Month: March 2012

9-11: History Commons; a good compendium, not a reliable source

Introduction

A correspondent recently asked me to track down a specific audio clip, the “Oh My God,” reaction by an Identification Technician at the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS)  That search led me to the History Commons timeline and information that was at once helpful but also erroneous.  My purpose in this article is to provide insight for researchers, historians, and academicians who routinely use History Commons as a reference or source.  I personally use the timeline and have a link to it on my home page.

My 9/11 Commission Experience

The antecedent to the History Commons timeline, the Cooperative Research timeline, was the first public domain timeline we used in our staff work.  Early on, as we began to develop our own timeline, we dropped the Cooperative Research timeline because of its inherent inaccuracy.  We found it to be a conglomeration of anecdotal information, derived extensively from eyewitness accounts, participant recall, media accounts, and, as time as passed, published books.  It is not grounded in the primary source information of the day and is, therefore, not reliable.

Post Commission Interest

I followed, with interest, the hearings held by Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney, primarily because one of her witnesses was Paul Thompson. Thompson was instrumental in the creation of the Cooperative Research timeline and my hope was that his testimony would extend that work in a positive direction by correcting the anecdotal record he had created. That did not happen. His testimony was a static reiteration of his understanding of events based on his timeline.  He did not move the analytical ball forward.

The Case at Hand

Here is what the History Commons timeline has to say about NEADS when it learned that American Airlines flight 11 struck the World Trade Center, North Tower.

8:51 a.m. September 11, 2001: NEADS Learns of Plane Hitting WTC, Informs FAA’s New York Center
Technicians on the operations floor at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) receive what is apparently their first notification that a plane has hit the World Trade Center, in a phone call from the FAA’s Boston Center. [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] NEADS ID technicians are currently trying to locate Flight 11, when they are called by Colin Scoggins, the military liaison at the Boston Center. ID tech Stacia Rountree answers the call. In response to Scoggins’s information, Rountree says to her colleagues, “A plane just hit the World Trade Center.” She asks Scoggins, “Was it American 11?” He tells her this is not confirmed. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 50] Another of the ID techs, Shelley Watson, starts murmuring in response to the news: “Oh my God. Oh God. Oh my God.” [VANITY FAIR, 8/1/2006] A computer maintenance technician then runs onto the operations floor and announces that CNN is broadcasting that a 737 has hit the WTC. [SPENCER, 2008, PP. 51]

Here is what I transcribed in 2003 as archived by the National Archives in my work paper “NEADS CDs.”

08:50:30 They dial New York. They show him heading, what did she say north coastal.
Coastal, I didn’t know what she meant. They show him headed coastal now. Primary
only. They’re going to give us 3 and 5 minute updates on lat lons. Dialed number didn’t
go through
08:50:03: That last lat long was 4039 7403W. They’re going to give us 3 and 5 minute
updates.
08:50:08: (In background. A plane just….) What? A 737. Like the WTC. Who’re you
talking to. Oh my God. Oh God. Oh my God. (Dooley) Update New York. See if
they lost altitude on that plane all together

With that background we can now refer to the NEADS audio files and find out what happened, in context.

First Air Force

Shortly after 0850 EDT, Sergeant Watson took a call from Sergeant Tibbets, First Air Force Public Affairs.  Tibbets was seeking information about the hijacked airplane and in the course of the conversation told Watson, “Wait a minute, a plane just hit, a plane hit the World Trade Center, I just saw that on the news.”  He then said “it may be a 737.”  [DRM1, Channel 7,cut 123030] 0850 First Air Force Call 

Here is how that call and the reaction was recorded on a different channel. [DRM1 Channel 5, cut 122917] 0851 Watson First Air Force Patch to MCC

The reaction to the call was recorded on yet another channel. [DRM1 Channel 4, cut 121806].  The “Oh God” voice is not that of Watson, she was on the call with First Air Force.  The voice is that of Stacia Rountree.  0850 Oh My God Reaction

The patch to the Mission Crew Commander was answered by Sergeant Joe McCain, the Mission Crew Commander/Technician (MCC/T).  It is his voice that sounds like Colin Scoggins when heard on the MCC channel.  Here is the continuation of the First Air Force Call as recorded at the MCC/T position.  Note that there are multiple conversations going on, to include one involving Major Nasypany, the MCC.  0852 First Air Force Call McCain  [DRM1 Channel 3, cut 123212]

And here is how all that came together as recorded at the MCC position, where, out of context, McCain’s voice sounds like that of Colin Scoggins. 0852 the MCC Perspective [DRM1, Channel 2, cut 121800]

Nearly 5 minutes later, Colin Scoggins at Boston Center became aware of the impact at the World Trade Center and that information was shared immediately in the course of a conversation between Sergeant Watson and Scoggins.  As we pick up the audio, NEADS found the Boston line to be busy but Watson persisted in dialing anyway and reached Scoggins.  In the latter part of the call we hear Master Sergeant Maureen Dooley on the phone.   Dooley Obtained a critical piece of information, the tail number for AA11, N334AA. [DRM1 Channel 7, cut 123304]  0855 Watson Scoggins Dooley AA11 

Assessment

It is clear from this event that it is not possible to use the NEADS tapes out of context or in isolation, one channel from another.  It takes a concerted effort across all channels to gain an accurate picture of what is actually happening.  It is always useful to start with the MCC channel, channel two, because the MCC position was the focal point for decisionmaking.  Moreover, it was the MCC, and the MCC only, who constantly updated the Battle Cab, specifically Colonel Marr, the NEADS commanding officer.

Understanding of this single event required audio recordings from 5 different channels; the MCC, the MCC Technician, and three devoted to the Identification Technicians.

It is also clear from this event that the History Commons timeline is unreliable as a definitive source.  It is useful to gain a starting point for analysis but it cannot and should not serve as the analytical answer because of its reliance on anecdotal information.

9-11: Air Force One; the return to DC, an uneventful flight

Introduction

A correspondent asked me what I knew about the return flight of Air Force One to the nation’s capital.  I had not previously looked at the event so turned to the primary source information to analyze the situation.  Here is that analysis based on 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron radar files, air traffic control communications from the Federal Aviation Administration’s Washington Center (ZDC), and the audio files of the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS).  The story is interesting but uneventful.  We begin with the radar files.

USAF Radar

Multiple aircraft are mentioned in the ZDC file, which we will discuss shortly.  That discussion, however, requires a picture of where the relevant aircraft were spatially during the time that Air Force One was controlled by ZDC.  I have selected a single time hack, 1809 EDT, to orient the reader.

At that time Air Force One was just completing a 360-degree turn, a holding pattern to allow its fighter escort, Cowry 45, 46 and 47, to catch up.  Even so, ZDC informed Air Force One that the escort was 90 minutes in trail, the red Xes off the chart to the west.

Caps 1 and 2, the Andrews fighters tasked to escort Air Force One on the final leg, were well to the east and had just passed The Plains, Virginia.  A Lifeguard flight, headed southwesterly, was accounted for, but did not impact the return flight.

A low level flight, Mode 3 code 0270 was discussed jointly by ZDC and NEADS; both agreed it had dropped off.  The plane was broadcasting a Mode 2 code indicating it was military-related.  The related target observed by NEADS and ZDC was at low level, 1200 feet and below and some of the returns were beacon only, not radar, hence the difficulty in tracking.

An additional pair of fighters, briefly mention by Mode 3 code, was to the south and circled back to the North and ultimately joined the escort of Air Force One.

Here is a screen shot of the 84th RADES radar file, annotated in powerpoint.

Washington Center (ZDC)

Air Force One was in ZDC airspace from 1800-1816 EDT as it returned the President to the nation’s capital.  The check-in after handoff from Cleveland Center was routine.  1800 Air Force One Checks In (ZDC audio clips come from file 148-911-3007885A-s1.mp3, as archived by NARA in 2004)

At 1802 Air Force One requested a right 360 degree turn after which it would continue on course.  That gradual turn, which covered considerable real estate when projected to the ground, served two purposes.  First, as we shall shortly hear, it allowed fighter aircraft in trail to catch up.  Second, it aligned Air Force One for a direct return just south of The Plains, Virginia, essentially parallel to Interstate I66. 1802 Right 360 Request Approved  At 1803, ZDC notified an unidentified air traffic control entity (Linden?) about the 360-degree turn.  1803 Air Force One Doing a 360  

At 1805 an Identification Technician at NEADS, Sergeant Lisa Raymond (digraph Lima Romeo), called to resolve Mode 3 code 0270.  ZDC and NEADS agreed that the track had dropped out.  It was sometimes a beacon-only (transponder return but not radar return) track at low altitude which may be why it “dropped out.”   The conversation is an example of how NEADS routinely worked with FAA en route centers to resolve tracks of potential interest.  Given the location and altitude the military-related aircraft, squawking a Mode 2 code, would have been under Dulles TRACON control and not ZDC.  1805 0270 Code NEADS ID Tech

Shortly thereafter, at 1806, two things happened simultaneously.  First, Sergeant Richmond called asking why Air Force One was turning and heading the opposite direction.  A background voice answered that “he is doing a 360 at his request.”  Concurrently, Air Force One was calling the same controller with a request.  That exchange tells us why Air Force One was turning.  It was waiting for Cowry, a flight of three F-16s likely still under Cleveland Center control.  The Air Force One cockpit voice asked that they be vectored to him.  1806 NEADS Concern and AF1 Request  

Soon after 1807, ZDC provided an answer to Air Force One.  Cowry 45 [flight lead] was 90 miles behind.  1807 Cowry 45 90 Miles Behind

A minute later, shortly after 1808 a Lifeguard flight made a routine check-in with ZDC.  1808 Lifeguard Flight Checks In  

At 1810 two things came to the attention of the ZDC controller.  First, Cowry 45 reported in and that he was “in the block” [tactical expression?] with Air Force One.  Second, another controller informed that a pair of fighters out of the national area were coming that way to “intercept the group.”  Here the term “intercept” simply means to join up.  They did just that as clearly shown on the depiction of the radar files.  They flew out, spotted and identified the aircraft, and then joined to escort Air Force One.  1810 Cowry 45 Check In Other Fighters Mentioned 

At 1812 the controller was informed by another sector of the presence of a different fighter and that “they know about it.”  That report referred to the second pair of fighters that joined the escort of Air Force One from the south, as depicted in the lower right of the graphic, above.  1812 Other Fighter Reported 

In the 1812-1814 time frame several things happened.  First, Cowry 47 reported in asking for a squawk [Mode 3] and that he was information with Cowry 45.  Second, Cowry 47 confirmed the approach of the fighters [085 direction] from the DC area.  Third, the Life Guard flight was informed and acknowledged the presence of military aircraft.  (The discussion about “Uniform” had to do with a division of labor among the Cowry flight as to who was going to monitor what frequency in which band.  A similar discussion had taken place eight hours earlier when another flight of three fighters, the Quit flight from Langley, also approached the nation’s capital.) 1813 Cowry 47 Other Fighters Life Guard 

At 1816 Air Force One was handed off routinely to Dulles TRACON.  1816 Air Force One Contact Dulles  Other than a  sweeping 360-degree turn to allow escorting fighters to catch up, it was an uneventful flight according to the available air traffic control communications, a primary source.  But we also have available additional primary source audio files, those of NEADS.

Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS)

NEADS began tracking Air Force One well before the flight entered ZDC airspace.  At 1730 EDT the track (B001) and altitude (33000) were reported to Master Sergeant Maureen Dooley (“Mo”)  The technician making the report did not observe any fighters.  He was told the track was being forward told, now, a probable reference to passing the track to Cheyenne Mountain. 1730 Track B001 Air Force One (Channel 4, DRM1, cut 210926)  Immediately, NEADS personnel decided that, according to NORAD, Air Force One was going to Andrews.  1730 Going to Andrews (Channel 4, DRM 1, cut 211022)

The NEADS tapes reveal that the first team was on duty as inferred by the reference to Sergeant Dooley.  In this next clip in the 1740 time frame we hear the voices of both the Mission Crew Commander, Major Nasypany, and the Senior Director, Major Fox.  There was an issue about a Mode 3 unknown 40 miles south of Air Force One which was resolved to be the “Omaha” flight. 1747 Some Familiar Voices (Channel 2, DRM 1 cut 212211)

Shortly after Air Force One checked in with ZDC NEADS controllers were aware of the position and were asking themselves where the fighter escort was.  They did not know. 1801 Wheres Fighter Escort  We know from the ZDC tape that the fighters were well to the west, but NEADS did not yet know they were in trail. (Channel 2, DRM 1, cut 212211)

By 1805, the observation on radar that Air Force One got NEADS attention.  This next clip, over two minutes long, captures how Major Nasypany handled that situation.  He is listening to multiple positions on the NEADS floor, but Sergeant Raymond’s voice comes through loud and clear when she reports that Air Force One is orbiting at the President’s request.  1805 Orbiting at the Presidents Request  (Channel 2, DRM 1 cut 212211)

For the record, here is the continuous conversation between Sergeant Raymond and ZDC concerning both the 0270 zero code and Air Force One.  The NEADS tapes provided to the Commission end on all channels shortly after 2208Z.  1805 Raymond and ZDC AF One 

Observation

Although it appears from the radar picture that Air Force One was unescorted while in ZDC airspace the tactical picture suggests otherwise.  The Cowry flight of three was  present to the west (trailing) and north.  The escorting fighters from the long-established DC Combat Air Patrol were present to the east and south.  In addition, there were two E3’s airborne, one in the Chicago area and one in the DC area.

I will eventually get around to telling the E3 story, one that spreads across most postions and recorded channels at NEADS.  The E3, in effect, mirrored and supported NEADS.  Each had a Mission Crew Commander working under the overall direction of Major Nasypany, the Mission Crew Commander at NEADS