9-11 Revisited

In previous articles we discussed the Mission Crew Commander/Technician (MCC/T) log kept at NEADS.  The purpose of this article is to provide historians, researchers, and other interested persons additional information about that important document.

It is the definitive secondary source document of the day to establish what NEADS knew and when they knew it.  Why definitive?  Because it is validated and verified by definitive primary sources, the NEADS and FAA tapes.

Explanation of copies of the log

My estimate is that the Commission Staff archived as many as three copies of the MCC/T log.  I archived one and it is likely that the New York office archived an additional copy.  Dana Hyde archived a third, unannotated copy.  The copy I linked in an earlier article was annotated by either Geoff Brown or John Azarrello while we were at NEADS; that is not my handwriting.

I note that we must have discussed the log with the several non-commissioned officers who performed the MCC/T duty that morning.  We established who made what entries via the handwriting.  For example, “Sgt Bianchi” made the 1324 entry.  Sgt Bianchi’s entries begin at 1240, the initial call from Boston Center.  He turned over the log to Sgt Perry sometime between 1401 and 1407.

A master copy of the log, as forwarded to the Commission via DoD, will ultimately be available when NARA uploads the Commission’s master paper files.  In the interim, the copy archived by Dana Hyde is an accurate rendition of the original log book, less redactions made by NARA.

The original log book, a general purpose ledger available in any office supply store, was and likely still is maintained in a safe at NEADS.  Each morning during our visits the NEADS staff would deliver the original to us for use during interviews; it was returned to them at the end of each day.  The approximate one-inch thick ledger was difficult to copy.  Readers familiar with the process will note that the book was opened to the relevant pages and copied under pressure to flatten the pages as much as possible.

Helpful background

Much work on the NEADS floor was accomplished by trained, experienced non-commissioned officers.  Each of the two key officers, the MCC, Major Nasypany, and the Senior Director, Major Fox, had such senior non-commissioned officers to constantly assist them.

For example, those familiar with the NEADS tapes will recognize that every scramble order that morning was broadcast by Sgt Powell, the SD/T.  Major Nasypany had three MCC/T on duty at various times, Sgt Bianchi, Sgt Perry, and Sgt McCain.

It is worth noting that McCain, Powell, Fox, and the Commander, Colonel Bob Marr, were all on duty the day of the Lufthansa hijacking a decade earlier.  This was an experienced crew, they knew what they were doing.

MCC/T log accuracy

Each critical entry was accurately posted, probably no longer than a minute or two after the fact.  For example, consider the first notification of the day, the call from Boston Center concerning AA 11.  That call was picked up by Sgt Powell a few seconds before 9:38.  It took a minute or two to gain actionable information.  We do not know when Sgt Bianchi actually made the log entry, but we do know that he determined the entry to be 8:40.

That pattern of accurate log entries by Sgt Bianchi continued.  He established the notification time for UA 175 as 9:05 and the notification time for AA 77 as 9:34; both consistent with the primary source audio files.  That pattern continued with Sgt Perry who recorded a notification time for UA 93 as 10:07.

Serious researchers, writers, and historians will appreciate and accept the work done by the non-commissioned officers, the ‘Technicians,’ at NEADS.

A key document thrice misinterpreted.

NEADS staff misread the MCC/T log in their initial review and established a notification time for AA 77 as 9:24, despite primary and secondary source information to the contrary.

NEADS staff again misread the MCC/T log  five days later under questioning by CONR and failed to accurately inform General Moore about the AA 77 notification as he was consulting with FAA, which knew the 9:24 time was not supportable.

NEADS staff, together with Col Scott, again misread the MCC/T log in preparation for the May 23, 2003 air defense hearing before the Commission.  It is then that an erroneous hijack time of 9:16 for UA93 was entered into the public record by NORAD.

Correspondents have called to my attention that Kevin Fenton has blogged about the Commission Staff’s quest to obtain the NEADS tapes.  Let me state up front that I have no quarrel with Kevin or the History Commons Scribd initiative to make available the Commission files.  I have personally found that initiative invaluable.  I have met Erik Larson and applaud the many hours he has devoted to a necessary and critical task.

I have also in other articles cautioned about applying post facto clarity and understanding to facto events.  Here, the caution applies to both the events of 9-11 and to the Commission’s quest to understand and report on those events.  I also cautioned about taking snapshots of the Commission’s work. One such quest was the effort to obtain all available NEADS tapes, which we ultimately did.  One such snapshot is the History Commons glance at a segment of staff work.

Kevin wrote me a private email laying out his analysis which is both interesting and informative.  It is a snapshot of the Commission’s work, one that has the beneficial effect of showing that the Commission Staff was working formal and informal channels at the same time.  That should come as no surprise to anyone who has engaged in such research.  I did respond to Kevin.

Insight provided to Kevin Fenton

I began by stating, “Kevin, that is a fair question.  Let me say up front that, ultimately, it [NEADS production of the tapes] was not nefarious.  So, please don’t try to make anything out of something that is not there.”

I continued: “In several discussions with our DoD POC we worked out how we would proceed.  NEADS would digitize the remaining channels and provide them to us on site during our first visit.  The original tapes were analog, reel-reel.  We found that delivery [on site] to be insufficient for our purposes and we called a halt to the first visit.  NEADS was offering up all the tapes, but it was piecemeal.”

I then explained what we did after we received the audio files.  “Once we received the digitized files then we contracted out a transcription effort.  One firm, Alderson, decided to use a technique of tracking individual voices, which is OK as long as folks understand what they were doing.  I posted an article on this on my website one I realized that [other researchers] were totally askew in their analysis of the Alderson tapes vis D1989.”

I then elaborated on the original transcription effort by NEADS.  “In the course of the NCO’s work [specialist brought in by NEADS to transcribe the tapes immediately after 9-11] NEADS thought it had lost the contents of one recording machine.  Together with DoD we approached the manufacturer, Dictaphone [General Dynamics], and they were able to not only recover all the files but provide them to us in a format which was useful and effective.”

I then summarized: “Bottom line, we ultimately got all the NEADS tapes, it took a while.  In the course of all our work we determined that the two channels that recorded the voices of the WD [Weapons Director, i.e. controller] and the WD/T for the Otis fighters were not recorded.  My work files that run all that to ground have been uploaded by Erik.  We know that the channels were never recorded because we never hear those two voices bleeding over into other tapes.  Please don’t try to make more out of this then is there.”

I concluded: “Kevin, thanks for your continued interest and dedication.  NEADS performed very well that day; not so well in the aftermath.  They had a good story to tell [see Bronner, Vanity Fair] and the blew it, as General Arnold acknowledged.

For The Record

The resolution of the NEADS tapes is documented by DoD in its rolling production spreadsheet.  Let me hasten to caution that this, itself, is a snapshot; the DoD spreadsheet was iterative, at least weekly.  A relevant version of the  spreadsheet is included in this file available on the History Commons Scribd site.  Here is the embedded documentation.

NQRAD/NEADS/Department of the Air Force Materials
The NORAD tapes of interest to the Commission contain 46 channels.
NORAD is currently transferring the information on those channels to compact
disks. Those CDs are scheduled to be delivered to the Commission as indicated
below. The schedule is determined by the real-time process by which each 6-hour,
40-minute channel can be recorded onto a CD.
CDs containing:
• 10 channels were delivered November 5, 2003
• 8 channels are scheduled for delivery by close of business November 10,
2003
• 4 channels are scheduled for delivery by close of business November 12,
2003
• 6 channels are scheduled for delivery by close of business November 14,
2003
• 18 channels are scheduled for delivery by close of business November
19, 2003

Even after we determined the difficulties DoD and  NEADS were having in copying the tapes and a subpoena was issued, it still took weeks for the audio files of all channels to be delivered.  Retrospectively, NEADS could not make a complete delivery during our first visit.

The important question for historians, researchers and writers is: “Were all available tapes provided and considered?”  How the Staff got to an answer of “Yes” is perhaps interesting and informative but it is of no probative value.