September 11, 2013
Publishcd an update acknowledging three important items; an article about Congressional oversight by the co-chairs of the 9/11 Commission, a blog article concerning what the Commission Report counsels concerning the situation in Syria, and acknowledgement of important work concerning the radar disappearance of American Airlines flight 77. The later work by Tom Lusch has been reviewed by two Commission Staff members and found to be an important extension and refinement of the work of the Commission Staff.
July 4, 2013
Published a short commentary under a new category, Occasional Comments, adding perspective to the nation’s holiday, July 4th. Twelve years ago that day, Khalid al Mihdhar reentered the United States, the last of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers to arrive. The article, “9-11: July 4, 2001; a retrospective comment,” establishes that national, state, and local agencies had two months and a week to thwart the transition of the attack from planning to action. Once the hijackers successfully entered the National Airspace System and were airborne, FAA and NORAD had less than two hours, to no avail.
The presumption is that those same national, state, and local agencies paid extra attention to who might be arriving on the nation’s shores today.
June 18, 2013
I am still very much tied up with personal family issues, specifically the health of my father-in-law. Research and writing will continue when I can manage the time. In the interim, I updated the What’s In The Queue page to give readers, researchers, and historians a sense of what lies ahead. There is much to do and not nearly enough time in which to do it.
March 22, 2013
I will be away from my files for at least two weeks and will not be publishing. My wife and I are taking the family to Disney World to celebrate our 50th wedding anniversary. We are taking the auto train and will drive back through St Augustine, Florida, and then go to our home in Pawley’s Island, South Carolina, to spend time with my father-in-law. Thanks to all readers for your continued interest and attention.
March 22, 2013
Made a long overdue update to the Welcome page. I included a link to the “NORAD, Crux of the Matter” article. I updated the count of in-depth articles about the day of 9/11 to include the five-part review based on the voice of the Mission Crew Commander, Major Kevin Nasypany, as recorded at the Northeast Air Defense Sector. The count of detailed reviews now stands at four, and counting.
February 13, 2013
Published a detailed article, “9-11: NORAD; Crux of the Matter, two perspectives.” The article was prompted by a discussion with a family member about a Kevin Ryan article, “The Case Against Ralph Eberhart, NORAD’s 9/11 Commander,” published in the “Foreign Policy Journal.” The family member advised that there was sufficient interest in Ryan’s article for me to put it in perspective. I have done that.
I state that Ryans’s article will stand or fall on its own merits; as will mine. I further state that the long reach of history may well conclude that the air defense story, while interesting, pales in comparison to the multiple defensive errors made by the Nation in the hours, days, weeks, months, and years prior to the attack.
January 16, 2013
Added a brief audio clip to the report card which establishes that Boston Center controllers were warning pilots in the air to increase cockpit security as early as 9:10 EDT.
Published a short article providing a different perspective on how Boston Center handled the hijacking of AA 11. The article focuses on the converstions between a controller and American Airlines flight 269, as recorded at the Departure Control position, Traffic Management Unit, Boston Center.
January 15, 2013
Published a short article concerning the hijacker seating arrangements on 9/11. The information comes from an MFR I wrote based on my travel with Team 7 to the headquarters of both United and American Airlines. I also include the specific time that ACARS documented the warning to UA93 to increase cockpit security and the time of the crew’s response. That exchange occurred about 10 minutes after Boston Center requested that Herndon Center pass such a warning to pilots in the sky. See the link, immediately below to Report Card for the audio file of that Boston Center request.
January 13, 2013
Updated the day of Report Card to downgrade the Air Traffic Control System Command Center (Herndon Center) from high marks to low marks. Herndon Center did not react promptly to a 9:15 EDT request from Boston Center to notify all centers to put out the word to increase cockpit security. Even though the reference was to planes departing Boston, by that time Herndon Center should have taken command of the situation. Herndon Center did not because the protocol was that such advice to pilots in the air should come from the carriers, not air traffic control. Boston’s initiative, to include warning planes on its own recognizance, reinforces the high marks given to that Center.
January 12, 2013
Updated the recent article on Quit 25 (Langley lead fighter) and Venus 77 (B747 ‘mystery plane’) to clarify the term “AFIO.” The precise terminology is “Authorization for Interceptor Operations,” as specified in Appendix 16, FAA Handbook 7610.4J, dated 11/3/98. A Mode 3 code for the fighters is not specified but the practice was that fighters under AFIO conditions would squawk mode 3 code 7777, “quad sevens.”
January 8, 2013
Published a short article documenting how Boston Center learned of the impact of a second plane [UA 175] into the World Trade Center and its immediate reaction to the New York Center requirement for a ground stop. The important point is that Boston Center started by notifying facilities to ground stop commercial flights and then shortened its order to be “ground stop everything.” This is one reason why FAA facilities were confused as to whether the ground stop, and subsequent order to land all planes, pertained to military, law enforcement, and first responder flights.
January 4, 2013
Updated and expanded the list of questions I posed to the truth community on December 31, 2011. Six questions have been added predicated on false flag as an alternative explanation of the events of 9/11. Two general questions have also been added. One asks what the air defenders were supposed to . The other asks about the truth community tendency to take a stand based on a single piece of anecdotal information and concurrently deny an explanation that is based on the convergence of a body of information that includes primary source data.
January 3, 2013
Published a second article, “9-11: AA11; Initial Notifications, the Boston Center perspective,” in response to Paul Schreyer’s “anomalies” article and companion You Tube video. Primary source information establishes that calls similar to what Colin Scoggins described were made, but by Dan Bueno to, first, Herndon Center and, second, Cape TRACON. There were no prior calls to/from NEADS. Scoggins worked in close proximity to both Bueno and Joe Cooper, the person who first called NEADS. Scoggins likely conflated events and compressed time, something that nearly all participants in and eyewitnesses to the events of 9/11 did, retrospectively.