{"id":2157,"date":"2010-03-16T20:06:00","date_gmt":"2010-03-17T00:06:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/?p=2157"},"modified":"2010-03-16T20:06:00","modified_gmt":"2010-03-17T00:06:00","slug":"chaos-theory-9-11-a-critical-period-examined-in-real-time","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/?p=2157","title":{"rendered":"Chaos Theory: 9-11; a critical period, examined in real time"},"content":{"rendered":"

Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n

The purpose of this article is to pull together multiple topics into a coherent whole to assess information that FAA was receiving and processing in real time.\u00a0 Our source is the audio file for Operations Phone 5115, Position 15, Air Traffic Control System Command Center (Herndon Center).<\/p>\n

The line was left open to FAA Headquarters and to the FAA tactical net.\u00a0 That provides historians and other researchers a real time window into the workings of FAA as a whole, thanks to the initiative of a Herndon Center air traffic specialist who decided on his own to leave the line open.\u00a0 No lines or positions were recorded at FAA Headquarters on 9-11.<\/p>\n

The Source
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n

In this article we will examine the second of one set of four cassette tapes provided to the Commission by FAA.\u00a0 That tape was digitized and is documented as 5 DCC 1912 Ops Phone 5115, Pos 15 1315-1415 UTC.\u00a0 Historians and serious researchers who want to upload and study the tape can do so here<\/strong><\/a>.\u00a0 The upload will take about one-half hour and will be well worth the effort.<\/p>\n

My further recommendation is that interested persons make the investment in an audio analysis program such as Adobe Audition.<\/em> Such an investment will allow you to quickly find and time stamp key conversations and to enhance and clarify background conversations.<\/p>\n

One procedural caution.\u00a0 Each FAA tape provided to the Commission has a lead-in certification by a Quality Assurance specialist that the tape is a true recording.\u00a0 The duration of that\u00a0 certification must be measured and subtracted from the time ruler for whatever playback software one is using.\u00a0 The lengths of the certifications vary.\u00a0 For example, the certification for the first tape in the series lasts 59 seconds.\u00a0 The certification on the tape of interest, 1315-1415 UTC (9:15-10:15 EDT), lasts 16 seconds.<\/p>\n

Clarification of Some Issues
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n

A close review of this tape resolves some things, clarifies others, and, in my case, provides additional insight into things I worked on while on the Commission Staff<\/p>\n

First, it is clear from this tape that the FAA primary net merged with the tactical net.\u00a0 Although the primary net was activated at 9:20 no operational information was ever passed; it was still born, as I’ve stated in a different article.<\/p>\n

Second, I have taken the position in several articles that the FAA’s Regions as\u00a0 administrative headquarters had no business in the midst of the battle being fought by Herndon Center.\u00a0 This tape supports that position.<\/p>\n

Third, it is now clear that the Herndon Center reference of going to the CARF (Central Altitude Reservation Facility) for military support had nothing to do with scrambling fighters.\u00a0 That was always nonsensical to me, given my understanding of the CARF as I discussed in the final article of the Scott Trilogy.\u00a0 The reference is to obtaining clearance for the E4B, VIVI 36, which had asked Patterson Tower (Wright-Patterson AFB) for clearance to fly a Presidential Support mission to JFK airport.<\/p>\n

Fourth, the conflation of information concerning the four incident aircraft and D 1989 is evident throughout.\u00a0 In a recent article I said I would document the point at which Herdon Center had had enough and interrupted to say so.\u00a0 You will hear that interruption and the clarity with which Herdon Center stated what was known.<\/p>\n

Fifth, it is clear that information was being passed in real time concerning the fate of UA 93, less so for AA 77.\u00a0 Moreover, if one listens to background voices the passing of information up the chain of command can be heard.\u00a0 There is no question that Headquarters FAA had far more real time information than was made available to Jane Garvery or that she shared with Richard Clarke.\u00a0 The SVTS was activated at 9:25 and was operational by 9:40.\u00a0 Garvey mentioned only AA 11 and UA 175, according to Clarke.\u00a0 Why was that so?\u00a0 SVTS was a closed system; Garvey did not know what her Operations Center knew.<\/p>\n

Sixth, it is clear that the evacuation of key government buildings came after the Pentagon incident.<\/p>\n

Seventh, it is clear how the terms “air phone” and “cell phone” became conflated.\u00a0 That happened in real time as we shall find.<\/p>\n

The Situation at 9:15<\/strong><\/p>\n

The only two planes of interest at Herndon Center and FAA Headquarters were AA 11 and UA 175, both were estimated to have hit the World Trade Center towers.\u00a0 The fact that AA 77 was lost was known within FAA at Indianapolis Center and Great Lakes Region, only.<\/p>\n

The only request for military assistance other than Boston Center’s initiative to Otis was by New York Center to Herndon.\u00a0 New York Center called off the request when they learned of the Otis scramble.\u00a0 That brief conversation between Pete Mulligan (ZNY) and Rick Bell (Ops Phone 5110, Herndon) took place at 9:02.<\/p>\n

For those interested in real time news reporting, the line at Position 13, Herndon Center was open and Bryant Gumbel’s coverage can be continuously heard clearly in the background.<\/p>\n

Chaos unfolds<\/strong><\/p>\n

It started about 9:16 with a suggestion from Boston Center (ZBW) about a warning to aircraft to increase cockpit security.\u00a0 ZBW followed that at 9:20 with concern about D 1989.\u00a0 ZBW had assessed the situation and determined that the hijack profile, from its perspective, was transcontinental flights originating in Boston.\u00a0 The one other flight that fit the profile was D 1989.<\/p>\n

We do not hear the false report of AA 11 still airborne, but the aftermath is clearly captured.\u00a0 Metro D. C. was ground stopped at 9:24.\u00a0 Four minutes later Herndon Center asked Cleveland if they had AA 11 on radar; the answer was no.\u00a0 Shortly thereafter everything was ground stopped everywhere.<\/p>\n

Herndon Center then initiated a nationwide airborne inventory at 9:31.\u00a0 , Cleveland Center (ZOB) immediately reported shortly after 9:32 that UA 93 had a bomb on board.\u00a0 That was the compelling transmission and chaos began to prevail despite Herndon Center’s best efforts to keep the situation bounded.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Introduction The purpose of this article is to pull together multiple topics into a coherent whole to assess information that FAA was receiving and processing in real time.\u00a0 Our source is the audio file for Operations Phone 5115, Position 15, Air Traffic Control System Command Center (Herndon Center). The line was left open to FAA … Continue reading Chaos Theory: 9-11; a critical period, examined in real time<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[32],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2157","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-z-drafts"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2157","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=2157"}],"version-history":[{"count":20,"href":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2157\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2222,"href":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2157\/revisions\/2222"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=2157"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=2157"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.oredigger61.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=2157"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}