{"id":5109,"date":"2011-11-16T20:14:23","date_gmt":"2011-11-17T00:14:23","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/?p=5109"},"modified":"2011-11-16T20:14:23","modified_gmt":"2011-11-17T00:14:23","slug":"9-11-the-andrews-fighters-the-reagan-national-story","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/?p=5109","title":{"rendered":"9-11: The Andrews Fighters; the Reagan National Story"},"content":{"rendered":"

D R A F T (This article needs some fine tuning)<\/strong><\/p>\n

Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n

The purpose of this article is to document for the record the air traffic control communications at the Reagan National TRACON (DCA) concerning the Andrews fighters. \u00a0The positions are F2, Final Radar, archived tape as provided to the Commission by FAA is “1 DCA 101-102 Tape 1-2 F2 1327 – 1450 UTC,” and Krant, Departure Control, archived tape as provided to the Commission by FAAis “1 DCA 99 Krant 1430-1600 UTC.” This article stands alone, narrowly focused on the FAA air traffic control positions most involved with the Andrews fighters. \u00a0I will designate Krant communications as “Krant.” \u00a0All other DCA communications are from the F2 position.<\/p>\n

I am creating this article as backup for my presentation. “9\/11: It Was ‘Chaos Out There,” to be presented on November 17, 2011, at the Air Force Historical Foundation and Air Force Historical Studies Office 2011 Biennial Symposium<\/a><\/strong>, “Air Power and Global Operations, 9\/11 and Beyond.”<\/p>\n

I am on the first panel, “9\/11 and Operation Noble Eagle,” along with Maj. Gen Larry K. Arnold, USAF (Ret) and John J. Farmer, Jr., Dean, Rutgers School of Law, Newark.” \u00a0Here is a link<\/a><\/strong> to the Symposium agenda.<\/p>\n

We begin the Reagan National story with the first hint that change is in the air.<\/p>\n

0950 – 1000<\/strong><\/p>\n

0952. \u00a0<\/strong>DCA informed Patuxent (a military training area between Washington and Langley\/Norfolk), “Do not let anybody in the Washington area. \u00a0Tell ’em to go someplace and land.” \u00a00952 Don’t let anybody in Washington area<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

0957.<\/strong>\u00a0The arrival of the Langley fighters came to the immediate attention of DCA TRACON. \u00a0Even though the arriving planes were under the control of FAA’s Washington Center, DCA TRACON and other air traffic control facilities immediately recognized and acknowledged the presence of fighters in the area. \u00a0In this next clip the DCA controller told a caller from Andrews Tower, “I don’t know who they are, but they’re somebody. \u00a0Don’t worry about it, OK. \u00a0They’re up high, they’re fighters.” \u00a0The caller had asked if DCA knew who “those three emergencies” were, squawking about twenty thousand. \u00a0The reference “emergencies,” refers to the fact that the Langley fighters were under AFIO, Authority For Intercept Operations, and were squawking 7777, the code for such operations.\u00a00957 They’re up high they’re fighters<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

0959. \u00a0<\/strong>DCA again told a caller do not land in his area. \u00a0“They don’t want anybody in Washington airspace. \u00a00959 No one in Washington air space<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

So what do me make of the activity at DCA?<\/p>\n

My Assessment.<\/strong><\/p>\n

<\/strong>\u00a0Earlier, at about 0934 when the alarm about the fast moving unknown (AA 77) was sounded, DCA TRACON established an open line with the Secret Service. \u00a0It can, therefore, be assumed that when the DCA uses the pronoun”they” in this context the reference is to the Secret Service. \u00a0These three communications, taken together, have to do with Presidential movement, the flight of Air Force One to the nation’s capital. \u00a0Air Force One took off in Florida at 0955 EDT and headed directed toward Washington D. C. until 1010, at which time it turned west and headed for Louisiana.<\/p>\n

This primary source information provides a glimpse into the advanced preparations for the arrival of Air Force One. \u00a0Those preparations translated into a general shootdown order as a protective measure, not one issued in response to a specific aircraft. \u00a0The Secret Service reports and actions will get more interesting as we examine the next time frame.<\/p>\n

1000-1010<\/strong><\/p>\n

The first of the Andrews fighters returning from the range at Dare, North Carolina showed up in air traffic control channels. \u00a0Concurrently, several things happened involving the Secret Service. \u00a0At 1003 it provided an erroneous report that a Northwest airline was inbound to Washington D.C. from Pittsburg and was unaccounted for. \u00a0That was probably a garble, more likely a reference to UA 93 approaching from the Northwest. \u00a0Here is that report as recorded at Herndon Center on phone line 4530. \u00a01003 SService reports NW airliner headed to DC<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Shortly thereafter, at 1004, \u00a0the Service directed a periodic broadcast from Andrews Tower announcing that Class B airspace<\/a><\/strong> was currently closed. \u00a0All aircraft were advised to avoid Class B airspace. \u00a0Any intrusion would result in a shootdown. \u00a01004 Class B airspace closed<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Class B airspace can extend as high as 18,000 feet, but the ceiling is generally lower. \u00a0Class B airspace is the domain of the TRACON, in this case Reagan National. \u00a0Because of the direct link between DCA and the Secret Service the order pertained strictly to the nation’s capital and only to that airspace under local control. \u00a0Andrews Tower was an additional tower in the Reagan National controlled area.<\/p>\n

Concurrently, DCA passed the alert to Herndon Center. \u00a0Herndon, in turn, passed the warning to Washington Center (ZDC). \u00a0100442 DCA passes Secret Service warning<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

And, in the same time frame, Herndon Center learned that major Washington D.C. buildings were being evacuated, including the Capitol and the White House.\u00a0100224 White House Capital being evacuated<\/a>\u00a0\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

Bully Two showed up in the middle of all that activity. \u00a0DCA had just passed the Secret Service alert to BWI TRACON and was told by Swan position, Washington Center, about a hand off. \u00a0DCA told Swan to turn the plane around, but quickly changed that order when the DCA controller learned that it was Bully Two. \u00a010004 Bully Two returns<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Here is the series of clips concerning Bully Two from a DCA perspective. \u00a0The critical information needed was whether or not he was armed and, if not, could he be armed at Andrews. \u00a0To expedite Bully Two’s approach DCA cleared him direct to Andrews.<\/p>\n

\u00a01006 Are you armed<\/a>\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a01007 Can you be armed<\/a>\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a01008 Bully Two unable for fuel<\/a>\u00a0\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

It is clear from this sequence that the DCA controller was communicating with the Secret Service and was relaying questions. \u00a0We can surmise that the plan was to use Bully Two, in some fashion, as an asset in the air. \u00a0This, despite the fact that the Langley fighters had already established a CAP over the nation’s capital and were available, as was known to FAA controllers and was surely known to the Secret Service.<\/p>\n

The first plan for Bully Two was to keep him in the air. \u00a0When he reported he was not armed the plan changed to land him, get him armed, and then back in the air. \u00a0That plan included a check on his fuel status.<\/p>\n

Despite that flurry of activity, Bully Two was not relaunched. \u00a0Commission Staff was told that he was a new pilot and that the Wing waited for Bully One and Bully Three to return.<\/p>\n

At 1010. the situation was that Bully One had returned and was available. \u00a0The Langley fighters had established a West-East CAP at 23,000 feet. \u00a0The E4B, Venus 77, was establishing a North-South, 60-mile leg orbit centered on Richmond, Virginia. \u00a0Bully One and Bully Three were en route North from Dare Range, North Carolina. \u00a0At 1010, Air Force One turned away from \u00a0its approach to the nation’s capital and turned West.<\/p>\n

1010-1020<\/strong><\/p>\n

We learned in the Nasypany articles<\/a><\/strong>\u00a0[link is to Part V] that the situation quieted down at NEADS during this time. \u00a0UA 93 and D 1989 had been accounted for and there was nothing on the horizon, air defense-wise. \u00a0The battle was over.<\/p>\n

That quiet interlude was mirrored at DCA. \u00a0The only thing of note during a nearly ten minute period was DCA learning that tanker support for the Langley fighters had arrived. \u00a0Washington Center, Swan Center, reported “tankers at nineteen seven [19,700 feet].” \u00a01016 Tankers at nineteen seven<\/a>\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

The quiet was interrupted by the return of Bully One. \u00a0DCA told the caller to “bring him home.” \u00a0The flight plan said the flight of two was landing at Patuxent. \u00a0That was changed and DCA was told “he will be coming to you.” \u00a01019 Bully One flight of two F-16s<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

In summation, as of 1020 the air defense battle was over. \u00a0Bully Two had recovered to Andrews and Bully One, flight of two, was approaching the nation’s capital. \u00a0Activity would again pick up at DCA as it dealt with the emerging Andrews situation.<\/p>\n

1020-1030<\/strong><\/p>\n

At 1022 a called asked if DCA was aware of a hijacked aircraft in the area. \u00a0DCA responded that it was. \u00a0The called asked where it was. \u00a0DCA responded, “we don’t know exactly.” \u00a0The caller responded, “is he coming from the West?” \u00a0Answer: “Yes.” \u00a01022 You aware of a hijacked aircraft<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

At this time it was still not known what aircraft hit the Pentagon and this could be a reference to either AA 77 or UA 93.<\/p>\n

At 1023 Dulles reported a helicopter, a medivac out of Hagerstown, that wanted to return to Davison [Fort Belvoir]. \u00a0DCA strongly advised against the return, “he will be shot down.” \u00a01023 Medivac Hagerstown to Davison<\/a><\/strong> \u00a0Hagerstown was the point of origin of the revised flight plan for United 93 as filed by Cleveland Center.<\/p>\n

At 1027, Bully One was cleared direct to Andrews. \u00a01027 Bully One cleared direct Andrews<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

At 1028, DCA learned that United 93 was no longer being shown in the system. \u00a0This is a reference to the flight plan system and to the associated traffic situation display. \u00a0 The flight plan entered earlier by Cleveland Center terminated the flight at Reagan National at 1028. \u00a0That termination was recognized immediately by someone in the FAA system and reported in near-real time to DCA. \u00a0United 93, which crashed at 1003, ceased to exist, even notionally, before Bully One landed. \u00a01028 United 93 no longer in the system<\/a>\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

At 1029, DCA asked Swan if he was talking to Quit 25. \u00a0He was. \u00a0DCA said he would get back to him, he thought Secret Service might have a question for him. \u00a0It is clear from this exchange, as heard in real time, that DCA was talking to the Secret Service. \u00a01029 Are you talking to Quit 25<\/a>\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

As of 1030, there was no known threat, real or notionally. \u00a0United 93 was not an issue. A helicopter was attempting to return to Davison Air Field from Hagerstown, as reported by Dulles TRACON. \u00a0Bully One, flight of two, was cleared to land. \u00a0The Secret Service knew that the Langley fighters were in the area. \u00a0DCA was standing by to relay questions to the Langley flight lead, Quit 25, via Swan.<\/p>\n

There was no apparent need to launch Andrews fighters, yet they were sortied, as we shall learn.<\/p>\n

1030-1040<\/strong><\/p>\n

First, at 1030, DCA relayed a message to Krant to have the Langley lead, Quit 25, change frequency so he could talk to Reagan National directly. \u00a01030 Have Quit 25 change frequency<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Within a minute, Quit 25 was talking directly to DCA. \u00a0He was told, “Secret Service wanted you on this frequency.” \u00a0Quit 25 said, “go ahead” and was then told to “stand by a second.” \u00a01031 Secret Service wanted you on this frequency<\/a>\u00a0\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

For the next minute, DCA was off microphone most likely talking to the Secret Service. \u00a0The DCA controller then came back to Quit 25 at 1032 and in a nearly two minute conversation verified four things. \u00a0First, he confirmed that the fast movers at altitude 240 and 250 were with Quit 25. \u00a0Quit 25 confirmed that they were his number two and number three wingmen. \u00a0Second, \u00a0he confirmed that there was no traffic in the Washington area. \u00a0In other words, no targets. \u00a0Third, he confirmed that fast movers to the east were part of the operation. \u00a0Quit 25 confirmed that they were his refueling aircraft. \u00a0Finally, he confirmed that the military had control of the airspace and that DCA would simply act as a relay. \u00a01032 The air picture established by DCA and Quit 25<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

At this point we lose the Bully One story as he switched to Andrews Tower frequency. \u00a0I will come back to that later, but let me summarize here. \u00a0At first, Bully One was told to proceed to E ramp to get armed. \u00a0At about 1036 those directions were coutermanded and Bully One reported that he had orders from his commanding general to get back in the air. \u00a0We will pick him up again when he switches back to a DCA frequency.<\/p>\n

At 1033 Krant advised Swan of some primary targets northwest of Washington and asked that the information be passed to the Langley fighters. \u00a0Krant confirmed that he was talking to Quit 25. \u00a0Krant also learned that military aircraft could return to base. \u00a0Specifically, the medevac helicopter from Hagerstown had permission to return to Fort Belvoir. \u00a01033 Krant military aircraft can return to base<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Meanwhile, Quit 25 addressed an unresolved issue with DCA. \u00a0NEADS had been under the impression for some time that a “First, flight of four” from Langley were in the air as part of the support package for the return of Air Force One. \u00a0That information had been passed to Quit 25 and he asked DCA about it at 1036, the same time as Bully One was receiving orders to get back in the air. \u00a0DCA confirmed with Washington Center that there was no “First, flight of four” from Langley. \u00a01036 No First flight from Langley<\/a>\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

At 1038, Krant position, Bully One’s departure for radar intercept was announced. \u00a01038 Krant Bully One departure for radar intercept<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

During the next two minutes, DCA talked primarily to Quit 27, the first time we hear his voice. \u00a0DCA confirmed the CAP configuration (East-West) and the identity in the air of each of the three Langley fighters. \u00a0He also learned that Quit 26 was in direct contact with Huntress (NEADS). \u00a0At 1040, Quit 25 was advised that an F16 \u00a0([Bully One] had just departed Andrews. \u00a01038 CAP discussed<\/a>\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a01040 F16 just departed Andrews<\/a>\u00a0\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

At 1039, Bully One checked in with Krant and asked for instructions to check out an aircraft flying down the river. \u00a0He was given instructions to check out what aircraft it was. \u00a0He was told to head toward Georgetown. \u00a01039 Krant Bully One checks in for instructions<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

As of 1040, DCA was communicating with Secret Service and was acting as a relay from the Service to the Langley lead, Quit 25. \u00a0DCA knew the Langley CAP configuration and had identified each of the three aircraft in it. \u00a0The DCA controller knew that the Langley flight was talking to Huntress [Quit 26]. \u00a0He also confirmed that the Langley flight knew about its tanker support, to include location. \u00a0Bully One had launched and was told to head toward Georgetown. Despite that air defense protection of the nation’s capital the first Andrews response, the relaunch of Bully One, heralded another chaotic event, the merger of the Langley and Andrews fighters into a coherent operation.<\/p>\n

1040-1050<\/strong><\/p>\n

At 1040, the refinement of the Langley CAP and its control continued. \u00a0Quit 25 advised DCA that the Langley flight would need to cycle through the tankers one at a time. \u00a0That would require some coordination by DCA. The DCA controller was also advised that Huntress (NEADS) wanted to talk to him. \u00a0A number was provided by Quit 27. \u00a0Presumably, that number was then available to the Secret Service. \u00a01040 Tanker support and give Huntress a call<\/a>\u00a0\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

At the same time, Bully One was told that the airspace belonged to the military for the operation [Huntress\/Langley], that there were several helicopters in the area, and nothing else, right now. \u00a0Bully One reaffirmed that he was sent aloft for a target. \u00a0Krant responded, “that information probably came through your source, not ours.” \u00a0Concurrently, in a comms over ride, the launch of the first pair of Andrews fighters, Caps flight, was announced. \u00a01040 Info from your source not ours<\/a>\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

Krant continued to work with Bully One at the same time that Caps one was checking in. \u00a01041 Krant Bully One and Caps One<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Concurrently, for several minutes, DCA continued to work with the Langley flight to coordinate squawks and tanker support. \u00a0Quit 25 needed to split off and refuel. \u00a0DCA informed Quit 27 that at the Huntress (NEADS) number provided, \u00a0“whoever answered has no idea what we’re talking about.” \u00a0DCA and Washington Center also discussed an unknown target, 3666, \u00a0northwest of Manassas airport. \u00a01041 Team 23 tanker support and target NW of Manassas<\/a>\u00a0 \u00a01042 Working out squawks with Quit flight<\/a>\u00a0 \u00a01043 Huntress number no idea<\/a>\u00a0\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

Also concurrently, a significant discussion took place between Caps One and Krant position. \u00a0Caps One asked for a vector to an unknown, unidentified aircraft, inbound. \u00a0Krant responded that there was no target, “as far as we know.” \u00a0Caps One then asked if Krant was in contact with the National Command Authority. \u00a0The \u00a0response was explicit, “affii rmitive.” \u00a0Thereafter, Caps One said they would orbit at whatever location Krant desired. \u00a0The Caps flight was directed to establish an orbit about 10 miles to the Northwest of Washington at 11,000 feet. \u00a0Caps One acknowledged, “eleven thousand would be fine.” \u00a01042 Krant You in contact with NCA Affirmative<\/a><\/p>\n

By 1043, Bully One confirmed that he had no targets and was headed back to Andrews. \u00a0He was advised of the Caps flight presence and its location. \u00a0Bully One’s status report to Krant was, “I have no other aircraft on my radar, and we only have helicopters out here, so I’m going to proceed back to Andrews.” \u00a01043 Krant Bully One no other aircraft on radar<\/a>\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

At 1044, \u00a0Krant and Caps One discussed a possible target. \u00a0Caps One was told about a possible unknown, \u00a0helicopters over the Pentagon, Bully One returning to base, and F-16s at 250 “on top of you.” \u00a0The conversation was predicated on Caps One asking for confirmation that he had no unknown civilian target as he was advised prior to takeoff. \u00a0This is primary source confirmation that the Andrews fighters knew about the Langley fighters at altitude. \u00a01044 Krant F16s above you<\/a>\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

At 1047, Caps One persisted in his hunt for a target. \u00a0He asked Krant, \u00a0“are there any blind spots in your radar coverage.” \u00a0He was told, “just, right over DCA.” \u00a01047 Krant any radar blind spots<\/a>\u00a0\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

At 1048, Caps One was told that the Wild flight was five minutes away from launch. \u00a0As Krant and Caps One sorted out the CAP configuration, Caps One made a significant statement concerning the Wild position. \u00a0The Wild flight would be centered south of Andrews and that “would be at peace, as well.” \u00a0That is the only statement of ROE (Rules of Engagement) status for the Andrews fighters of which I am currently aware in primary source information. \u00a01048 Krant Wild at peace as well<\/a>\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

Compare that status statement with a similar statement two minutes later by Major Fox, Senior Director, NEADS. \u00a0Fox was asked about authority concerning a target in the Boston area. \u00a0His answer was, “at peace.” \u00a00911145222 Request Clearance to Shoot<\/a>\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

Therefore, as of 1050 both NEADS and Andrews, separately, were operating under “at peace” ROE, despite Vice Presidential guidance to the contrary as recorded in the NEADS chat log shortly after 1030 \u00a01032 You need to read this<\/a>\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

I am stopping this narrative for now. \u00a0Remaining is the contentious arrival of Wild One on the scene and the struggle to establish a joint CAP between the Langley and Andrews fighters. \u00a0 Part of that story is the DEFCON status change promulgated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff at 1052.<\/p>\n

To be continued<\/strong><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

D R A F T (This article needs some fine tuning) Introduction The purpose of this article is to document for the record the air traffic control communications at the Reagan National TRACON (DCA) concerning the Andrews fighters. \u00a0The positions are F2, Final Radar, archived tape as provided to the Commission by FAA is “1 … Continue reading 9-11: The Andrews Fighters; the Reagan National Story<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[14],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5109","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-andrews-fighters"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5109","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=5109"}],"version-history":[{"count":50,"href":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5109\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5203,"href":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5109\/revisions\/5203"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=5109"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=5109"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=5109"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}