March 2010 – 9-11 Revisited

9-11: FAA Tactical Net; a window into the FBI SIOC

Introduction

The purpose of this article is to document primary source information concerning the Federal Aviation Agency’s (FAA) Tactical Net. The source is Herndon Center tape 5DCC 1923 Ops Phone 5128, Position 28 13-15-1415 UTC. Thanks to the inclination of air traffic specialists at Herndon Center to leave lines open we have a window into FAA Headquarters and, by extension, a brief window into the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC).

The Commission Staff interview with Mike Weikert established who was sitting where in the FAA’s Washington Operations Center (WOC). Pete Falcone was running the Tactical Net, his recorder was Chuck Gaffey. Mike Weikert was running the Primary Net, his assistant was Tom Taffe. A sketch of the WOC positions is in notes from the Weikert interview.

According to Weikert there was “little traffic on his net.” According to Major Chambers at the National Military Command Center nothing was passed on the Primary Net. From notes I took, “virtually nothing being said–dead air space–dropped at some point.”

When I interviewed Taffe he could identify everyone who was on the dais at the front of the WOC, his line of sight was through the operations position for the Primary Net. He could not identify who was operating the Primary Net. According to a memo I prepared, “he could not recall who manned the primary net and was reluctant to place Mike Weikert at that position.”

At some point, the Primary Net was for all intents and purposes merged with the Tactical Net, “dropped at some point” in Chambers words. On the tape for position 28 we hear one potential Primary Net participant, the FBI’s Jeff Bauer at the SIOC come up on the Tactical Net. My assessment is that he did that because the net he should have been on, the Primary Net, was not available. The Primary Net was activated at 9:20; Bauer called at 9:21 and was directed to the Tactical Net as we shall hear.

We begin by identifying position 28 as an open line to the Tactical Net.

Tactical net identified

There was confusion within FAA as to which net was which. At 9:18 Marcus Arroyo, Eastern Region manager called Pete Falcone and asked which net he was on. That conversation can be heard here. 091800 FAA Tactical Net That was two minutes before the Primary Net was activated, an indication that the Primary Net was redundant.

FBI calls seeking information

Immediately after the Primary Net was activated Jeff Bauer called to establish contact with FAA. That request can be heard here. 092100 Bauer SIOC announced. Seconds later he is announced as joining the Tactical Net. That continuation can be heard here. 092116 Jeff Bauer joined tactical net.

Bauer leaves the line open

Bauer did not hang up on the Tactical Net. For the next nearly eight minutes background conversations at the SIOC are heard. It is clear from those conversations that the FBI had no new information and was in the process of getting itself organized at the SIOC. For example, the date of the last World Trade Center attack was discussed. At one point Bauer is heard explaining that he is on the FAA’s “Ops” net. That statement can be heard hear. 092315 FBI on FAA Ops Net

FAA realizes there is an open mike

The window into the FBI SIOC continued for over five more minutes before someone, probably Pete Falcone, realized he had an open mike on his net. That realization can be heard here. 092850 Open Mike on Tac Net

Situation

The time of the open window into the FBI SIOC was just under 8 minutes, from 9:21 to nearly 9:29. That covers the time that the national level was getting itself organized. The FAA’s Primary Net was activated at 9:20. The White House Secure Video Teleconference, chaird by Richard Clarke, was activated at 9:25 and becaome operational at 9:40. The NMCC was in the process of convening a Significant Events Conference which was terminated in favor of an Air Threat Conference. Not one of the three entities, four included the FBI, knew that a fast moving unknown, AA 77, was approaching from the West.

In his testimony to the Commission, Norman Mineta cited a time of 9:20 that he was operational in the President’s Emergency Operations Center (PEOC). Logs of the day, as reported by the Commission in its report, place both Mineta and the Vice President in the PEOC after 10:00.

Mineta was simply wrong in his recall and researchers and writers who argue from a position of accepting Mineta’s testimony have placed themselves in an untenable position. There is no primary or secondary information that supports Mineta’s testimony. Indeed, the convergence of evidence is conclusive that Mineta misspoke and information he claimed pertained to AA 77, in fact, pertained to UA 93.

93, Go pass that

There is one brief background conversation just before 10:15 at Operations Position 28 which suggests that erroneous information concerning UA 93 was being passed along from the FAA’s Washington Operations Center (WOC).

The background voice said, “OK, number one is 93, it’s 20 minutes outside of DC, go pass that.” That brief transmission can be heard here. 101430 UA 93 20 minutes out.

Despite the known status of UA 93, someone at the WOC decided to pass along erroneous information, information that could only have come from a Traffic Situation Display which depicted the new flight plan for UA 93 as entered by Cleveland Center. According to landing records at Reagan National, UA 93 “landed” at 10:28.

The Battle of 9-11, Redux

The attack began at 5:45 when Mohammed Atta entered the National Airspace System at Portland, Maine. The counterattack began when Boston Center declared a hijack at 8:25. The air defense response began when NEADS was notified at 8:40, according to the MCC/T log. The FAA Tactical Net was activated at 8:50. At 9:03 the nation knew it was under attack.

As we have learned in this article it took the national level an additional 15-45 minutes to get itself organized. No one at any level had the situational awareness to accurately inform the National Command Authority which as of at least 10:15 was being misinformed.

To be continued….

9-11: UA 93; airphone call, not a cellphone call

This short article provides an example of how the terms “airphone” and “cellphone” became conflated and confused right from the first reports of use. The pertinent conversation was recorded at Operations Position 28, Herndon Center, a few minutes after 10:00.

Great Lakes Region security notified the FAA Tactical Net of a report from the Oak Brook, Illinois, police that they had received a 911 airphone call from a passenger aboard UA 93 reporting three hijackers with knives and making bomb threats.

Concurrently, in the background another individual passed the information to someone else and substituted the word “cellphone” for “airphone.” That conflation occurred as the report was received by the Tactical Net.

The audio of those conversations can be heard here. 100310 Airphone Call UA 93

A report that the White House, Treasury and State are being evacuated can be heard in the background at the beginning of the audio clip. The time was 10:03, so that was a delayed report. BBC video footage from “Clear The Skies” established that the White House evacuation began sometime after the Pentagon was struck, but before 10:00.

9-11: Chaos Theory; 9:33 to 9:37, a most confused time

Introduction

In an earlier article I stated that at one point Herndon Center became upset with the misinformation being passed on the FAA Tactical Net and broke into a conversation to set the record straight. This article covers a nearly four minute conversation between FAA Headquarters and FBI Boston which conflated and confused information about AA 11, UA 175 and AA 77.

That conversation took place between 9:33 and 9:37. At the same time, Dulles TRACON was alerting the air traffic control system and, by extension, the Secret Service that a primary-only target was bearing down on the nation’s capital. That report reached FAA HQ during this conversation on the Tactical Net, as you will hear.

Nothing in all of the primary source information available better portrays the confusion of the morning and the lack of situational awareness within FAA as a whole.

FBI Boston asks for an update

Both FBI Boston and the FBI’s SIOC (Strategic Information and Operations Center) were on the FAA’s Tactical Net at various times after it was activated at 8:50. The FBI should have been on the Primary Net, but there is no evidence that net passed operational information after it was activated at 9:20.

The first portion of the FBI/FAA conversation can be heard in the following audio clip, the first of three. (The complete conversation was too large to upload as a continuous file) 093300 FAA to FBI Boston, confused report

FAA HQ believed that the two planes that struck the World Trade Center were AA 11 and AA 77. They also understood inaccurately that UA 175 was not involved and had dropped off radar.

FBI attempts to clarify

FBI Boston asked for a recapitulation to make sure it understood what FAA HQ was saying. That conversation can be heard here. 093400 FBI recap

FBI Boston pursued the issue concerning UA 175.

Herdon Center had heard enough

Ricky Bell at the Herndon Center had been listening to all the misinformation. His frustration is clearly evident as he broke into the conversation proudly announcing that the intruding voice was from the “Air Traffic System Command Center, Herndon, Virginia.” Only because Bell decided earlier that morning to leave his line open do we have this window into the real-time information available to FAA HQ.

That segment of the conversation via the Tactical Net can be heard in this audio. 093500 Herndon Center had heard enough

FAA HQ attributed the information that UA 175 had dropped off radar over Indiana to FAA’s Eastern Region. I have consistently held the position that the FAA’s Regions, administrative headquarters, did little to help Ben Sliney and Herndon Center fight the battle of 9-11. There is no better example–in chaos terms–of disruptive feedback into the air traffic control system.

Supervisor provides accurate information, Eastern Region (AEA) reports fast moving “VFR”

Bell then stepped aside, and a supervisor provided a concise and accurate accounting of the four hijacked aircraft, to include UA 93. As he concluded, Eastern Region broke back into the Tactical Net to report a fast moving VFR approaching the White House. The time was 9:36:30, according to the tapes of Operations Positions 28, phone line 5128, and Operations Position 35, phone line 5135, Herndon Center.

Those conversations can be heard on this audio clip. 093600 Herndon clarifies and Eastern Region informs Tac Net about fast moving VFR

Eastern Region concluded by stating that the information came from air traffic control. That was not, in context, a ringing endorsement by Eastern Region. Nevertheless, they did report the information. That is the first time FAA Headquarters was informed of the immediate threat to the nation’s capital.

Concurrently, the Administrator, Jane Garvey was on her way to Clarke’s SVTS conference. FAA records show that she was present at 9:40. Clarke’s account has Garvey reporting that AA 11 and UA 175 were “the two aircraft that went in,” accurate information. His account mentions no other aircraft. Clarke’s account also has Norman Mineta as missing. “At first, FAA could not find him.”

To be continued

In a separate article I will address the impact of the report of a fast-moving aircraft approaching from the West as it played out in real time on the Tactical Net. That article will put the information recalled during interview by Terry Van Steenburgen, FAA, and Nelson Garabito, Secret Service in perspective.

Chaos Theory: 9-11; Delta 1989, flap of a butterfly’s wings

Introuction

No one could have predicted that a plane never under duress could be a center piece in the unfolding events of 9-11. Yet it was and its story became conflated and confused as the government, in particular NORAD and FAA, failed to sort out the events of the day in the aftermath. It was a significant flap of a butterfly’s wings that morning.

In this article we will tell the Delta 1989 story using the best primary source, the actual voices of the people involved. The clarity of my emerging understanding of the story comes about for two reasons. First, I now use the lens of chaos theory to revisit, study and better understand the events of that morning. Second, I now have the luxury of time to parse the audio files of the day in detail and with an overarching theory in place.

Background

I have touched on Delta 1989 in other articles. The radar files show that the paths of UA 93 and D 1989 were such that controllers had to move Delta 1989 out of the way, to cause it to “meander.” We know that NORAD, Colonel Marr and General Arnold in particular, recall watching UA 93 “meander.” We also know that Delta 1989 was the only plane for which NEADS established a track, B-89, and forwarded that track to NORAD. Delta 1989 was the only “hijacked” plane that NORAD would report about in the National Military Command Center’s (NMCC) Air Threat Conference. Delta 1989 took on a life of its own far beyond its mere position as simply one other aircraft aloft.

So, how did all that happen? Here is that story, and we began with a discussion of how chaos built that morning as the nation grappled with unfolding events it did not anticipate, under estimated as they occurred, and, in both real time and the final analysis, did not understand.

Chaos, from Boston to Herndon

Events became chaotic for Boston Center (ZBW) the moment a strange voice was heard on frequency by the controller responsible of AA 11. Boston’s reaction was straight forward, they declared a hijack at 8:25, notified Herndon Center at 8:27, contacted Otis TRACON at 8:34 and NEADS at 8:38. They thought they had things under control and the situation transferred to New York Center (ZNY).

The transfered situation was not immediately chaotic; it was a matter of finding AA 11 spatially, they had it on radar, and projecting a potential destination. All that changed at 8:46 when AA 11 slammed into the World Trade Center north tower and the attack bifurcated. The transponder code for UA 175 changed and changed again as it morphed into a transponding intruder and, UA 175, itself, became a plane of interest.

Watchers around the world saw UA 175 knife into the second World Trade Center tower. What no one knew was that the original attack, itself, had bifurcated, AA 77 went missing and was presumed down. That was chaotic for Indianapolis Center, but not for Herndon Center. The lost report went to FAA’s Great Lake Center and to the DoD’s Rescue Coordination Center, and no further.

In the immediate aftermath of the two-pronged attack on New York Center, Herndon Center and the air traffic control centers did what they could to control chaos; they established bounds, ground stops at key locations.

However, while this was happening ZBW had been assessing the situation. Ever proactive–hijack notification to the military, cockpit notification to planes under its purview–ZBW concluded that there was a developing pattern and it reported its assessment to Herndon Center.

Delta 1989 becomes a plane of interest

ZBW concluded that the pattern was that transcontinental flights to Los Angeles from Boston were being hijacked. There wee three planes that fit that model–AA 11, UA 175, and Delta 1989. They reported that observation to both New England Region, its higher administrative headquarters, and to Herndon Center, tis higher operational headquarters.

That initiative took hold before anything was known about AA 77 outside of Indianapolis Center and Great Lakes Region. It is the most likely source of concern by the air traffic control system that there might be a third plane. That “third plane” was not AA 77, it was not UA 93, it was Delta 1989.

Chaos Theory: 9-11; a critical period, examined in real time

Introduction

The purpose of this article is to pull together multiple topics into a coherent whole to assess information that FAA was receiving and processing in real time. Our source is the audio file for Operations Phone 5115, Position 15, Air Traffic Control System Command Center (Herndon Center).

The line was left open to FAA Headquarters and to the FAA tactical net. That provides historians and other researchers a real time window into the workings of FAA as a whole, thanks to the initiative of a Herndon Center air traffic specialist who decided on his own to leave the line open. No lines or positions were recorded at FAA Headquarters on 9-11.

The Source

In this article we will examine the second of one set of four cassette tapes provided to the Commission by FAA. That tape was digitized and is documented as 5 DCC 1912 Ops Phone 5115, Pos 15 1315-1415 UTC. Historians and serious researchers who want to upload and study the tape can do so here. The upload will take about one-half hour and will be well worth the effort.

My further recommendation is that interested persons make the investment in an audio analysis program such as Adobe Audition. Such an investment will allow you to quickly find and time stamp key conversations and to enhance and clarify background conversations.

One procedural caution. Each FAA tape provided to the Commission has a lead-in certification by a Quality Assurance specialist that the tape is a true recording. The duration of that certification must be measured and subtracted from the time ruler for whatever playback software one is using. The lengths of the certifications vary. For example, the certification for the first tape in the series lasts 59 seconds. The certification on the tape of interest, 1315-1415 UTC (9:15-10:15 EDT), lasts 16 seconds.

Clarification of Some Issues

A close review of this tape resolves some things, clarifies others, and, in my case, provides additional insight into things I worked on while on the Commission Staff

First, it is clear from this tape that the FAA primary net merged with the tactical net. Although the primary net was activated at 9:20 no operational information was ever passed; it was still born, as I’ve stated in a different article.

Second, I have taken the position in several articles that the FAA’s Regions as administrative headquarters had no business in the midst of the battle being fought by Herndon Center. This tape supports that position.

Third, it is now clear that the Herndon Center reference of going to the CARF (Central Altitude Reservation Facility) for military support had nothing to do with scrambling fighters. That was always nonsensical to me, given my understanding of the CARF as I discussed in the final article of the Scott Trilogy. The reference is to obtaining clearance for the E4B, VIVI 36, which had asked Patterson Tower (Wright-Patterson AFB) for clearance to fly a Presidential Support mission to JFK airport.

Fourth, the conflation of information concerning the four incident aircraft and D 1989 is evident throughout. In a recent article I said I would document the point at which Herdon Center had had enough and interrupted to say so. You will hear that interruption and the clarity with which Herdon Center stated what was known.

Fifth, it is clear that information was being passed in real time concerning the fate of UA 93, less so for AA 77. Moreover, if one listens to background voices the passing of information up the chain of command can be heard. There is no question that Headquarters FAA had far more real time information than was made available to Jane Garvery or that she shared with Richard Clarke. The SVTS was activated at 9:25 and was operational by 9:40. Garvey mentioned only AA 11 and UA 175, according to Clarke. Why was that so? SVTS was a closed system; Garvey did not know what her Operations Center knew.

Sixth, it is clear that the evacuation of key government buildings came after the Pentagon incident.

Seventh, it is clear how the terms “air phone” and “cell phone” became conflated. That happened in real time as we shall find.

The Situation at 9:15

The only two planes of interest at Herndon Center and FAA Headquarters were AA 11 and UA 175, both were estimated to have hit the World Trade Center towers. The fact that AA 77 was lost was known within FAA at Indianapolis Center and Great Lakes Region, only.

The only request for military assistance other than Boston Center’s initiative to Otis was by New York Center to Herndon. New York Center called off the request when they learned of the Otis scramble. That brief conversation between Pete Mulligan (ZNY) and Rick Bell (Ops Phone 5110, Herndon) took place at 9:02.

For those interested in real time news reporting, the line at Position 13, Herndon Center was open and Bryant Gumbel’s coverage can be continuously heard clearly in the background.

Chaos unfolds

It started about 9:16 with a suggestion from Boston Center (ZBW) about a warning to aircraft to increase cockpit security. ZBW followed that at 9:20 with concern about D 1989. ZBW had assessed the situation and determined that the hijack profile, from its perspective, was transcontinental flights originating in Boston. The one other flight that fit the profile was D 1989.

We do not hear the false report of AA 11 still airborne, but the aftermath is clearly captured. Metro D. C. was ground stopped at 9:24. Four minutes later Herndon Center asked Cleveland if they had AA 11 on radar; the answer was no. Shortly thereafter everything was ground stopped everywhere.

Herndon Center then initiated a nationwide airborne inventory at 9:31. , Cleveland Center (ZOB) immediately reported shortly after 9:32 that UA 93 had a bomb on board. That was the compelling transmission and chaos began to prevail despite Herndon Center’s best efforts to keep the situation bounded.

9-11: UA93; an air traffic control trilogy, part 1

Introduction

In part 2 we covered how Cleveland Center, ZOB, kept Herndon Center informed. In this article we will go back to Cleveland Center and continue the UA93 story in the voices of the day. We start at the scope level at the Lorain Radar position and will tell that controller’s story up to the time the UA 93 transponder is turned off.

Two things will assist the reader. First, note interlaced conversations with D 1989 and observe that, at the scope level, information concerning D 1989 and UA 93 is not conflated. Second, the following graphic will orient the reader spatially. Times on the graphic are not radar times, they are times taken from the FAA transcript of air traffic control communications at the Lorain Radar Position. The graphic is one a set of powerpoint slides I made in summer 2003.

UA 93 enters Cleveland airspace

The Lorain controller had a busy morning. It took two attempts by UA 93 to check in with him, as heard on these two clips. UA 93 checks in with ZOB and ZOB acknowledges UA 93. The time was 9:25.

Lorain last communicated with the pilot not quite three minutes later, 9:27:30. ZOB UA 93 last normal communication.

The hijacking

Shortly thereafter the controller heard the first indication of something wrong. He could not understand the transmission and did not know what it was or from where it came. The time was shortly after 9:28. Here is what the controller heard. UA 93 first evidence of hijack

As we hear next the controller was busy and it took him a few seconds to react to what was heard. ZOB controller query

Fourteen seconds later the controller heard this transmission on his frequency. UA93 get out of here

Again, the controller did not know what was happening or from where the transmission originated. He began a series of checks to verify the status of UA 93. He asked the pilot to verify his altitude UA 93 FL 350 and then to “ident,” to send a signal that would cause the UA 93 icon to flash on the controller’s screen. ZOB UA93 Ident please. Note the similarity to the approach used at Boston to deal with AA 11. The difference in this case was that UA 93’s transponder was still on

The controller was homing in on UA 93 as the problem. He gave UA 93 two specific instructions, neither of which was followed. He also called a ‘company’ plane, another United flight and asked him to make a maneuver which the controller would be able to observe on his screen.

He then took an additional step. He compared information with other planes in the air. The time was 9:31. Check with UA 1523 and Controller check with AA 1060

Bomb on Board, passed immediately to Herndon

Executive Jet (EJ) 956 also heard the unusual transmissions and interacted with the controller several times as he worked to ensure safety in the sky. Shortly after talking to EJ 956 the controller heard this transmission on his frequency. UA93 Bomb on Board The time was 9:32.

We know that the Controller was talking to his supervisors and suspected the transmission came from UA 93. As we learned in Part 2, Herndon Center had issued an order for an airborne inventory. The ZOB TMU desk responded immediately notifying Herndon that UA 93 had a bomb on board. Herndon knew within seconds what ZOB knew, that there was another hijacked plane in the system and that it was UA 93.

That information would not find its way to Jane Garvey, headed into an SVTS conference with Richard Clarke. As we learned in my SVTS article, Clarke’s first words were to ask for an FAA update. Garvey told him about AA 11 and UA 175 and no other specific aircraft.

Delta 1989 checks in

D 1989 checked in with Lorain at 9:32:30. It became a plane of interest, not because it was hijacked but because it was in the path of UA 93 as it turned and headed back East. D 1989 Checks In. Shortly thereafter an unspecified aircraft checked in and asked if the controller heard a ‘bomb on board.’ The controller, unsure, asks if that is UA 93. Plane asks about Bomb on Board

EJ 956 again interacted with the controller providing supporting information. Note in this next clip that the controller advised another plane to limit conversations with him. ZOB another confirmation controller busy

The controller began to redirect traffic away from UA 93, which he could still see on his screen; it was transponding, he knew where it was and its altitude. Among the aircraft involved was D 1989. Controller vectors other traffic and UA93 spotted, D1989 diverted

Note to Historians, Researchers and Writers

There is a garble in FAA’s partial transcript for the Lorain Radar position as faxed on September 19, 2001 from the ZOB 520 Airspace Office. It is not clear if this was a transcriber error or an error in transmittal. Either way, there is a disconnect between Pages 5 of 15 and 6 of 15 (Fax pages 12 and 13). About two minutes of recorded air traffic control conversation were either not transcribed or not sent. That was an administrative error and has no bearing on our understanding of events. We have the audio files.

UA 93 climbs to the West and turns back East

The chart at the beginning of the article, a plot of data from the 84th RADES radar files, shows that it took Jarrah five minutes to complete the turn back, 9:34-9:39. He was unable to maintain altitude and the plane climbed to nearly 41,000 feet during the turn. Thereafter, Jarrah did not maintain altitude, the plane gradually descended and at one time was a potential threat to Pittsburgh Tower, which evacuated.

The Lorain controller constantly redirected traffic before and during the turn, as heard at these clips. UA93 at Dryer per EJ 956 and Controller redirects traffic

XXXX

Taking Stock, What is and isn’t happening at 9:40

Note that there have been no cockpit warning notifications to pilots in the air. As we discussed in an article about such notifications, that task was a carrier responsibility.

The transponder on the last hijacked plane, UA 93, has just been turned off. NEADS, through the Joint Surveillance System will have only seven minutes to acquire the plane as a target. UA 93 will drop below JSS coverage at 9:47 while approaching the tri-border area between Ohio, West Virginia, and Pennsylvania.

NEADS does not know about this plane and will not know until after it crashes. It has acquired Delta 1989 and has established track B-89 and has forward told that track to CONR and NORAD. It learned of AA 77 shortly before impact and briefly established a track, B-32, which it did not have time to forward tell. Earlier, it had learned about the rebirth of AA 11, as reported to them by Boston Center. That fortuitous misreport actually trigger the Langley scramble, which went astray.

The Langley fighters are now under AFIO (Authority for Intercept Operations) and have been redirected toward the nation’s capital. One of the three planes will fly directly over the Pentagon at 10:00.

23,000 feet directly below the NMCC will be in the midst of an air threat conference which they convened as the Pentagon was being struck. At 9:40 the key agency, FAA, is not on the conference. Concurrently, the NMCC is a participant in a CIA-convened NOIWON along with the FAA security watch seven stories below the FAA’s Washington Operations Center at FAA Headquarters. No real-time information is available on that link

However, seven stories higher the FAA WOC is getting near real time information concerning UA 93. That information is not being shared on FAA’s primary net because that net, activated at 9:20 to include the NMCC, was still born. Concurrently, Administrator Garvey, as of 9:40 is a participant in a just-beginning, closed-system SVTS conference with Richard Clarke. She is disconnected from the WOC and is not aware of the near real-time information being passed by Cleveland Center via Herndon Center to the WOC.

No one at levels above Clarke is effectively engaged. Secretary Rumsfeld has left his office for the Pentagon crash site. General Myers has departed Senator Cleland’s office and is en route the Pentagon. The Vice President is on his way to the PEOC at the insistence of the Secret Service. Secretary Mineta is out of pocket en route the White House to join the Vice President.

AT 9:40 the President is on his way to board Air Force One and departs at 9:55. It is his intention to return to the nation’s capital. Concurrent with the arrival of the Langley fighters to protect the capital the President’s advisors and protectors recommend he not return. At 10:10, with the nation’s capital protected, Air Force One turns west and heads for Barksdale Air Force Base.

At 9:40 aboard UA 93 the passengers and cabin crew are learning of the fate of other hijacked aircraft and of their near certain fate. They begin to take matters into their own hands. They accomplish what no one else at any level can do; they counter-attack, successfully for the nation, tragically for themselves.

9-11: Delta 1989; Addendum, Confirmed not trip by Delta

The purpose of this article is to establish that Delta Airlines did not consider Delta 1989 to be a “trip,” a hijacked aircraft. At 9:55, Herndon Center, Operations Position 27 called Delta asking about the flight. Delta confirmed that it was landing normally at Cleveland.

The primary source audio can be heard here. 095527 Delta 1989 not a trip

Delta Airlines considered the source of the concern about Delta 1989 to be Boston Center, ZBW. ZBW, on its own initiative, had assessed the developing situation and determined that the hijack pattern concerned transcontinental flights departing Boston. Three flights fit that profile: AA 11, UA 175, and D 1989. ZBW shared its analysis, and what was originally an expression of concern by ZBW morphed into speculation that D 1989, itself, had been hijacked.

My understanding, using the lens of Chaos Theory, is that D 1989 became a “strange attractor,” a focal point for attention that could not be predicted. Contorted concern for the flight became disruptive feedback into the air traffic control system during an already chaotic time. An unknown aircraft (AA 77) had just slammed into the Pentagon. Minutes earlier, Cleveland Center had reported that UA 93 had a bomb on board.

The conflation of events concerning D 1989, UA 93 and AA 77 persisted long after the attack was over. Norman Mineta conflated the AA 77 and UA 93 stories. General Arnold and Colonel Marr conflated the D 1989 and UA 93 stories.

All three internalized the events of the day in the immediate aftermath as FAA and NORAD failed to agree on a common timeline. Their misunderstanding of events became the public story, one which persists erroneously to this day.

9-11: War Games; an update

Russian “Missile Shot”

I just rediscovered a short audio conversation at Position 22, Operations Phone 5122, Herndon Center that indicates the National Operations Manager (NOM), Ben Sliney, was aware of the Russian “missile shot.” That primary source information is an update to my first article on “Training, Exercises, and War Games.”

The 8:17 call came from Oakland to Herdon Center asking who the NOM was and to speak with him. Herndon Center asked the nature of the call and was told it had to do with the Russian “missile shot.”

That request can be heard here. 081709 Oakland Sliney Russian Missile Shot There is no known audio recording of Oakland’s conversation with Ben Sliney.

The threat, in perspective

For the first time in the post-Cold War era the Russians had scheduled an air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) live-fire exercise. The exercise was ongoing the morning of 9-11. It had the nation’s attention.

In the course of my staff work I saw the briefing slides prepared for the Chairman JCS intelligence brief that morning. At the Pentagon, General Myers likely saw a slide depicting the ALCM threat to CONUS as part of the brief. I estimate he didn’t spend much time on it; he simply looked to see if the threat had changed.

It was a slide he had seen multiple times over the years. The slide I saw as part of his brief was little different from one I was responsible for maintaining in the early 1980’s while stationed at the Intelligence Center, Pacific supporting the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command.

General Myers likely saw the slide sometime before 7:30. A little more than two hours later terrorists flew a hijacked commercial airliner into the Pentagon. That was not the threat of the day briefed to the Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Addendum March 21, 2010

Background

Herndon Center tape 5DCC 1927 Ops phone 5134 Position 34 1215-1315 UTC provides additional information important to understanding how the Center worked, specifically the Strategic Planning Team (SPT) using the SPO (Strategic Plan of Operations) as the National Airspace System (NAS) operators dealt with the Russian exercise and missile shoot. Position 34 is the National Operations Manager position.

A study done in 2000 on weather processes and product requirements provides insight to both the SPT and the SPO. Even though the study was weather-related the procedures discussed pertain to any of the frequent planning conferences held each day at Herndon Center.

Why are planning conferences so frequent, on the order of every two hours? Because Herndon Center is in business to manage chaos. Nothing is more chaotic than weather. The Butterfly Effect of weather is a defining term for chaos in the literature. Although weather was the primary reason for a planning conference, in this case the conference was used to discuss the Russian exercise.

The study cited also establishes that one of eight large screen displays at the Herndon Center as of 2000 was the “National Traffic Situation Display (TSD).

We pick up the audio from an ongoing “SPO” conference at 8:15. Why 8:15? The Commission Staff requested four hours of tape from every Herndon Center position, 8:15 to 12:15, to cover the time of the four hijackings.

East Coast Discussion

As we listen in, Herndon Center concluded that Boston Center and the Canadians (Montreal) will provide a briefing at the end of the 9:15 SPO, as it was referred to by one participant. The intended audience was the carriers and that participant asked if the European carriers could be included. That first conversation can be heard here. 081505 Herndon Center SPO

Separate Conference Recommended

In this segment we hear the reason for inviting the European carriers. They had “quite a few questions the other night.” Boston Center recommended a separate telecon. That second conversation can be hear here. (Note this is one continuous conversation that I’ve broken up to limit the file size of any one segment.) 081550 separate conference suggested

Time Set and Changed

In this segment we first hear a time of 1400Z (9:00) recommended. Gander suggested a later time, 1430Z (9:30) to make sure every one had the tracks. This is a reference to declared Russian tracks. Russia was required to issue a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM), a copy should be in the Commission master files. That conversation can be heard here. 081653 time set, tracks mentioned

Advise Edmonton and Anchorage

Manchester recommended that Edmonton and Anchorage be advised later in the day, as well. The reason was to make them aware of the Russian restrictions last night (September 10) and what was going to happen tonight (September 11). That conversation can be heard here. 081747 Advise Edmonton and Anchorage

Ben Sliney Working the Issue

In this next conversation we learn that Ben Sliney was dealing last night (September 10) with two issues (Boston/Montreal and Edmonton/Anchorage, two areas). Ben was aware of the impact of last night and what could be expected today (September 11). That conversation can be heard here. 081835 Ben Sliney involved

Russian NOTAM Compliance Mandatory

The last substantive question asked for confirmation that the tracks would be put out. Herndon Center said they would put the tracks out now and a second time with a reminder that compliance with the Prestwick NOTAM was mandatory. That conversation can be heard here. 081913 Compliance with NOTAM mandatory

Perspective

This addendum establishes that Oakland Center called Herndon Center asking to speak to Ben Sliney while a national planning conference was ongoing to address the Russian exercise.

Herndon Center had long established procedures in place to manage extraordinary events. It handled the Russian exercise in a simple and straight forward manner. All parties had their say and consensus was reached on who needed to know what. Russia was in compliance and had issued a Notice to Airmen. The Russian exercise had no impact on the NAS and only limited impact on the existing air defense posture.

Two “areas” are mentioned; Boston/Montreal and Edmonton/Anchorage. We know that the air defense response was to forward deploy air defense fighters in Canada and Alaska and that the dedicated air defense fighters on the east coast carried added fuel tanks and armament.

9-11: VIVI 36; another airborne command post, not a mystery either

This short article concerns a NAOC (National Airborne Operations Center) aircraft, an E4B, stationed at Wright-Patterson AFB. At 9:39, after the nationwide ground stop had been declared, the E4B, call sign VIVI 36, requested clearance from Patterson Tower to fly to Kennedy airport in New York.

The issue was referred to Herndon Center because of the ground stop. Here is the primary source communication with Herndon. The caller was Indianapolis Center, ZID. 093907 VIVI 36 Patterson to JFK

The caller continually refers to the flight as “Presidential support.”

The answer soon came back that someone up the chain of command would have to make the decision. Herndon would not allow the plane to depart. 094217 Answer to ZID on VIVI 36

Situation

The National Military Command Center (NMCC) has just segued from a Significant Events Conference to an Air Threat Conference. The latter had SIOP (Single Integrated Operations Plan) implications according to NMCC officers that Commission Staff interviewed.

Concurrently, a decision was being made as to where the President would fly; he is on his way to the airport to board Air Force One. At the same time, Venus 77, another E4B has told Andrews Tower it is going to take off VFR, initially declaring for either Wright Patterson or Offut and then changing its plan to fly a holding pattern over Richmond, Virginia.

There is nothing remarkable or unusual about any of this activity. It is what we would expect the National Command Authority to be doing, given the unfolding attack, the NMCC’s activation of an Air Threat Conference, and the determination as to where it was the President should fly. It is likely, given the VIVI 36 flight plan request, that one option on the table was for the President to fly to New York.

9-11: Transponders and Ghosts; the search for AA 11

This brief article provides additional evidence that air traffic control was looking for AA 11 after the false report that it was still airborne and possibly heading for the nation’s capital.

Washington Area Ground Stop

On a conference call shortly before 9:24, Herndon Center directed a ground stop into the D. C. metro area; National, Dulles and Baltimore. That action followed the determination, somehow, that AA 11 was still airborne. I am not aware of any primary source information that documents that determination.

Here are the primary source voices, recorded at Position 14, Ops phone 5154 at Herndon Center. 092354 Ground Stop DC area

Radar and TSD Search

It is clear that someone a few minutes later, most likely Herndon Center, observed on a Traffic Situation Display (TSD) that AA 11, on its original flight path, was still in the system and was, according to Herndon Center, crossing the boundary into Cleveland Center’s (ZOB) airspace. Herndon called the ZOB Traffic Management Unit and asked if they had the plane on radar. ZOB checked; they did not. That exchange also occurred at Position 14, Ops phone 5154. 092815 Herndon asks Cleveland about AA11

Note that this recording also confirms Ben Sliney’s order to ground stop everything, everywhere. The time was just approaching 9:29.

Assessment

The latter exchange is clear evidence that there were two AA 11 flight paths in the TSD system. Recall that we established that a new track, AA 11A, had been entered to track AA 11 after it turned south in the vicinity of Albany, New York. Conversations on tapes from New York Center (ZNY) verify that action.

It is clear from this Herndon exchange with Cleveland that the old flight plan was not removed from the system. I recall that there was a later second call to a Midwestern Center, most likely Kansas City, posing the same question as was posed to ZOB. I will add a link to that audio when I find it.

It has long been established that the primary source voice that announced the rebirth of AA 11 was Colin Scoggins at ZBW in a call to NEADS. The conversations in this article show that Colin was not the only one who heard a reference to AA 11.

John Farmer and I believe, intuitively, that the false information concerning AA 11 was conflated from the report by Great Lakes Region that AA 77 had been lost. We continue to work to resolve the issue. My personal estimate, as I’ve voice in several articles, is that the FAA’s regional structure and its focus on incident and accident investigation, interfered with the Herndon counterattack that morning.