed was fluctuating. Shortly thereafter, Air Force radar regained radar contact which had been lost about 13 minutes earlier. Concurrently the observer aircraft reported, “back toward the Southeast, not progressing.”

At 10:02:45, Air Force radar detected the transponder (green dot in above image). A second return, 12 seconds later at 10:02:57, detected the transponder but no radar contact (red dot in above image). By 10:03, air traffic control reported that the transponder was back on.

Thereafter, voices from the cockpit continuously shouted “Allah is the Greatest”, ceasing at 10:03:09. By 10:03:11 the flight data recorder ceased recording parameters. Department of Defense space sensors detected an infra-red event between 10:03:10-11, with peak intensity at 10:03:16.  

Both the National Traffic Safety Board and the 9/11 Commission Report established the time of impact as 10:03:11.

The Clarity

At 10:03:10, Cleveland Center, Imperial Radar Position, reported radar lost. By 10:06, Cleveland reported to Command Center that they had lost United 93. Last known position was 16 nautical miles south of the Johnstown VOR (Very high frequency omni-directional range).  At 10:07:27, Cleveland reported black smoke from that area, and at 10:09:12 reported coordinates, 39 51N 07 8 46W. At 10:12:37 Cleveland confirmed a downed aircraft.

For its part, Command Center passed that same information to the WOC at FAA headquarters. At 10:06:18 the Center reported that radar contact was lost followed quickly by the location, 16 nautical miles south of Johnstown. The black smoke report was forwarded by 10:08, followed two minutes later by the coordinates. At 10:13:20, Command Center confirmed a downed aircraft to the WOC. At 10:18 a voice is heard in background at the Operations Center confirming the United 93 coordinates to someone.

Clear, relevant information was passed to FAA Headquarters within 10 minutes after United 93 impacted. All the precision of the event and reporting clarity became confusion at the highest levels. 

The Confusion

We begin with the National Command Authority.

The President. “Dick called back a few minutes later. Condi, Josh Bolten, and senior members of the national security team had joined him in the PEOC. They had been informed that an unresponsive plane was headed toward Washington.” (Bush, Decision Points, 2010, p 129-30)

The Vice President. “At around 10:03 a.m., barely five minutes after Cheney walked into the conference room, United 93 took on a third identity…This time it was an unknown jetliner racing toward Washington at five hundred miles an hour. By then the plane had already crashed… But the Federal Aviation Administration, apparently relying on a projection after losing live radar data, issued rapid updates on the phantom bogey. The plane was eighty miles out, then sixty, then ten.” (Gellman, Angler, The Cheney Vice Presidency, 2008,  p. 119)

The Secretary of Defense. The Secret Service, with the support of Vice President Cheney, advised Bush not to return to Washington until the situation was clarified. We were receiving unverified reports of hijacked airliners heading toward U.S. cities. Targeting the White House remained a possibility.” (Rumsfeld Known and Unknown, A Memoir, 2011, p. 338.)

The National Security Advisor. “Sometime after the order was given [shootdown] Norm [Mineta] was told that a plane had disappeared from the air traffic control radar. It was United Airlines Flight 93.” (Rice, No Higher Honor, 2011, p. 74)

Immediately below the leadership in the chain of command was Richard Clarke, National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counterterrorism. Clarke convened the Secure Video Teleconference System (SVTS) that morning.

Clarke recalled that the SVTS started as early as 9:28. However, logs show that Administrator Jane Garvey and Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet did not join until 9:40. Nevertheless, Clarke wrote, “Okay,” I began. “Let’s start with the facts. FAA, FAA, go.” “Jane Garvey, the administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, was in the chair.”

This was before the Pentagon was hit, according to Clarke.

Then, Clarke resumed, “FAA, FAA, go. Status report. How many aircraft do you still carry as hijacked?” Garvey read from a list… “Here’s what we have as potential hijacks: Delta 1989 over West Virginia, United 93 over Pennsylvania.”

Later—Ralph Seigler stuck his head around the door: “Secret Service reports a hostile aircraft ten minutes out.”. Then, “hostile aircraft eight minutes out.” (Clarke, Against All Enemies, Inside America’s War on Terror, 2004, pp 3-10)

I operated an SVTS link after the system was built in the 1986-1987 time-frame. Activation and operational are two separate steps. Once activated it takes time to turn on the lights, fire up the computers, and convene a conference. The Commission Staff accepted 9:40 as the conference start time, based on logs of the day.

Confusion began with the convention of that conference and it continued into the aftermath as individuals recalled events of the day. It was left to the 9/11 Commission to sort things out.

The Commission

“At 10:02, the communicators in the shelter began receiving reports from the Secret Service of an inbound aircraft—presumably hijacked—heading toward Washington. That aircraft was United 93. The Secret Service was getting this information directly from the FAA. The FAA may have been tracking the progress of United 93 on a display that showed its projected path to Washington, not its actual radar return. Thus, the Secret Service was relying on projections and was not aware the plane was already down in Pennsylvania.” (The Commission Report, p. 41)

Monte Belger, the Acting Deputy Administrator, was the most likely source of the FAA reporting. Belger did not have access to a radar display, only a TSD (Traffic Situation Display), a projection. Despite his reliance on TSD information, near real-time accurate information was provided to the FAA WOC, as discussed earlier. Accurate information was passed verbally to and within the WOC. There is no evidence that it was passed to Belger.

The Commission Reported the following conversation at 9:49 EDT. (p 29)

Headquarters to Command Center: “They’re pulling Jeff away to go talk about United 93.” (Jeff Griffith, Deputy Director of Air Traffic), the senior air traffic control official at FAA Headquarters.

Griffith was called away just before accurate information about United 93 began flowing to FAA Headquarters.

Belger said this when interviewed by Commission Staff, Team 8:

“Belger commented that he believes the only Traffic Situational Display (TSD) at FAA Headquarters was in the WOC. He does not know of any other TSD locations. [Note: Commission staff has learned that there are numerous TSD displays at FAA Headquarters, including the one referred to by Belger.] According to Belger, someone with air traffic experience would never use a TSD for precise data. (emphasis added) When the airspace was cleared, the WOC used the TSD to monitor the number of aircraft still airborne”. (Interview, April 20, 2004)

Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta confirmed Belger, in part, in a September 11, 2016 interview on MSNBC. (https://www.msnbc.com/msnbc-news/watch/fmr-transportation-secy-recalls-9-11-from-wh-762662467869)  Mineta stated that when he first learned of events he was having breakfast in his office with a foreign dignitary and Administrator Jane Garvey.

Thereafter, he was called to the White House, conferred briefly with Clarke in the White House Situation Room, and then was escorted to the PEOC. There he sat opposite the Vice President and was in communication with Belger. Mineta’s account conflates information concerning United 93 to pertain to American 77. He did confirm that Belger said FAA lost radar contact with United 93. Thereafter, however, Mineta’s recall is that Belger was relaying information that could have only come from a TSD.

So, what happened?

We may never know. Mineta’s own testimony to the Commission and his recall has been consistently inconsistent. Information concerning American 77 and United 93 became conflated, inextricably.

The significant intervening variable was Clarke’s convention of an SVTS conference. That isolated Garvey from her staff and, as the Commission reported, they had to be called away from the FAA Operations Center to confer with her. Concurrently, Mineta was talking to Belger, not Garvey.

Belger knew from air traffic control that United 93 was lost but somehow decided to pass along TSD information to Mineta. None of the relevant information—transponder lost, black smoke reported, site coordinates, aircraft confirmed down—made it to Mineta and the National Command Authority.

The Commission reported that the PEOC was getting its information from the Secret Service.

Dense fog, impenetrable, enveloped the National Command Authority. It has yet to clear.

Introduction

United Airlines flight 93 (UA93) was commandeered at 9:28 EDT on September 11, 2001, 46 minutes after it took off from Newark International Airport at 8:42 EDT, 42 minutes late. This article is a spatial analysis of the takeover and final moments using United States Air Force (USAF) radar files and Google Earth.

Here is snapshot of key events from the time UA93 entered Cleveland En Route Traffic Control Center (Cleveland Center) airspace until the UA93 transponder was turned off at 9:40:28 EDT.

UA93 Commandeered

UA93 was commandeered in the skies over Warren, OH in just 90 seconds. The attackers waited until the assigned crew checked in with Cleveland Center at 9:25 EDT, and just one minute after the last crew broadcast to the Center.

The commandeer time frame is depicted as the solid yellow line that begins 5 Nautical Miles (NM) east of Warren and ends 6 NM to the west of the city. Air traffic controllers had noticed an unexplained altitude drop. The parameters of that drop are established in USAF radar files from the 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron (84th RADES) as provided to both the National Traffic Safety Board and the 9/11 Commission. Those files were provided to me by the National Archives and Record Administration.

UA93 was flying at 35K altitude. At 9:28:08 EDT it began to drop a total of over 600 feet. It returned to 35K altitude at 9:29:39 EDT. The radar data establishes a takeover that lasted just 91 seconds. It is reasonable to assume that the takeover of the other three aircraft commandeered that day was just as efficient.

The assigned crew was able to make two brief transmissions over the air during the takeover. Immediately, the crew broadcast “MayDay.” That was followed 35 seconds later by “Hey get out of here…” Given that, it then took the attackers less than one minute to gain positive control of the cockpit.

Turn Back to Target

Ziad Jarrah then turned the plane around, unable to maintain constant altitude. UA93 reached nearly 41K altitude during the maneuver. Once flying straight again Jarrah turned off the UA93 transponder, 30 NM west of Akron, OH.

This presented a different case to air defense and air traffic than the earlier situation with American Airlines (AA11). In that case the USAF radars supporting Boston Center were able to determine altitude for a non-transponding aircraft, had they been able to locate the flight. That was not the case with UA93. Older generation USAF radars did not have a height finding capability for a radar only target. It didn’t matter, the air defense controllers at the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) were unaware of the developing UA93 situation.

USAF radars did track UA93 for a while and then lost it South of Youngstown, OH, and 34 NM WNW of Pittsburgh, PA. One radar, The Plains, did regain coverage briefly just before impact when the transponder briefly came back on.

Here is the 84th RADES forensic analysis of the radar data concerning UA93.

The track is a fine red line running through key data points. Green squares are reinforced returns, that is a return based on both radar and transponder. Red circles are returns based on the transponder only. Purple triangles are either radar only returns or simply atmospheric clutter. Forensically, 84th RADES technicians were able to match up those radar returns that correlated to UA93. The straight red line lower right is the correlation to the final moments of flight UA93.

UA93 Final Moments

Here is the continued 84th RADES forensic analysis of the final path of UA93 to impact.

This analysis is a unique, never published, visual picture of the moments after UA93 quit flying and plummeted to earth. The long, straight red line is a typical 84th RADES correlation of data. It is the result of a fore and aft search to establish a track on an unknown target. The 84th RADES technicians were able to correlate four radar only returns to UA93. Those returns were less than a minute before the transponder came back on. Hence, the moment UA93 quite flying is the red line right angle turn south. That moment was 10:01:57 EDT, just over a minute before impact shortly after 10:03 EDT.

After 10:01:57 EDT, the plane was in free fall, not flying, and falling a bit like a leaf to earth. There is more insight, another primary source of information, the cockpit voice recorder.

Cockpit Voice Recorder, Correlated

Just three of eight black boxes survived the attack of 9/11, the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) from UA93 and the Flight Data Recorders from American Airlines flight 77 (AA77) and UA 93.

Here are selected transcriptions from the UA93 CVR:

10:01:09 Yes put it in and pull it down

10:02:19 Down down

10:02:23 Pull it down

10:03:09 God is the greatest

The “put it in” decision was made about 45 seconds before radar forensic analysis shows UA93 went into free fall. At the time, UA93 was approximately over Latrobe, PA, 26 miles NE of the crash site. The next two cited statements occurred during free fall. In other words, continue the “put it in” decision.

The last CVR statement, “God is the Greatest”, occurred just before the end of the recording at 10:03:11 EDT, an estimate of the impact time. An extrapolation of the radar files suggests an impact time of approximately 10:03:06, close agreement.

Flight Data Recorder, Correlated

The UA93 Flight Data Recorder (FDR) readout is consistent with both the radar forensic analysis and the cockpit voice recorder. UA93 impacted shortly after 10:03 EDT, according to all metrics captured by the FDR.

The linked document is from the Commission Staff Files, Team 7 Box 3. The annotation pinpointing the “hijack” at 9:29 EDT is my hand writing. Metrics displayed show consistent problems after 10:00 EDT. Also noteworthy, Jarrah was not able to maintain straight and level flight after the turn and was in a continuous descent.

Other Confirmations

Gofer 06. Gofer 06 was the unarmed C130, H model, that earlier reported the impact of AA77 into the Pentagon. Thereafter, Gofer 06 continued North, en route home. The flight path was approaching the last known flight path of UA93. As a result, this exchange with Cleveland Center occurred at 10:06 EDT:

Cleveland: Gofer 06, we’ve lost the target on him [UA93], to be safe I’m gonna run you North about 25 miles and then put you back on course…

Gofer 06: OK, Gofer 06, copy, and sir if you’d like we’ve got black smoke at our nine o’clock, looks like about 30 miles.

Gofer 06, had been turned North at 10:04 EDT to avoid the projected path of UA93. He soon sighted the black smoke after turn. He was 34 NM SE of the crash site, just south of I70, NW of Hagerstown, MD. At 10:12 EDT, after a turn back West on course, Gofer 06 was due East of the crash site as a private jet was reporting the coordinates to Cleveland Center.

Falcon Jet

Cleveland Center vectored a private jet, a Dassault Falcon 20 owned by VF Corporation, to circle the crash site and provide coordinates.

USAF Radar files show that the Falcon was in a descent from 23K altitude at 10:02 EDT and circled the cite between 10:11-10:15 EDT at 6000-6500 feet elevation. The maneuver was counter-clockwise. Approach was on the south side with a circle around the north side and recovery again on the south side. The coordinates were obtained on the first pass.

Of note, The Plains radar had just intermittent coverage, 6 transponder only returns during the circling of the site. That is typical coverage when an aircraft is in a turn. Here is a close-in snap shot of the event.

The UA93 Monument is clearly visible, upper middle. In military terms, data points Falcon 1, 2, and 3 represent the approach pass. Data points Falcon 3 and 4 are the circling pass. Data points Falcon 4, 5 and 6 are the exit pass. Falcon 20 passed the coordinates to Cleveland Center while immediately south of the crash site; 4002.2N 7854.7W. The reporting time was 10:10:14 EDT, just after the radar return designated “Falcon 2.” The Falcon actually reported its own position as is clear from the graphic.

A Combined Picture

Here is a Google Earth screen print showing the spatial relationship of UA93, the Falcon 20 jet, and Gofer 06. Included for reference is a geographic overlay.

Conclusion

Evidence presented here is comprehensive and conclusive that UA93 crashed shortly after 10:03 EDT. Nothing ever aligned for the crew that commandeered the flight. The flight was way late in taking off, the crew was short a person, and air defense was in position by 10:00 EDT, over the National Capital Region. None of that mattered. The remaining crew and passengers had gained situational awareness and too matters into their own hands.

There is one final primary data source to consider. Infrared sensors in space recorded the impacts of all four commandeered aircraft on the morning of 9/11.

Here is the data for UA93: Impact time was 10:03:10+/- EDT. Peak intensity was 10:03:16 EDT. Fireball dissipation was 10:03:25 EDT.

For all impacts, therefore, the fireball was visible for about 25 seconds. Thereafter, black smoke was visible. I can confirm that. I was eyewitness to the immediate aftermath of AA77 slicing into the Pentagon. My office window overlooked the south side of the Pentagon. I went to the widow quickly after hearing the impact and feeling its vibration. All I saw was black smoke.

Interactive Google Earth

Here is a link to Google Earth, a plot that includes both the takeover and the final moments. Click on the projects icon in left vertical menu bar and then click on any data point for detailed information.

https://earth.google.com/web/search/40+04+04.0N+78+55+02.0W/@40.70291619,-80.51713731,335.89216638a,342739.3773278d,30.00003404y,0h,0t,0r/data=CigiJgokCSSGcxn2DkRAEX2pJ_zxDURAGcTrm-ZXu1PAIZeFMCeJvFPA

Addendum October 9, 2014

This addendum makes one correction and adds a PDF of my May 15, 2014 appeal letter. Based on the date of that letter it took NSA not quite five months to reconsider. Here is a link to my appeal.

IR Appeal Letter May 2014

Data Release

On October 4, 2014, I received a letter from the National Security Agency, Central Security Service, dated September 23, 2014.  The letter responded to Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) case 70401 (NARA case number NW 168), my appeal to an earlier complete denial of all infra-red related information.

The release authority has now provided graphic analysis of the data for all four impacts, as originally provided to the Commission. The times, in all cases, are consistent with the times established from radar files and air traffic control tapes.

Here is the transmittal letter for the information release.

NSA MDR Letter Sep 23 2014

I addressed the total denial of all infra-red related information in a short post on March 25, 2014 under “Current News.” It took just over six not quite five months for the National Security Agency to reconsider. I based my appeal narrowly, asking only for the infra-red impact times, and nothing else. That is perhaps a lesson learned  for researchers and historians, present and future.

Background

The 9/11 Commission Staff requested infra-red data concerning the impacts of the four hijacked airplanes on September 11, 2001.  The staff took that extra step because an analysis of seismic data by a separate individual reported a impact time for United Airlines Flight 93 three minutes after the 10:03 EDT impact time as determined from radar files and air traffic control tapes.

It is important to know that the later time, 10:06 EDT, was not a seismic data time. It was the extrapolation and interpretation of seismic data by a single individual. His coauthor and the sponsor of his article, the Maryland Department of Natural Resources, chose not to validate and verify his work when asked to do so by the Commission Staff. Instead, they simply referred the Staff back to the person who had made the extrapolation. I addressed the seismic issue in detail in an article published in 2010.

In 2011 during a visit to the National Earthquake Center, Golden, Colorado, I informally asked the staff there to take a look at the interpretation that led to a time of 10:06 EDT. They, too, declined, and simply referred me back to the original author.

The Staff Request

The original request is “Document Request No. 4-34: Final data from the Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center (DEFSMAC) that established the time of impact for each of the hijacked aircraft.” The response to the Commission was classified “SECRET//X1” and was titled (U//FOUO) NSA’S ANSWERS TO DoD DOCUMENT REQUEST No. 4-34.” The response is annotated NW#: 168 DocId: 8977.

The Response

There are two graphs that are accurate to the minute and the approximate seconds for each impact, if extrapolated. The following chart depicts my current extrapolations. The intensity measurement is in Kilowatts per microsteradian (KW/sr-μ).

Flight	Impact Time	Intensity
AA11	8:46:30+/-	250 KW/sr-μ
UA 175	9:03:10+/-	3500 KW/sr-μ
AA 77	9:37:30+/-	900 KW/sr-μ
UA 93	10:03:10+	2000 KW/sr-μ

One graph depicts the times for all planes except UA 93. A second graph pertains to UA 93 and incudes a peak intensity time centered on 10:03:16-17+, and a dissipation time of 10:03:25+  Peak intensity was recorded as 5000 KW/sr-μ.  That graph provides an approximate measure of the time the fireball was observable, a period of about 15 seconds.

There is no data to indicate that DEFSMAC considered peak intensity for the other three impacts.

I do not recall making an extrapolation while on the Commission Staff. It was clear from the graphs provided that the infra-red times were consistent with other primary source data.  In particular, the infra-red data was conclusive for a 10:03 EDT impact time for UA 93, not 10:06 EDT, as had been speculated.

Here is the graph titled: “Aircraft Impacts – NY & DC, 11 September 2001 – IR Intensity vs Time (Zulu)”

IR impact times AA11 UA175 AA77

Here is the graph titled: “Impact of United Flight 93 – Pennsylvania, 11 September 2001 IR Intensity vs Time (Zulu)”

IR Data UA93

Conclusion

This completes my work on all speculation that the seismic extrapolated time is relevant to the impact on UA 93. It is not, now, and never was. All such speculation is based on the work of a single individual who informed the Commission Staff that the seismic data, itself, was not conclusive.

At some future time a scientist or engineer will examine the original raw data—seismic, radar, and infra-red—and will find that the three data sets are consistent.

Addendum added Feb 27, 2014

Here are links that provide additional insight into my work on the UA 93 story.

Seismic data considered

A 2009 article with a graphic showing tracks

Introduction

A correspondent recently contacted me to discuss the relationship of United Airlines flight 93 (UA 93) and Gofer 06, the Minnesota Air National Guard C130H.  The correspondent speculated that there was an important relationship which was crucial to an incident time of 10:06 for UA 93.  The 10:06 time was an extrapolation from seismic data by a single individual who, when queried by the 9-11 Commission Staff, agreed that the seismic data was not conclusive concerning UA 93.

Nevertheless, the correspondent concocted this explanation:

I need to review the testimony of C-130 pilot Captain Steve O’Brien before the 9/11 Commission. What he had to say is highly relevant. Why? Simple. That morning, O’Brien had a bird’s eye view of the Shanksville crash site – and was in position at the right moment to be a witness to whatever happened at 10:06 AM, which is the crash time indicated by the seismic signal.

At that very moment, he was in the cockpit of his C-130 looking straight at the crash site from 24,000 feet, after being prompted by the Cleveland ATCs.

Are you aware of what O’Brien told the commission? Do you know if his testimony has been released? I have searched for it without success. Did the commission ask him what he saw at Shanksville?

The issue looks to be of primary interest, because it does appear that someone tampered with the 20-page transcript of the real time conversation that O’Brien had with ZOB Cleveland ATCs, on the morning of 9/11.

I believe that transcript offers some powerful clues about what transpired. I am attaching the file below. It’s pretty big — apologies for the size. Or you can download it at [https://www.911datasets.org/]

The file includes a number of transcripts. The relevant ATC transcript has 20 pages. The key page is 18 of 20. You will notice that at 1405:45 O’Brien mentions that he sees smoke at the site. But, notice, he says the smoke is at 3,000-5,000 feet. There is no indication it rose from the ground, i.e., from a crash. This is an extremely important detail, as we shall see.

Then, after 1406:27, something strange happens. Four minutes of the transcript, from 1407-1411, appears to have been deleted. It’s gone!

Why do you think?

Could it be because O’Brien saw the unspeakable, i.e., saw a cruise missile crash at 10:06 AM — and reported this to the ATCs? This observation, had it been reported to the commission and/or made public, would have exposed the entire official 9/11 story as a HUGE lie, and at the same time would have revealed a criminal conspiracy in the act of “cleaning up” flight UAL 93, which had turned into a fiasco.

I now suspect that the Shanksville witness [redacted] saw a cruise missile just before it crashed — not a UAV. She told me it was “tubular” and “cylindrical” and had fins — but no wings. This sounds like a missile.

But why a cruise missile? Well, if the perpetrators decided to terminate UAL 93 by detonating explosives which had been pre-planted on the aircraft — they still needed a crater in the ground to serve as the basis for a cover story that UAL 93 had crashed, when in fact it was exploded at 3-5,00 feet.

Any help you can provide in locating O’Brien’s testimony before the commission would be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely for 9/11 truth,

Perspective

I interviewed Lt Col O’Brien by telephone. The interview has not been released, according to the National Archives. My contact there reports that they have found a pointer to the interview and they will have it reviewed for release. I do not recall if the report of interview was an MFR or a recording.

O’Brien was asked the key questions.  Did he at any time at all see a military aircraft and/or any evidence of a missile?  Was he armed, had his C130H ever been armed, had any C130H model ever been armed? O’Brien responded in the negative to that round of questions.

I have again reviewed the transcript, the radar, and the audio files.  The correspondent distorted the story.  O’Brien never had a birds eye view. He was never prompted by air traffic control.  He initiated the report of smoke.  He was briefly considered as a candidate aircraft to circle the crash site but was not so tasked. A civilian aircraft was vectored to circle the crash site and provide GPS coordinates.

This is an old story, recycled.  Now is a good time to set the record straight.

Air Traffic Control Communications

The tape of interest is file 148-911-03003840k.s1, the Cleveland Air Traffic Control Center tape of Imperial Sector for the period 1340-1418 UCT (0940-1018 EDT).

Gofer 06 checked in, routinely, shortly before 10:03 EDT reporting an altitude of “two four zero” (24,000 feet.) Here is that exchange.

1002 Gofer 06 Checks in

A minute later, air traffic control turned Gofer 06 to a heading of 030 (North North East) away from the projected path of UA 93. Concurrently, Cleveland Center was losing UA 93 on radar, telling Gofer 06 that he was heading east, but now turned to the south.

The radar clearly shows the turn to the south to be the plunge to earth. UA 93 impacted during this conversation with Gofer 06.

1003 Gofer 06 Turned to 030

Over a minute later, Gofer 06 was told he would be run north about 26 miles before a return to original heading.  Gofer 06 then volunteered a report of black smoke at his “9 o’clock” (easterly).  The pilot could not tell if the smoke originated from the ground or from the air. Air traffic control was satisfied with the report and cleared him “direct Dryer,” about 10:06. The radar shows that Gofer 06 did return to original heading at that time.

1005 Gofer 06 reports black smoke

None of O’Brien’s report or subsequent conversation with air traffic control correlates to a speculated crash time of 10:06.  It is clear from this primary source information that UA 93 was down well before that time.  O’Brien was not queried further by air traffic control about anything that might have happened in the 10:06 time frame.

The Next Five Minutes

The Correspondent claimed, “Four minutes of the transcript, from 1407-1411, appears to have been deleted. It’s gone!”  That is a misinterpretation of the transcript. Here is what the certified transcript (ZOB-ARTCC-287 N591UA(UAL 93) for Imperial Sector actually contains:

1406:27 GOF06 ok direct dryer gopher zero six
1407
1408
1409
1410
1411
1411.11 UNKN (unintelligible)

Here is the actual audio for that nearly five-minute period during which there were no transmissions. All the transcriber was doing was noting, for the transcipt record, the minutes that were passing with nothing to transcribe.

1007 Five Minutes no transmission

Crash Site Confirmation, Gofer 06 Considered, Not Tasked

Once Gofer 06 returned to original heading its path took it a few miles north of the crash site. The controller advised another controller that he could vector Gofer 06 to verify the crash site. This next conversation, an internal one at Cleveland Center, confirms that Cleveland had used a different plane and that the “lat long” of the crash site had been verified.

1011 Positive ID Gofer 06 not tasked

Grounding all flights

The order by the FAA’s Air Traffic Control System Command Center to ground all airplanes played out differently at different locations.  The emphasis was on grounding commercial traffic.  There was initial confusion as to whether or not the order pertained to military and emergency response aircraft. Here is how that order played out in the airspace controlled by Cleveland Center that included Gofer 06.

 1015 Only One in Air is a Military Plane

After that internal Cleveland Center conversation, the controller thought that he should ask Gofer 06 why he was still in the air.  Gofer 06 responded, no one told me to land. Gofer 06 then asked if anyone else was in the air. The last thing heard on the tape is the Cleveland controller telling Gofer 06 that “he would expand,” meaning he would zoom out so his scope would display a larger area.

 1017 No One Told Me to Land

Grounding of All Traffic, A Comment

One air traffic control facility posed a direct question about the status of military and emergency response flights.  I believe the question came from National TRACON and that the answer was that such flights would be allowed. I will update with that audio clip when I find it.

At no time was Gofer 06 told to land, nor were other military aircraft in the air. The only specific restriction to all flights, regardless of status, was a warning not to enter Class B airspace in the DC area. Those warnings started after 10:05 EDT.