{"id":3400,"date":"2011-02-11T20:27:05","date_gmt":"2011-02-12T00:27:05","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/?p=3400"},"modified":"2011-03-12T20:58:45","modified_gmt":"2011-03-13T00:58:45","slug":"9-11-exercise-vigilant-guardian-sep-10","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/?p=3400","title":{"rendered":"9-11: Exercise Vigilant Guardian; Sep 10"},"content":{"rendered":"

Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n

In previous articles in this series we have listened to NEADS respond to one major scenario on each exercise day.\u00a0 On Sep 6, the scenario concerned a military C-130 that was behaving strangely.\u00a0 On Sep 7, the scenario was a defecting Aeroflot plane.\u00a0 On Sep 8, NEADS exercised counter narcotics procedures dealing with a split track out of Bermuda headed for Philadelphia.<\/p>\n

On Sep 9, CONR raised the force protection condition to “Bravo.” \u00a0NEADS then dealt with a terrorist rogue aircraft that was a threat to the tankers at Bangor, Maine, the preferred FAA divert landing site. \u00a0NEADS did not push back and the plane exploded on the runway at Bangor.<\/p>\n

This article covers exercise activity on Sep 10, 2001.<\/p>\n

Early Morning Activity<\/strong><\/p>\n

In a previous\u00a0article<\/strong><\/a> I described early morning notional training at the Identification Technician (ID) position involving that position, a mentor\/trainer, the MCC, and the simulation cell. \u00a0That training scenario involved a scramble on an unknown and then a divert to close with a deviating Cubana B747 that was NORDO. \u00a0The pilots confirmed the situation and the plane “landed” at Richmond, “away from the NCA.”<\/p>\n

Later, about 1130Z (0730 local) the MCC left a voice mail morning brief for the command ground. \u00a0The report was short, “nothing significant.”\u00a0 0910111643 Morning Brief<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Exercise Pace Picks Up<\/strong><\/p>\n

Shortly thereafter the sector floor had to deal with an exercise unknown that could not be identified by the ID Technician. That scenario played out over 75 minutes.<\/p>\n

The pace of play increased substantially and we have extensive audio available from the WD (Weapons Director\/Controller) position and the Surveillance Technicians (trackers).\u00a0 Here is the ID Technicians announcement of the unknown track.\u00a0 0910111739 Track B054<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Next we hear several exchanges between the MCC and the Weapons Director.\u00a0 They decided to scramble Atlantic City and to make an “unknown rider” call on the guard frequency (in this case sim guard).\u00a0 An unknown rider call is a procedure used to attempt contact with an unknown at a specific location.\u00a0 In this audio file we hear a voice known to readers familiar with the audio files from 9-11.\u00a0 Major Fox was the Weapons Director on the morning of Sep 10.\u00a0 Given his role on 9-11 as the Senior Director and given his extensive exercise play the day before I will tell the rest of this scenario primarily in his voice.\u00a0 0910111815 Scramble Atlantic City<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

We also learn in that clip that the NEADS call sign during exercise Vigilant Guardian was “Absence.”\u00a0 Major Fox corrected himself immediately when he started to use “Huntress.”<\/p>\n

In this next clip we hear language that would be replicated by Major Fox the next day.\u00a0 He asked the MCC to state mission; it was ID by type and tail.\u00a0 We also hear the phrase “Jersey Scramble.”\u00a0 As Commission Staff learned, that was the standard scramble flight plan for Atlantic City, 090 for 90 (east heading for 90 nautical miles).\u00a0 That standard plan was replicated with a slight variation at Langley for the real world alert fighters, 090 for 60.\u00a0 And that was the exact flight plan entered into the FAA system on 9-11 by Andrews Tower to get the Langley fighters rapidly airborne to altitude over water.\u00a0 This clip provides historians and researchers insight into the tactics, techniques and procedures in place at NEADS and exercised just one day prior to 9-11. 0910112023 ID by Type and Tail<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

The MCC canceled Atlantic City before the fighters were, notionally, airborne and scrambled Burlington instead. 0910112313 Scramble Burlington<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Then Major Fox directed that the fighters come out at a higher altitude since they had so far to go.\u00a0 He explained that they would put the fighters at “max subsonic” when they were airborne.\u00a0 This audio is clear evidence of the standard air defense speed, a speed exercised on 9-10 and specified for the real world alert fighters on 9-11.\u00a0 0910112553 Max Subsonic<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

During this scenario the trackers established a loop, a comms path, and their voices are heard on multiple channels.”Weapons” tasked them to hit up all tracks between Burlington and the unknown.\u00a0 0910113320 Trackers at Work<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

NEADS then decided to place a second set of Burlington fighters on immediate.\u00a0 The sim cell handled the request and said the pilots were in the building and the planes were cocked and ready to go.\u00a0 As part of that procedure Major Fox took the time to provide a brief tutorial on telephone procedures at the SD and WD positions.\u00a0 0910113503 Fox Tutorial<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

The Burlington “fighters,” Sunup 32 and 33, established contact with the Weapons Director, Major Fox.\u00a0 He provided them specific instructions concerning mission and weapons status, and provided a BRA (bearing, range and altitude) to the target.\u00a0 0910113925 Fox Directs Fighters<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

A few minutes later the flight lead reported that Sunup 33 was having compressor problems and that he was trying to restart.\u00a0 0910114810 Fighter Problems<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

NEADS put the backup fighters at Burlington on Battle Stations. The situation with Sunup 33 was not resolved and the first pair of fighters was given a vector for Pease; the second set of fighters was scrambled.\u00a0 0910114828 Sramble Sunup 34 and 35<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

While that situation was developing FAA’s Boston Center, Colin Scoggins simulated, reported that the Weather Service called and said they had lost a weather balloon somewhere near Brunswick.\u00a0 0910114915 Scoggins Reports Balloon<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Concurrently, NEADS was deciding whether to continue with a single fighter from the first scramble or with the second scramble, flight of two.\u00a0 The Director of Operations opted for the latter.\u00a0 On this next clip we hear those exchanges mixed with word from the MCC about the Scoggins report.\u00a0 0910114928 DO Wants Them Together<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Meanwhile, the Scoggins call continued and NEADS learned that Boston Center was not requesting military assistance.\u00a0 0910115012 Scoggins Miltary Assistance Not Needed<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

NEADS was also dealing with the Burlington Command Post. That clip is important because in the background we hear the technicians discuss how log entries are made and gain some sense of the timeliness and accuracy of those entries.\u00a0 0910115148 Log Entires Discussed<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Weather was played real world for the exercise as we hear in this next clip.\u00a0 0910115504 Weather is Real World<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

That caused a problem for the MCC since the unknown was a “little fast” for the winds aloft.\u00a0 Even though the target was a suspected weather balloon the MCC determined that they would still have to “vis ID” it.\u00a0 0910115742 Still Have to ID<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

NEADS apparently used this scenario to exercise regeneration of forces, the ability to maintain sustained operations.\u00a0 Keeping in mind that Exercise Vigilant Guardian was, in part, preparation for war, regeneration capability was vital.\u00a0 In this next clip we hear the MCC tasking Burlington Command Post (notional) to be prepared to launch a third and fourth set of fighters.\u00a0 0910115900 Regeneration of Forces<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

On 9-11 the only east coast alert base capable of sustained air defense operations was Otis.\u00a0 Otis did recall fighters on routine training to land and be armed to replace the Panta flight over New York City.\u00a0 Langley had just four aircraft and three pilots available.\u00a0 All three participated in the original scramble.\u00a0 Langley was augmented by Andrews, ultimately.<\/p>\n

The Burlington flight in distress did land at Pease AFB.\u00a0 Thereafter, we hear Major Fox as Weapons Director controlling the second pair of Burlington fighters.\u00a0 Although multiple conversations are heard the primary one is Fox going down his check list.\u00a0 The language is technical and brief.\u00a0 He informed the MCC that the check list was complete.\u00a0 Note that the speed restriction, again, was max subsonic.\u00a0 Near the end of the clip the Burlington fighters reported they were at .7 Mach.\u00a0 0910120040 Weapons Director Check List<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

The Balloon Scenario End Game
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n

The next few clips provide a detailed view of how NEADS controlled a scramble, once airborne.\u00a0 First Major Fox provided an updated BRA to the target and acted as an air traffic controller concerning other traffic in the area.\u00a0 0910121503 Fox as Controller<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Once the fighters reported “feet wet” (over water) Fox ordered them to “strangle” (turn off) Mode 3 alpha charlie.\u00a0 He confirmed they had radar contact with the target and gave them an updated BRA.\u00a0 0910121633 Strangle Mode 3<\/a><\/strong> He then confirmed that he and the fighters were tracking the same target.\u00a0 0910121703 Contact is your Bogie<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

The fighters provided updates as the winds caused some concern at NEADS that the target was not a balloon.\u00a0 Thereafter, Fox order the fighters to pursue.\u00a0 0910121903 Sunup Go Pursuit<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

The final tactic used was to order the fighters to split, if necessary, to ID the target.\u00a0 One fighter was to go no lower than 15,000 feet to maintain communications.\u00a0 0910122137 Cleared to Split<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

The target was identified as a weather balloon and the fighters were ordered to return to base.\u00a0 Major Fox immediately ordered the fighters to recycle Mode 3 and then mused, “how do we know if a weather balloon is friendly?”\u00a0 0910122443 A Friendly Weather Balloon<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Another Unknown<\/strong><\/p>\n

An hour later NEADS dealt with another unknown, one within the ADIZ. \u00a0The ID Technician did not resolve the identity within two minutes and Atlantic City was scrambled, again on a “Jersey Scramble.” \u00a0Even though the ID Technician had determined that the target might be an AT&T cable checker, NEADS continued the scramble process and, as with Burlington earlier, asked that an additional pair of fighters be placed on immediate status.<\/p>\n

The resolution process was similar in most respects to the earlier Burlington pursuit of the balloon and was resolved when the fighters were able to gain communication with the AT&T plane and determined that all was well.<\/p>\n

Here is the NEADS telephonic Form 61 report to CONR and NORAD, concurrently.\u00a0 Note that the NEADS caller refers to cable checkers as a common occurrence.\u00a0 0910132555 CONR NORAD Form 61 Report<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

I have spoken to that type flight in previous articles.\u00a0 The AT&T flight is an example of a DVFR (Defense Visual Flight Rules) flight.\u00a0 Such flights were a continuing concern to NEADS, as CONR and NORAD were informed. It is not surprising that\u00a0 an exercise event was devoted to such a flight.<\/p>\n

Waiting For Next Scenario<\/strong><\/p>\n

Fighter attrition was becoming an issue, one NEADS would have to track as the pace of the exercise accelerated.\u00a0 There were continuing discussions about dispatching a maintenance team to Burlington to repair the fighter diverted there.\u00a0 In addition, Atlantic City reported that one of the fighters who scrambled on the cable checker suffered a wheel assembly fire on landing and would be out of commission for several days.<\/p>\n

Periodic real world activity was also dealt with, primarily a flight by Air Force Two from Andrews AFB to Lexington Kentucky, a B757.\u00a0 There are two noteworthy clips, one concerning takeoff and concerning destination.\u00a0 NEADS proactively called Washington Center concerning the departure.\u00a0 0910133605 Washington Center AF 2<\/a><\/strong> NEADS also proactively called Indy Center military desk to check on the arrival of Air Force Two.\u00a0 Note how routinely NEADS dealt with two of the FAA Centers in its area of responsibility.\u00a0 0910141352 Indy Military AF Two<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Langley Training Question<\/strong><\/p>\n

Captain Craig Borgstrom from the Langley air defense alert detachment called with a training question.\u00a0 They wanted to engage in local training with “hot pilots, cold birds.”\u00a0 Here is that request.\u00a0 0910144020 Langley Borgstrom Question<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

NEADS approved “hot pilot cold birds” training but wanted the alert fighters to remain uploaded, given the situation [unstated, but likely the ongoing Russian exercise].\u00a0 Here is the answer.\u00a0 0910144401 Langley Borgstrom Answer<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

My recall is that the Langley pilots told Commission Staff during interview that they had been scheduled to participate in local training on 9-11, something they often did in support of the Wing at Langley.<\/p>\n

SEADS Evacuation, NEADS Expansion<\/strong><\/p>\n

At 1517Z (1117 local) NEADS learned that SEADS was evacuating for the exercise because of a fire in the battery room and that NEADS had to expand to take over SEADS area of responsibility.\u00a0 The take over was treated as a real world expansion.\u00a0 Here is the audio file with the notification and NEADS actions taken.\u00a0 0910145650 SEADS Evacuation<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

The expansion was technical and the process of exchange was captured on the NEADS tapes.\u00a0 For historians, that is available on Channel 2, DRM1, clip 150436.\u00a0 The expansion took 19 minutes.\u00a0 Here is the MCC’s announcement of the takeover.\u00a0 0910152036 NEADS Assumes Control<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Transponders Off, An Effective Hijacker Tactic<\/strong><\/p>\n

Here are two audio clips of NEADS coordinating with Miami AMIS, real world, concerning potential unknown tracks.\u00a0 NEADS was just assuming responsibility for SEADS, to include Miami, an FAA entity not part of the NEADS normal ID checklist.\u00a0 In just under two minutes two potential unknowns were resolved, the second one in a matter of seconds.\u00a0 The reason the resolution was expeditious in both cases was that NEADS and Miami AMIS were seeing the transponder code.\u00a0 0910154012 NEADS call to Miami AMIS<\/a> 0910151437 Miami AMIS call to NEADS<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

A few minutes later NEADS resolved multiple tracks with Miami AMIS in just over a minute.\u00a0 0910160906 Second NEADS Call to Miami AMIS<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Multiple scenarios<\/strong><\/p>\n

After the expansion NEADS personnel worked to gain situational awareness concerning the task of covering for SEADS.\u00a0 They discussed what to do if a real world scramble occurred and provided an update to the Battle Cab on the status of fighters at Homestead and Tyndall.\u00a0 The ID and SD positions completed detailed coordination with their counterparts at Oakgrove (SEADS).<\/p>\n

Because the expansion was both real world and exercise NEADS went to “mixed mode,” which meant that they were looking at tracks for both on the same scopes.\u00a0 That was a net advantage as it turned out.\u00a0 Canada East was trying to lateral tell an exercise track without success.\u00a0 However, they were able to voice tell the track and provide a “Z” point in relation to a real world track.\u00a0 Both tracks were Aeroflot flights.\u00a0 Concurrently, there was a report of MiG 23s (Cuban) airborne (not clear whether exercise or real world) which required NEADS to respond.<\/p>\n

Here is how NEADS responded to multiple scenarios beginning around 1540Z (1140 local) and continuing for at least two hours.\u00a0 We being with the actions to take over from SEADS.<\/p>\n

In this first clip the scramble policy was discussed.\u00a0\u00a00910151954 SEADS what if<\/a> <\/strong> Then the MCC provided a fighter update to the Battle Cab.\u00a0 0910152158 Homestead Tyndall<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

After the position level coordination between the ID and SD sections,\u00a0 NEADS called Canada East for clarification on a live track of interest, an Aeroflot flight headed for JFK.\u00a0 Here is that exchange.\u00a0 0910160001 Aeroflot Special 20<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

A few minutes later the Sim Cell, simulating Canada East injected a deviating special 23 track, S426.\u00a0 In these next two exchanges the exercise track was clearly distinguished from a live track. The problem was that the Canada East lateral tell was not showing up at the NEADS end. 0910161418 S426 Deviating <\/a>0910161646 Conversation Continued Special 27<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

NEADS ID then called Canada East to clarify the real world track and the exercise track.\u00a0 The deviating exercise track was not responding to communications from Canadian air traffic control.\u00a0 0910161948 NEADS clarifies both tracks with Canada<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

The ID Technician then made sure the Surveillance Technicians were aware of the situation.\u00a0 A Surveillance Technician confirmed that NEADS was working in “mixed mode” because of the SEADS expansion and that the exercise lateral tell track was not displayed. The exercise track was Gander to Havana.\u00a0 0910162400 ID cues Surveillance<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

The clarification between the two tracks was further extended to the Surveillance “loop.”\u00a0 In a loop multiple trackers are controlled by a single entity.\u00a0 In this next clip the AST position said “go 12,” acknowledging the tracker at scope 12.\u00a0 Researchers\u00a0 familiar with the NEADS tapes for the day of 9-11 will immediately recognize the lingo.\u00a0 0910162805 Surveillance perspective<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

The next clip contains separate concurrent conversations, one by the MCC the other by AST.\u00a0 AST provided guidance to his tracker since he had an extended area to cover.\u00a0 In that conversation we learn that tracks over land were not of interest, but all tracks over water were, to include tracks over land that went “feet wet.”<\/p>\n

(In my work on the Brothers to the Rescue project I learned that NORAD policy was that any mode 3 track that originated in CONUS was friendly by definition.\u00a0 The surveillance conversation is a manifestation of that policy.)<\/p>\n

The MCC, primarily in background, order a scramble from New Orleans on an unknown which was quickly determined to be a flight of F-15s (the Mice) returning.\u00a0 That conversation was exercise related.\u00a0 SEADS had no air defense alert fighters at New Orleans.<\/p>\n

Here are both overlapping conversations.\u00a0\u00a0 0910163513 MCC and AST concurrent conversations<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

The MCC briefed the Battle Cab in detail suggesting a scramble from either Burlington or Atlantic City.\u00a0 The Battle Cab was told where the deviating aircraft was, a “Zulu Point,” and was advised that the Canada East lateral tell was not coming through.\u00a0 0910163820 Battle Cab briefed<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Thereafter, the MCC called Canada East and arranged a work around, Canada East surveillance technicians would “voice tell” the track to their NEADS counterparts.\u00a0 0910164050 Canada East Voice Tell<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Separately, the Canada East SD\/T called the NEADS MCC\/T and passed specific information concerning the deviating flight, to include its projected path.\u00a0 In the audio clip note the clear distinction between Mode 3 (transponder code) and Mode C (altitude) information passed by Canada East.\u00a0 0910164153 Mode 3 Mode C<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Immediately thereafter NEADS had to handle two exercise situations simultaneously, one in their sector, and one in the SEADS sector.\u00a0 The NEADS sector issue involved the deviating flight, the SEADS sector issue involved a reaction to two Mig 23’s airborne from Cuba.<\/p>\n

This next clip is an example of the ability of the MCC to “plug in” and listen to any position on the NEADS floor.\u00a0 The overlapping conversations involved the SD and the MCC, concurrently.\u00a0 The NEADS MCC consulted with the Battle Cab and the decision was to divert the Mice flight to a Zulu point south of Key West and to scramble Burlington on the deviating flight being handed off by Canada East.\u00a0 0910164259 Two concurrent requirements<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

The concurrent work by the SD and the MCC, together and separately, continued.\u00a0 In this next clip we learn that the Battle Cab directed that two additional Burlington fighters be brought up on immediate status.\u00a0 Additional details about the deviating aircraft were provided including its route, Gander to Havana.\u00a0 0910165124 Gander to Havana<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Concurrently, S426, was voice told and NEADS assumed responsibility.\u00a0 Here is the surveillance tracker exchange that made the transfer.\u00a00910165122 S426 Voice Told<\/a> <\/strong> Here is the formal announcement to the NEADS floor by the ID section.\u00a0 0910165140 ID Announcement<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

NEADS was having difficulty with sim tracks double registering in the system.\u00a0 That was a known problem that day.\u00a0 In this clip Sergeant Powell asked the AST specifically about the number of tracks he was seeing, especially live tracks.\u00a0 The AST spoke to the double register problem which did not concern Powell.\u00a0 He challenged the number of real tracks and was told what he was seeing crossing Canada was normal.\u00a0 Here is that exchange.\u00a0 0910165455 Density of real tracks<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Shortly thereafter, real world, NEADS was informed of the departure of Air Force One for Florida.\u00a0 Here is that notification from FAA’s Washington Center (ZDC).\u00a0 This clip demonstrates that there was a working relationship between NEADS and ZDC.\u00a0 0910165524 President departs for Florida<\/a><\/strong> Here is an immediate Air Force One update from Calvert Sector to NEADS.\u00a0 0910165815 AF1 Update Calvert Sector<\/a><\/strong> The ID technician passed the tracking data to Surveillance who immediately acquired the track.\u00a0 0910165917 AF1 passed to surveillance<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

NEADS continued to work the two issues vectoring the Burlington fighters to do a covert intercept of the deviating Aeroflot flight and establishing coverage in the SEADS area.\u00a0 Concerning the latter, there was one tracker exchange which provides additional evidence that NEADS was focused on over water and considered tracks over land, unless they had been designated special, to be friendly.\u00a0 Here is that exchange.\u00a0 0910170858 Over land not a Special<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Over an hour after the deviating Russian flight was declared a Special 27 NEADS was granted intercept authority, to go in using hand signals to try and determine the intentions of the pilot.\u00a0 Here is the audio file for those instructions.\u00a0 0910172008 Intercept Authority<\/a><\/strong> Concurrently, <\/strong>an ID Technician asked Boston Center (simulated) what kind of military assistance they wanted.\u00a0 The sim cell was evasive and left NEADS to their own devices. \u00a00910172008 Military Assistance Requested<\/a><\/strong> The ID Technician then shortly called the sim cell again to confirm that the flight was, in fact, civilian.\u00a0 0910172116 Confirmed Civilian<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Thereafter the scenario in the SEADS area was resolved leaving the NEADS staff free to deal with the deviating Russian flight.\u00a0 0910172246 RTB<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

The Russian flight was not cooperating.\u00a0 NEADS grappled with what to do and where to divert, if necessary. \u00a00910172426 Concord’s Close<\/a><\/strong> The Russian pilots simply waved, passengers took pictures of the fighters and communications could not be established. 0910172609 Taking Pictures<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

NEADS was running out of options.\u00a0 The next tactic mentioned was “wing rock, follow me.”\u00a0 There was still no radio contact with the flight even though one of the fighters (notional) was just outside his window. 0910172850 Wing rock follow me<\/a><\/strong> The pilots were alerted and told to maintain tactical position and stand by for “the words,” meaning a specific authority or direction to do something.\u00a0 0910172924 Stand by for the words<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

The instructions were modified a bit and the fighters were directed to divert the flight out to sea, if able, working through [FAA] Center. 0910172941 Divert out to sea<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

NEADS continued to also work with Boston Center and learned they were still not talking to the flight.\u00a0 0910173130 Check with Boston Center<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

NEADS insisted the fighters confirm that they had used both “loss of coms” and “loss of nav” hand signals and directed them to continue to divert the aircraft away from land.\u00a0 It was heading for Boston.\u00a0 0910173219 Heading toward Boston<\/a><\/strong> Specific instructions were then passed to the Surveillance section to report any change in altitude.\u00a0 0910173412 Report any change in altitude<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

The Russian flight continued on a steady course for Boston at altitude.\u00a0 The NEADS floor reaction, humorous at times, continued to push the air defense fighters for information and confirmation that they had followed procedures.\u00a0 NEADS then decided on a divert base, if possible; Westover. 0910173430 Divert is Westover<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

NEADS real world responsibilities continued and they received a call from FAA’s Jacksonville Center that Air Force One was it its air space.\u00a0 0910173442 AF1 in Jacksonville Center airspace<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Meanwhile, at some point, NEADS determined the deviating aircraft would continue south and they considered possible divert bases and also what to do with the Burlington fighters.\u00a0 There apparently was no tanker support and NEADS asked the fighters if they could make it to Langley.\u00a0 In this next clip Major Fox’s voice is again heard as the Weapons Director.\u00a0 0910174538 Make it to Langley<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

NEADS then worked with Langley to scramble fighters to replace the Burlington fighters, recover the Burlington fighters, and put a second set of Langley fighters on immediate status.\u00a0 Concurrently, SEADS reconstituted its capability and recovered its radars one at a time from NEADS, the reverse of the earlier expansion progress.\u00a0 This next audio clip provides insight into those multiple activities.\u00a0 0910174721 Deexpansion and Scramble Langley<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

SEADS assumed air sovereignty in its area of responsibility at 1819Z (1419 local).\u00a0 NEADS continued to try and divert the Russian civilian aircraft and Major Fox\u00a0 worked to adjust the work schedule.\u00a0 In an earlier article in this series concerning Vigilant Guardian we learned that he was arranging the work schedules for his Flight (Delta Flight, as I recall) for the exercise.\u00a0 In this clip Fox is hear saying he will cover the SD (Senior Director) position tomorrow morning. 0910175910 Fox will be SD on 9-11<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

After SEADS took their area back NEADS dropped out of mixed mode display and as their sim picture separately restored they checked sim comms to determine if there was anything new with the Russian flight.\u00a0 There was nothing new.\u00a0 Here is Major Fox’s sim call to the fighters.\u00a0 0910180349 Nothing new<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

SEADS and NEADS compared notes on the expansion and return to normal.\u00a0 NEADS conducted expanded operations, exercise and real world, for two hours and thirty-five minutes.\u00a0 Here is the SEADS\/NEADS comparison.\u00a0 0910180508 NEADS SEADS Compare notes<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

A few minutes later, the Burlington fighters, Sun Up, checked in to advise the Russian flight had turned slightly.\u00a0 NEADS estimated it was heading for Atlantic City and the fighters were advised not to let it over fly that location.\u00a0 The MCC, in consultation with the Battle Cab, then scrambled Atlantic City.\u00a0 0910181114 Scramble Atlantic City<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

NEADS, in consultation with the Burlington fighters, decided they would recover to Atlantic City.\u00a0 They were relieved by the Atlantic City fighters.\u00a0 Once airborne, the Atlantic City fighters checked in with NEADS and provocatively asked for permission to fire across the bow of the Russian flight.\u00a0 Major Fox ignored that gambit by the exercise cell, but would later return to the issue.\u00a0 0910182736 Atlantic City fighters check in<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

NEADS was puzzled about what to do with the Russian flight and what threat it posed.\u00a0 The MCC at one time thought about the NCA (Washington DC), but then recognized that the plane had proceeded south.\u00a0 The Battle Cab asked the Burlington and Atlantic City fighters if they had noticed anyone on board the plane wearing military uniforms or if the plane had reconnaissance bubbles that had not been reported.<\/p>\n

As the plane continued south Major Fox gave the Atlantic City fighters explicit instructions to not allow the flight to overfly Oceana and Langley and they added, “you are weapons safe,” closing the loop on the earlier request for permission to fire across the bow.\u00a0 0910184256 Weapons Safe<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Whether by accident or by design of the exercise, NEADS briefly lost data on the Russian flight.\u00a0 The MCC immediately called the Coast Guard (simulated) and the sim cell reconstituted the data as a result.\u00a0 Meanwhile, the SEADS ID section, planning ahead, called for information on the wayward flight.\u00a0 0910183826 SEADS ID call<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

At the Weapons Director position Major Fox thought that a pilot fuel report was suspiciously low.\u00a0 He asked the fighters how they were configured and then suggested that they tap on their fuel gauges and provide a correct status.\u00a0 They did as directed and reported more fuel than before.\u00a0 The MCC found that exchange amazing.<\/p>\n

More seriously, the Battle Cab was planning a turnover of responsibility for the Russian flight to SEADS.\u00a0 As that was happening word came in of a bomb threat at WADS.\u00a0 It was uncertain if they were evacuating but the implication for NEADS was clear, they might have to expand coverage as they did earlier for SEADS.\u00a0 0910185317 WADS bomb threat<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Nearly two and one-half hours after the Special 27, deviating Russian commercial flight, was voice told to NEADS from Canada East, NEADS formally handing the track and the Atlantic City fighters to SEADS.\u00a0 Here is that clip including the notification to the NEADS MCC.\u00a0 0910190542 Handoff to SEADS<\/a><\/strong> It remains to be seen if NEADS will learn the ultimate disposition of both the track and the fighters.<\/p>\n

Looking ahead, NEADS will, in turn, receive a track and fighters from SEADS, a hijacked Cubana flight with armed persons on board seeking asylum.\u00a0 NEADS, knowing that the pace of the exercise was accelerating and not knowing what was ahead had already put Atlantic City on alert to provide two additional sets of fighters.\u00a0 Here is that exchange with the sim cell.\u00a0 0910185737 Atlantic City on further alert<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

What’s Next?<\/strong><\/p>\n

As NEADS personnel waited for the next exercise inject they took time to clear up the WADS bomb threat issue and learned that the event was over; there would be no expansion.\u00a0 0910191246 WADS bomb threat over<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Shortly before, they received a real-world Cubana track from SEADS, a flight from Havana to Montreal.\u00a0 Shortly after, Canada East called about the same track.\u00a0 Here is the SEADS notification.\u00a0 0910191116 Cubana flight real world<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

NEADS had also followed up with SEADS to make sure the Atlantic City fighters were being lateral told back to NEADS.\u00a0 In the course of that conversation SEADS asked if NEADS had gone to twelve (twelve hour shifts).\u00a0 The answer was no, that was scheduled for Wednesday, Sep 12.\u00a0 Here is that exchange.\u00a0 0910191845 Working Twelve<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

During what was likely a shift change, we hear about the resolution of the Atlantic City fighters and the first mention of a possible Cubana hijack.\u00a0 In this next clip we learn that SEADS was to provide a tanker for the Atlantic City fighters so that they could return home.\u00a0 We also learn that, according to the FO (Fighter Officer, a Battle Cab position) there was a potential hijack of a Cubana flight.\u00a0 The requirement discussed was to have SEADS lateral tell the track.\u00a0 0910193357 Hijack first mention<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

SEADS was lateral telling the Cubana flight, track C106, but the track dropped.\u00a0 NEADS called SEADS to restore the lateral tell and in the process received detailed information.\u00a0 The flight plan was Havana to Shannon.\u00a0 Three hijackers were seeking political asylum and the pilot was planning to head for JFK.\u00a0 SEADS had fighters in trail.\u00a0 In this next clip note the deliberate, check-list, approach to the hijacking, which was, according to SEADS, squawking the hijack code, 7500.\u00a0 The track had been reclassified a Special 15.\u00a0 0910195332 SEADS report to NEADS<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

The MCC was briefed and she discussed what to do next.\u00a0 The decision requirement was in the Battle Cab (Fighter Officer) and the NEADS floor speculated a requirement to scramble Atlantic City.\u00a0 In this next clip we learn that for the first time in the exercise tanker support will be available, at 2100Z.\u00a0 0910200022 MCC briefed<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

A few minutes later on the Guard (emergency) Channel for the exercise NEADS received a distress call.\u00a0 Guard was, and is, constantly monitored, by NEADS, and the other CONR sectors, real world and exercise..\u00a0 On the NEADS recording system, for those familiar with the NEADS audio files, that was channel 24, in this case DRM2, channel 24.\u00a0 A caller with a military call sign, Split 23, reported that he had been shot by Split 22.\u00a0 Here is that emergency call.\u00a0 0910201045 May Day Call<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

On the first rebroadcast NEADS responded immediately.\u00a0 In that audio clip we learn that Split 22 was an F-18 and that Split 23’s intentions were to recover to Oceana.\u00a0 0910201107 MCC Immediate Response<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

The Senior Director then learned that Split 22 could not escort Split 23.\u00a0 The shooting was deliberate and Split 23 declared Split 22 to be a “Rogue F18.”\u00a0 0910201213 Split 22 Rogue F18<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Thereafter, the Senior Director, Captain Shelley, was faced with two concurrent events, each requiring a scramble.\u00a0 How she handled that situation is important primary source information concerning 9-11.\u00a0 It depicts explicitly how NEADS handled concurrent multiple events on 9-10 during the exercise and how they would have done so on 9-11.\u00a0 It also establishes that the exercise was an advantage for NEADS, as NORAD stated and as Scott established when he wrote his trilogy of articles.\u00a0 NEADS did not have to recall anyone, they had sufficient assets on hand because of the exercise to handle multiple events.\u00a0 Their process and procedures were simple, as you are about to hear.\u00a0 They expanded operations using additional scopes and additional manpower.<\/p>\n

The beginning of that multi-event story is best told in Captain Shelley’s own voice as we listen to her grapple with the situation.\u00a0 I’ve broken up the audio file in manageable segments.<\/p>\n

Shelley dealt first with the rogue F18 asking for an additional Senior Director to assist.\u00a0 She then dealt with the hijack. This is implicit evidence of the mind set prevalent through out NORAD and FAA prior to 9-11 that managing a hijack would be an extended event to assist the pilot in reaching an intended destination.<\/p>\n

We start with the Guard May Day calls separately recorded, in context, on a different channel.\u00a0 Shelley had just learned that the Burlington fighters who landed at Atlantic City had recovered back to Burlington.\u00a0 She was arranging for their return to status when the May Day calls came in.\u00a0 0910200848 May Day calls in context<\/a><\/strong> She quickly delegated responsibility for the Rogue 18 issue and got that under control.\u00a0 0910201328 That’s Under Control<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Shelley had things organized within a few minutes and she turned her attention to managing both situations.\u00a0 Two scrambles had been ordered, Langley (not the dedicated air defense fighters) for the Rogue F18, and Bangor for tanker support.\u00a0 She received guidance from the MCC, Major Anderson, to hold off on a scramble from Atlantic City concerning the hijacked Cubana flight.\u00a0 0910201548 We’re Almost Done Here<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

The rogue F18 became a menace to air traffic and Washington Center (sim) made a series of two calls to NEADS.\u00a0 NEADS advised they knew about the aircraft and that their checklist said to take no action unless requested by the controlling agency.\u00a0 0910201932 Washington Center report<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Washington Center called back asking for assistance.\u00a0 NEADS had determined there was no controlling agency and reported that the F18 “was doing its own thing,” and that they “would take care of business.”\u00a0 0910202144 Rogue aircraft doing own thing<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

NEADS then checked with SEADS on the status of its returning Atlantic City fighters and the hijacked Cubana flight.\u00a0 They learned (incorrectly) that the fighters would recover at Langley and that the Cubana flight was still destined for JFK but had turned toward land toward the Myrtle Beach area.\u00a0 NEADS later learned that the Atlantic City fighters had enough fuel to return home.\u00a0 0910202553 SEADS Cubana Update<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

NEADS then received a call from a hurricane hunter that was going to penetrate the ADIZ and wanted to make sure NEADS knew who he was.\u00a0 NEADS immediately asked if the call was real world or exercise. It was a real world flight.\u00a0 0910202612 NOAA42<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

NEADS continued to work both events simultaneously.\u00a0 They were told that Split 23, the wingman who had been shot, had landed safely at Langley.\u00a0 For the rogue F18 they received specific rules of engagement.\u00a0 For the Cubana hijacked flight they observed that it had gone “feed dry” (was overland) and considered canceling the tanker scramble from Bangor and the fighter scramble from Atlantic City.\u00a0 They were also tasked to determine how much fuel the rogue fighter had and estimate its “play time.”\u00a0 In this next clip we hear both situations being handled concurrently in overlapping conversations.\u00a0 0910203211 ROE<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

The overlapping conversations continued.\u00a0 The SD reported to the MCC that Split 22 had 30 minutes “play time.”\u00a0 Concurrently, the Weapons Directors understood that the hijacked Cubana flight might land at Charleston; they immediately worked to put the Bangor scramble on hold.\u00a0 0910203451 30 Minutes Play Time<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

The Rules of Engagement were passed to the Langley (not the Hooligans) fighters.\u00a0 In this next audio clip we hear the passage of that authority from the SD to the Weapons Team and then to the pilot.\u00a0 The exchange is explicit evidence of how NEADS would engage any target, to include proper authentication. It is how they would have engaged on 9-11 if ordered to do so.\u00a0 (I speculate that on 9-11 they would also have been provided precise tactical instructions and very specific guidance on weaponry to use.)\u00a0 The audio also reveals that there was a civilian airliner in the area.\u00a0 Weapons worked with the ID technician to positively identify that track.\u00a0 0910203711 Cleared to Engage<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Rogue F18, the end game, how NEADS would have operated on 9-11<\/strong><\/p>\n

The rogue F18 landed at Baltimore (BWI) on his own volition.\u00a0 The NEADS audio files reveal the explicit steps the Sector took to deal with shoot-down authority in a populated area against a target that was also a potential threat to the NCA.<\/p>\n

Here is that story and we begin with a legitimate diversion by the sim cell as a distraction, a call from Cape May (sim) Search and Rescue.\u00a0 Here is how the SD, Captain Shelley handled that situation.\u00a0 0910204105 Cape May SAR<\/a><\/p>\n

The first step taken by NEADS was to direct the pilots to broadcast a warning on the guard frequency.\u00a0 0910204415 Broadcast on Guard<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

The second step was to determine the threat and the fuel state of the fighters.\u00a0 0910204608 Threat and Fuel State<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

The third step was to determine the results of the call on guard.\u00a0 0910204725 Guard call results<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

The fourth step was to determine what was on the ground in the vicinity.\u00a0 The fighters were again given engagement authority because the rogue F18 had turned toward the NCA.\u00a0 That authority was soon withheld when the fighters reported they were over a populated area.\u00a0 The solution was to force the F18 out over the water.\u00a0 The pilots then reported that it looked like he was going to land at Baltimore.\u00a0 0910204828 Ground Situation<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

The fifth step was to let the F18 land so long as he stayed in the landing pattern.\u00a0 If he deviated they were cleared to engage.\u00a0 0910204951 Monitor landing<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Once he landed the sixth step was to provide further instructions to the fighters.\u00a0 0910205220 Landed what next<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

The seventh step was to ask through FAA (sim) that the pilot be apprehended.\u00a0 An ID Technician made that call as the MCC coordinated events.\u00a0 The SD was told the runway was closed but if anything took off the fighters were cleared to engage.\u00a0 0910205628 Guard against takeoff<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

The eight and final step was to ensure that airport security had the situation under control.\u00a0 The ID Technician made the call to Baltimore (sim).\u00a0 0910205808 F18 surrounded<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

That left one loose end, the disposition of the Cubana hijacked flight.\u00a0 The AST informed the new MCC that the Special had landed at Shaw Air Force Base.\u00a0 The event was apparently resolved by SEADS and it never became an issue for NEADS.\u00a0 0910210330 Landed at Shaw<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Quiet Time<\/strong><\/p>\n

The NEADS floor was quite during the evening hours.\u00a0 However, there were five administrative events that expand on our knowledge of NEADS operations.<\/p>\n

First we hear a request to make a PA announcement concerning Force Protection Bravo.\u00a0 Recall that NEADS had been at Bravo for sometime for exercise Vigilant Guardian.\u00a0 An announcement was supposed to be made every two hours, according to the request.\u00a0 The requestor was told that things were relatively quiet and to go ahead.\u00a0 This is primary source validation that Force Protection was an integral part of exercise Vigilant Guardian.\u00a0 0910223235 FP Bravo Announcement<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Next is a point out, real world, on a Cubana flight by FAA’s Cleveland Center to the NEADS ID Section.\u00a0 This clip verifies the close working relationship between NEADS and not just FAA’s Boston, New York, and Washington centers but interior CONUS centers, as well.\u00a0 I will have more to say about that relationship in a Vigilant Guardian 01 summary article, currently in draft.\u00a0 0910225456 Cleveland Center<\/a><\/strong> Within an hour, NEADS received a similar call from Washington Center concerning a scheduled Aeroflot flight, Dulles to Moscow.\u00a0 0910234421 Washington Center<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Third is a real world annoucement that NEADS was partial mission capable.\u00a0 This had to do with a command and control link (TADIL)<\/a><\/strong> that was being worked by NEADS technicians.\u00a0 The issue was briefed to the MCC for his information and approval.\u00a0 The announcement also demonstrates a consistent NEADS practice to clearly separate real world and exercise events.\u00a0 0910230150 Real World Announcement<\/a><\/strong> A few minutes later, the MCC announced that the NEADS SOC was fully mission capable [full duplex].\u00a0 0910231920 Mission Capable<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Fourth was a conversation which confirmed the NEADS three-shift status, they had not yet gone to twelve-hour shifts.\u00a0 The caller asked if Major Nasypany was coming in on “mids” and was told that Charlie Crew as coming in and that Nasypany [Alpha Crew] we be in first thing in the morning.\u00a0 0910231330 Nasypany status<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

Fifth, the Wing at Otis called to advised that both alert aircraft were on status.\u00a0 One had been taken off status for a systems check.\u00a0 The caller advised that the alert fighters had been configured for the ATO<\/a><\/strong> (air tasking order for the next day,9-11).\u00a0 We know from testimony and documents collected by the 9-11 Commission that the air defense fighters on 9-11 carried additional fuel and armament because of the Russian air exercise.\u00a0 That configuration would have been specified in the ATO.\u00a0 0910234648 Otis Status Real World<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

The end of the day<\/strong><\/p>\n

The rest of the day was uneventful as of 0400Z (2400 local)\u00a0 There was one additional update from Washington Center of an Aeroflot flight.\u00a0 And NEADS later handed the flight off to another sector.<\/p>\n

Charlie crew ended the day with an intelligence briefing.\u00a0 Shortly before midnight the MCC made the announcement.\u00a0 0911033620 Intel Briefing<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

My assessment is that the briefing pertained to the Russian exercise, an exercise that had Ben Sliney’s attention at the FAA’s Herndon Center the next morning.\u00a0 081709 Oakland Sliney Russian Missile Shot<\/a><\/strong> There is no evidence that NEADS ever talked to Herndon Center during Exercise Vigilant Guardian.<\/p>\n

That next morning, September 11, 2001, Ben Sliney National Operations Manager and operator of the National Air System, and Colonel Robert Marr, NEADS Commander and defender of the National Air System on the East coast, would fight a losing battle against a double envelopment terrorist hijack attack.\u00a0 Demonstrably, neither Sliney or Marr was aware of the others existence.\u00a0 The only thing they had in common was an interest in the Russian exercise.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Introduction In previous articles in this series we have listened to NEADS respond to one major scenario on each exercise day.\u00a0 On Sep 6, the scenario concerned a military C-130 that was behaving strangely.\u00a0 On Sep 7, the scenario was a defecting Aeroflot plane.\u00a0 On Sep 8, NEADS exercised counter narcotics procedures dealing with a … Continue reading 9-11: Exercise Vigilant Guardian; Sep 10<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_feature_clip_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false},"categories":[40],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3400","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-exercise-vigilant-guardian-2001"],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3400","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=3400"}],"version-history":[{"count":181,"href":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3400\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3546,"href":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3400\/revisions\/3546"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=3400"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=3400"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=3400"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}