{"id":5042,"date":"2011-10-28T19:15:02","date_gmt":"2011-10-28T23:15:02","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/?p=5042"},"modified":"2012-07-12T19:37:42","modified_gmt":"2012-07-13T00:37:42","slug":"9-11-neads-mission-crew-commander-a-valiant-effort-ultimately-futile-part-v","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/?p=5042","title":{"rendered":"9-11: NEADS Mission Crew Commander; a valiant effort, ultimately futile, Part V"},"content":{"rendered":"

Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n

This is the fifth and concluding article in a series describing the battle on the morning of September 11, 2001, from the perspective of the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), Mission Crew Commander (MCC) Major Kevin Nasypany.\u00a0 The account is based on primary source information, the NEADS audio tapes.<\/p>\n

In the first four articles (part I<\/a>, part II,<\/a> part III<\/a><\/strong>, part IV<\/a><\/strong>) we covered Major Nasypany’s actions up to 1010 EDT.\u00a0 NEADS had just heard about a fourth hijacked aircraft, UA 93, and, concurrently an aircraft over the White House.\u00a0 It had also heard of a potential threat of an unknown aircraft from Canada headed toward the nation’s capital.<\/p>\n

We will pick up the story at that point, but first we need to tend to some unfinished business.\u00a0 In Part IV we left hanging the story of how the Langley fighters finally arrived on station and we did not identify the source of the unknown aircraft over the White House.<\/p>\n

Unfinished Business<\/strong><\/p>\n

Langley fighters. <\/strong>In part IV the status of the Langley fighters was described as follows: “ <\/strong>At 0946 the CAP point provided, 3825N 07702W was transposed in its northern component, which should have been 3852<\/strong>N, a separate story for another time.” Now is that other time.<\/p>\n

While comparing notes on other activity the Weapons Controller and Weapons Controller\/Technician realized that Quit (corrected Jul 12, 2012. \u00a0Original text was “Caps”) \u00a025, Langley lead, was astray.\u00a0 Quit 25 informed the controllers that “the CAP point you gave us [was wrong]” and asked for a “lat long.”\u00a0 The correct lat long was 3852<\/strong><\/span>N 07702W.\u00a0 Quite 25 acknowledged, “eight FIVE TWO.”<\/p>\n

Readers will recall that in Part IV, at that same time, Major Nasypany gave this explicit instruction: “Talk to me about my Langley guys.\u00a0 I want them over the NCA, NOW!! Immediately, the Weapons Controller said, “where are the fighters.”\u00a0 And that’s when the Langley fighters were turned back North, vectored, correctly, toward the CAP point, the last location of track B32, AA 77. 0952 Langley CAP point corrected<\/a><\/strong> (DRM 2, Channel 13)<\/p>\n

There are two things that historians and researchers need to know about this event.\u00a0 First, Quit 25, when interviewed, took full blame, stating that he had an equipment malfunction in his cockpit display.\u00a0 That was admirable of him, but it was not his fault.\u00a0 It was a controller transposition of two digits in a latitude designation, according to the primary source information of the day.\u00a0 On a separate note, it is also to Quit 25’s credit that he took full responsibility for missing the Norfolk TRACON controller question asking him which direction he wanted to go.\u00a0 His comment when he heard the air traffic control tape was straight forward and professional, “there was an opportunity missed.”<\/p>\n

Second, this event is yet another example of how responsive NEADS SOCC personnel were to every order or suggestion given by Major Nasypany.\u00a0 Subordinate personnel consistently took immediate action to his leadership, without hesitation.<\/p>\n

Unknown over the White House<\/strong><\/p>\n

Once the Langley fighters got squared away they began a combat air patrol over the nation’s capital at 1000.\u00a0 Had someone in the Pentagon courtyard looked straight up with binoculars he would have seen one of the Quit flight at 23,000 feet, vertically overhead at exactly 1000 EDT.\u00a0 The approach of the Langley fighters, however, itself became chaotic.<\/p>\n

Two of the three fighters, Quit 25 and 26, were squawking identical Mode 2 and Mode 3 codes.\u00a0 Quit 27 was supposed to also be squawking the same Mode 3 code, 7777, but was not.\u00a0 In the resulting confusion, at NEADS and both the FAA’s Washington Center and Baltimore TRACON, military and civilian controllers became confused.\u00a0 The net result was that one of the Langley fighters became the unknown over the White House.\u00a0 The air defense intercepted itself, as we shall find out. <\/strong><\/p>\n

The initial report came from an FAA air traffic controller in the Baltimore area and was reported by Quit 25. “<\/strong>Baltimore is saying something about an aircraft over the White House, any words (mission)?”\u00a0 The Weapons Controller\/Technician reported that the information came from “Center,” meaning Washington Center. Moreover, the fighter the controller was talking to was actually Quit 26, as we shall hear. Here is how all that played out at the Weapons Controller\/Technician position from 1007 to 1011 resulting in a mission to Quit 26 to “identify by type and tail.”\u00a0 1007 unknown near the White House<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

That situation was concurrent with Major Nasypany learning about United 93.\u00a0 We return to his operations position to pick up the story.<\/p>\n

Back to the MCC Position<\/strong><\/p>\n

We ended Part IV with this clip.\u00a0 1007 UA 93 bomb on board unknown over White House.<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

A relisten, after hearing from the controllers, provides yet more insight into Major Nasypany as floor commander.\u00a0 Note that he speculated that the unknown over the White House might be that fifth airplane, a reference to the false report of an unknown headed toward Washington from Canadian airspace.\u00a0 Nasypany also mused, quickly, to someone that “he had had better days.” <\/strong><\/p>\n

Nasypany continued to juggle two competing issues, United 93 and the unknown over the White House.\u00a0 He also fielded a quick question from someone asking if he needed MCC help.\u00a0 His quick response was, “we are fine for MCCs, right now.” <\/strong><\/p>\n

Nasypany’s evenhanded demeanor comes through clearly when he asks about, probably, the Toledo fighters, “any weapons?”\u00a0 He answers his own question, “we don’t know, we’ll press with that.”<\/p>\n

His explicit and profane exchange with Major Fox concerning the unknown over the White House is also revealing.\u00a0 “Negative clearance to shoot,” was his guidance from the Battle Cab to Jamie (also “Foxy”).\u00a0 Major Fox responded that “he wasn’t really worried about the code words (possible reference to authentication).\u00a0 Nasypany’s immediate response was “Fuck the code words, that’s perishable information.”\u00a0 Nevertheless, the explicit guidance was “negative clearance to fire, ID type, tail.”\u00a0 1010 Negative clearance to fire<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Major Nasypany then turned his attention to the United 93 situation and spoke with the commander at Syracuse about United 93 and “the special,” (Delta 1989).\u00a0 The commander advised that he had “hot guns, that’s all I’ve got.”\u00a0 Nasypany’s matter-of-fact response was, “that’s good enough for me, for now.”\u00a0 Further, he dealt directly with the commander to arrange for the preparation for launch of two additional fighters. Nasypany did this on his own recognizance.\u00a0 This\u00a0 vignette is an example of Nasypany’s ability to deal with a senior officer while balancing the requirement of managing his crew on the SOCC floor. 1012 Conversation with Syracuse<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

United 93 Down<\/strong><\/p>\n

Immediately thereafter, at 1014, Major Nasypany learned that United 93 was down.\u00a0 The confusion on the SOCC floor is captured in this next audio clip.\u00a0 NEADS personnel equated the report of a bomb on board with an explosion and speculated that the plane exploded near Camp David.\u00a0 The voices of the Identification Technicians are clearly heard in the background as they help sift through information. At one point MSGT Dooley stated emphatically that “this is making no sense, whatsoever.”<\/p>\n

Separately, but intertwined, the E-3 support issue was briefly discussed. MCC position personnel learned that an E-3 was headed Northeast, one they wanted headed toward Chicago, and that two more were on immediate status.\u00a0 1014 NEADS learns UA93 is down<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

At 1016 Nasypany took a call front CONR which provides insight as to how he dealt with the next higher headquarters.\u00a0 The issue was that CONR did not know the disposition of fighters over the NCA (National Command Authority) area because NEADS was falling behind in forward telling (electronically forwarding) the track information.\u00a0 CONR did not have radar scopes and relied on NEADS (and the other sectors) to forward tell tracks of interest, friendly and enemy.\u00a0 Nasypany, again, gave explicit direction to his crew to get the tracks forwarded and told CONR, “I’m protecting the NCA, as best I can.”<\/p>\n

This next clip establishes two things.\u00a0 First, CONR, and by extension (Granite Sentry, the Cheyenne Mountain display system) NORAD, and by further extension (Air Threat Conference) the NMCC, knew as of 1017, that there were three air defense fighters protecting the NCA.\u00a0 Second, in a background conversation, Nasypany informed Major Deskins that a track, “this guy,” (Delta 1989) faded over Cleveland.\u00a0 1016 CONR call protecting NCA best I can<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Time for a Summation<\/strong><\/p>\n

At this point in the Major Nasypany story it is time to stop for a moment and speak to the larger narrative, the NORAD story concerning the events of 9-11.\u00a0 As documented in primary source information at the MCC position on the NEADS SOCC floor we can conclude two things.<\/p>\n

First, as of 1017 EDT, the status of friendly forces protecting the nation’s capital could have and should have been known at every echelon, including the NCA–the Secretary of Defense and the President, and by extension the Vice President and the Secretary of Transportation, to include the Secret Service.\u00a0 Major Nasypany told CONR, explicitly, that he was protecting the NCA as best he could.<\/p>\n

Second, the status of both United 93 and Delta 1989 was established by that same time.\u00a0 United 93 was known down, possibly exploded, and Delta 1989 had faded over Cleveland.\u00a0 Those facts were known to the NEADS Battle Cab and, by extension, CONR and NORAD.\u00a0 The clarity of the dual situation of those two airplanes, whose stories were intertwined, was firmly established at the MCC position, but never established in the aftermath by the staffs at NEADS, CONR, and NORAD.<\/p>\n

Unfinished Business, Finished<\/strong><\/p>\n

At this point, readers may ask what happened to the unknown over the White House?\u00a0 That story is instructive as to how the NEADS SOCC floor operated, particularly under Major Nasypany’s command.\u00a0 It was the nature of operations that important information flew immediately to everyone who needed to know it.\u00a0 If it become unimportant the flow stopped immediately and the issue was resolved at the scope or position level. <\/strong><\/p>\n

It is worth restating at this point that the Mission Crew Commander had the capabililty to “plug in,” to listen to any position on the SOCC floor.\u00a0 That capability makes it confusing for researchers to sort out what is going on and to track issues of particular interest since conversations were recorded concurrently on one channel even though they took place disparately on the SOCC floor. <\/strong><\/p>\n

The unknown aircraft over the White House issue was resolved by the controllers, as we hear on this next clip from DRM 2, Channel 13. Quit 26 reported that Washington now knew about the Quit flight squawks: “They do now, they didn’t earlier.”\u00a0 The controller immediately said to those nearby, “It was our guys, It was our guys.\u00a0 Washington was reporting our guys flying around.”\u00a0 And, later, “we intercepted one of our own guys.” 1014 We intercepted one of our own guys<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Back to the MCC Position<\/strong><\/p>\n

With that issue resolved by subordinates and the Delta 1989 and United 93 issues clarified things quieted down at the MCC position and by 1018 Major Nasypany had unplugged from all other positions. <\/strong>For an extended period of time we hear primarily his voice as he dealt with the occasional issue of interest to him.<\/p>\n

One such issue was the report to him at 1026 that Air Force One was airborne out of Florida headed for Washington.\u00a0 He was also briefed that the First Fighter Wing at Langley would provide escort at the appropriate time.\u00a0 Southeast Air Defense Sector was to have fighters on Air Force One, according to the report.\u00a0 Nasypany tasked Major Fox to take over fighter escort once “they hit our AOR (area of responsibility).\u00a0 1026 AF One Airborne headed for Washington<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

None of that happened the way it was recorded at NEADS.\u00a0 Air Force One took off at 0955 and was vectored west to Barksdale Air Force Base at 1010, well before NEADS was informed the plane was airborne.\u00a0 There was no fighter escort until just before landing at Barksdale when fighters from the Texas Air National Guard joined the flight.\u00a0 Even though a requirement did not materialize, Nasypany anticipated that NEADS would be tasked.\u00a0 However, he had no assets.\u00a0 The flight of four fighters from Langley did not materialize, a story for another day.<\/p>\n

You Need to Read This<\/strong><\/p>\n

At 1032 activity at NEADS took an interesting turn as Major Nasypany verbalized what he was reading off the chat log. “Hey, you need to read this.\u00a0 The Region Commander has declared that we can shoot down tracks if they do not respond to our direction.”\u00a0\u00a0 He then repeated what he had read, “OK, the Region Commander has declared that we can shoot down aircraft that do not respond to our direction. OK?”\u00a0 “Copy that?”\u00a0 So if you try and divert somebody and he won’t divert.”<\/p>\n

Nasypany broke the thought process to announce that Atlantic City was scrambled at 1430 [Zulu time].\u00a0 He then picked up the thread by asking “Foxy, you got a conflict with that?”\u00a0 Fox responded, “right now, no.” Then, “you read that from the Vice President has cleared,” and another voice picked up the recitation, “the Vice President has cleared us to intercept tracks of interest and shoot them down if they do not respond per CONR CC [General Arnold].”\u00a0 1032 You need to read this<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

The preceding account is how that event was recorded at the MCC position.\u00a0 In the June 2004 Commission hearing the Staff presented the same information but recorded at a different position on the SOCC floor.\u00a0 At that position a voice commented that the DO (Director of Operations) said no.\u00a0 That voice was not picked up on the MCC channel.<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n

We leave the story of 9-11 as told in the voice of Major Nasypany at this point.\u00a0 The battle was over, his job thereafter was maintenance and continuity.\u00a0 Life on the NEADS floor would thereafter follow two main threads.\u00a0 The first was the one we just heard, shootdown authority and what to do about that.\u00a0 The second was the emergence on the scene of fighter augmentation from an unexpected source, Andrews Air Force Base.<\/p>\n

We hear the voice of Major Nasypany one last time in this story as he asks the logical question when told at 1041 that fighters were scrambling from Andrews.\u00a0 “Are the coming under our control?”\u00a0 1041 Andrews scrambled under our control<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

The key point here is that NEADS, and by extension CONR and NORAD, knew that the Andrews fighters were joining the fray.\u00a0 They knew because Colonel Brooks from the Air National Guard Crisis Action Team\u00a0 told them at 1039 before Andrews launched the Caps flight (Sasseville and Penney). 1039 Andrews CAT checks in with NEADS<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Colonel Brooks was referred to the Senior Director position and when the phone was answered the story of the battle of 9\/11 came full circle back to the original call from Boston Center just two hours earlier. \u00a0Sergeant Jeremy Powell, still on duty as the Senior Director\/Technician, greeted the Andrews caller by saying “Huntress Weapons, Sergeant Powell.” \u00a0Powell was precise and effecient as always but did say, “The 113th, I hate to ask, where’s that?” 1039 Huntress Weapons Sergeant Powell<\/a>
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n

The initial assumption by Major Nasypany was that NEADS would control.\u00a0 However, Sergeant Powell told Colonel Brooks that control would remain with FAA and that NEADS would be backup.\u00a0 We will pick up that point when I retell the Andrews story in the voice of the Reagan National (DCA) controller.<\/p>\n


\n<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Introduction This is the fifth and concluding article in a series describing the battle on the morning of September 11, 2001, from the perspective of the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), Mission Crew Commander (MCC) Major Kevin Nasypany.\u00a0 The account is based on primary source information, the NEADS audio tapes. In the first four articles … Continue reading 9-11: NEADS Mission Crew Commander; a valiant effort, ultimately futile, Part V<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[4,44],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5042","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-9-11","category-neads-story-from-mcc-perspective"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5042","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=5042"}],"version-history":[{"count":37,"href":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5042\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5089,"href":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5042\/revisions\/5089"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=5042"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=5042"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=5042"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}