9-11 Revisited

March 27, 2010

Published an article concerning the FAA’s Tactical Net under the category, Linear Processes.  The article documents the merger of the Tactical Net and the Primary Net.  The Primary Net was activated at 9:20.  Within a minute the FBI, a designated participant in the Primary Net, was added to the Tactical Net.

The FBI caller left his line open and we have a nearly eight minute real time window into the FBI’s SIOC.  We learn that, like everyone else at the national level, the FBI was in the process of getting itself organized.

That open line is available because the line at Operations Position 28, Herndon Center, was also left open, providing a window not only to the FAA’s Washington Operations Center but through it to the FBI’s SIOC.  Near the end of the 1315-1415 UTC tape from Position 28 is a background conversation which clearly shows that misinformation about the approach of UA 93 to the nation’s capital was being passed along to an undetermined entity.  The background voice clearly stated, “go pass that.”

I have put in a request to NARA to provide the audio tape for 1415-1515 UTC at Position 28.  This is a continuing story.

March 22, 2010

Published an addendum to the article: “The Ghosts of 9-11: AA 77; a real ghost, unseen (part 2),” to add an important conversation between Herndon Center and Indianapolis Center.  The audio file is embedded in the addendum.

The Herndon call was from the National Operations Manager position asking specific questions about AA 77.  Herndon was told that the plane was off radar and lost.  Indianapolis Center assessed that AA 77 was not involved in events at the World Trade Center.  Herndon Center assessed that the Sears Tower in Chicago was the most likely target.

At that time, 9:25, there is no evidence that anyone above the scope level at Dulles TRACON had any actionable information whatsoever.  Dulles controllers did not immediately realize what they were seeing and the general alarm was not sounded until 8 minutes later.

March 21, 2010

Published an addendum to the article; “9-11: War Games; an update.” The addendum covers a planning conference recorded at the National Operations Manager position at the Herndon Center.  Primary source audio from 8:15 to 8:20 covers a national planning conference dealing specifically with the Russian exercise.

The National Airspace (NAS) managers were well aware of the exercise, had dealt with it the night before, and were preparing to deal with it again on September 11.  Ben Sliney is identified as a person knowledgeable of both past and upcoming events concerning the exercise.

The NAS was focused on two areas; Boston/Montreal, and Edmonton/Anchorage and would publish “tracks” so that participants, including international carriers, could have them for a second planning conference at 9:30.  Herndon Center announced that it would also publish a reminder that compliance with a “Prestwick NOTAM (Notice to Airmen)” was mandatory.

March 17, 2010

Added a short article, “9-11: UA 93; airphone call, not a cellphone call,” under the UA 93 category. FAA’s Great Lakes Region passed to the FAA Tactical Net a report from the Oak Brook, IL, police about an airphone call from UA 93 reporting three armed hijackers on board.  Immediately, the word “airphone” was translated to be “cellphone” in real time as the report is passed along.

This is specific near-real time evidence that the two terms became interchangeable at FAA Headquarters.  Those who speculate that calls from the hijacked aircraft did not occur are simply wrong.

March 16, 2010

Published a short addendum to the Delta 1989 article; “9-11: Delta 1989; Addendum, Confirmed not trip by Delta.”  An included Herndon Center audio clip contains a key conversation with Delta Airlines.  Delta suggested that it was Boston Center who had the concern about its flight, not them.

I added some perspective on Delta 1989 in terms of Chaos Theory and assess that conflation of near-concurrent events concerning D 1989, AA 77, and US 93 was confused in the aftermath by Norman Mineta, General Arnold, and Colonel Marr.  That confusion has led some researchers to be misinformed to this day about the attack the morning of September 11, 2001.

March 16, 2010

Added a section to the article “Chaos Theory: 9-11; times of interest” to account for a 9:20 conversation between Herndon Center and Dulles TRACON concerning AA 77.  The Dulles TRACON Traffic Management Coordinator had no situational awareness of AA 77 and observed that it was over Indiana just as the Herndon Center caller broke in to say they just had a report of a 757 lost on radar west of Virginia.  Audio of the 9:19:25 to 9:20:37 conversation is embedded in the article.

March 10, 2010

Embedded an audio clip in the Battlefield article to establish that Newark was ordered to stop all departures at 9:04:40, 23 minutes after UA departed.  The order was recorded at Herndon Center, Operations Position 25 and was likely issued by New York Center, ZNY.

March 9, 2010

The “What’s New” page became unwieldy, so I divided it up.  For new readers, the archived “What’s New” pages provide a good thumbnail of posts over the past several months, to include links in most cases.

Also, new readers should look at the “Welcome,” and “Joining the Commission Staff” pages, and the article, “Framework for Analysis.”

March 7, 2010

Published a short article, War Games; an update, under the category “Exercises and War Games,” to account for a brief conversation at one of Herndon Center’s west positions with Oakland.  Oakland asked to speak with the NOM about the Russian “missile shot.”  The audio clip is embedded in the article.

March 6, 2010

Published a short article, “9-11: VIVI-36; a national airborne command post, not a mystery either,” under the “Mystery Plane” category.  The article accounts for the National Airborne Command Post (NAOC) E4B aircraft, VIVI 36, request for clearance to JFK for Presidential support.  The primary source audio is embedded in the article.

There is nothing unusual or remarkable about the request.  The time was 9:39; the President was on the move to get airborne, the NMCC had just convened an Air Threat Conference, and a second E4B, Venus 77 was obtaining clearance to depart VFR from Andrews AFB.  At the time a decision had not been made as to the President’s destination.

March, 6, 2010

Published a short article “9-11: Transponders and Ghosts; the search for AA 11,” under the category “Transponders and Ghosts.”  In this article I document air traffic control conversations which show that Herndon Center was concerned about the report that AA 11 was still airborne.

Two audio clips are embedded.  The first documents that by 9:24 the order had gone out to ground stop everything coming into the D. C. metro area.  The second confirms that by at least 9:28 AA 11’s old flight plan was still tracking in the TSD (Traffic Situation Display) system.  Herdon Center called Cleveland Center noting that AA 11 was just crossing the boundary (into Cleveland airspace) and asked Cleveland if they had the plane on radar.  They did not.

March 2, 2010

Added a second addendum to the Cockpit Notification article to contrast and compare the situational awareness at Cleveland Center and Boston Center.  Relevant audio is embedded and a link is provided that leads to the Cleveland Center, Lorrain Sector, tape for the period 9:19 to 9:33, the period of the hijacking of UA 93.

February 26, 2010

Addendum to the Cockpit Notification article to establish that the idea may have originated with FAA’s New England Region, ANE.  ANE persisted, calling first the National Traffic Manager, East, and when rebuffed calling the National Operations Manager line, direct.

The ANE focus was on internationals and ZBW.  The initiative triggered a linear process to work through the carriers and their dispatchers to make the notifications.  The ANE plea “to do something” did not translate into a transcendent effort to notify UA 93.

February 23, 2010

Published under Chaos Theory an article about Cockpit Notifications.  I included primary source audio to show that as early as 9:10 Boston Center (ZBW) was providing cockpit warnings to aircraft, despite the fact that such notifications were a carrier prerogative.

The ZBW non-linear approach contrasts significantly with the Cleveland Center approach.  Cleveland followed existing linear policy and left notification responsibility to the carriers.

I compare the case of United 93 to demonstrate the relative timeliness of a non-linear solution on 9-11.

Added cockpit notifications to the linear process list.

February 23, 2010

The Department of Homeland Security published its Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report; A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland, February 2010.

Secretary Janet Napolitano began her introductory letter by stating: “Pursuant to the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, I am pleased to submit the first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR).”

The first words in the introduction are: “The story of homeland security is inextricably linked to the story of 9/11. The vivid images of the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and smoldering fields in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, portrayed a Nation obviously shaken by the catastrophic surprise attacks that had occurred on its soil.”

A few voices argue that the events of 9-11 were not a surprise and that there needs to be a new investigation.  Clearly, the Executive Branch acknowledges the “catastrophic surprise attacks,” and has moved on.  Twice Congress has invested political capital to conduct investigations; first the Congressional Joint Inquiry followed closely by the 9-11 Commission.  There is no Congressional will for yet another investigation and that is not going to happen.  Congress, too, has moved on.

February 19, 2010

For those who check the “What’s in the Queue” page periodically.  Here is a quick update.  My next article will be about the Otis Scramble, a neglected piece of work.

The audio projects will be longer range; I need to collect the necessary files and then time-verify conversational segments.  The overall objective is to tell the story of 9-11 in the voices of the day.  John Farmer referred to our incomplete staff audio monograph.  It is my intention to complete that work in some fashion.

Why is that important?  The audio files are the most important primary source; they inform us about ordinary people going about their business as professionally as they could as the nation came under attack.

February 16, 2010

Published a third article in the category “Framework For Analysis,” “9-11: The Attack; A Different Perspective, Khalid Sheik Mohammed.”  The article is based on defense exhibits used at the Moussaoui trial. In addition to examining the attack from a different perspective, I provide my perspective about the system “blinking red,” and about the August 6, 2001, President’s Daily Brief.

February 16, 2010

I just learned of a serious forensic software modeling effort concerning the events of 9-11.  The site belongs to Mike J. Wilson and he has an included page, “9/11 Modeling, Renderings and Animations,” of particular interest to historians and serious researchers.

His current postings deal with the final moments of AA 77.  Here is the You Tube link, titled: “911 Case Study: Pentagon Flight 77.”  His findings are consistent with and expand the work of the 9-11 Commission.  As a preview, he accounts, graphically, for every light pole clipped by AA 77 on its final approach.

February 15, 2010

Added an important link, Terrorist Travel Staff Monograph.

The linked document is; “9/11 and Terrorist Travel, Staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.”  It details the activities of the 19 hijackers as they entered the country and conducted their business.  The account builds on the work of the Congressional Joint Inquiry and adds significant detail to the Commission Report, itself.  This is the definitive source, one that historians and other serious researchers concerned with the events of 9/11 will want to use in their work.

February 8, 2010

Added an item on the Current News page with a link to a Feingold/Hamilton Wall Street Journal article on February 7th.  The issue is that the HPSCI and the SSCI do not have appropriations authority.  Both the Congressional Joint Inquiry and the 9-11 Commission recognized the need for Congressional reform.  That has not happened.

February 7, 2010

Edited the “Battlefield” article to show that Atta had to re-enter the National Airspace System (NAS) at Logan.  His negative reaction on being told he had to pass through security a second time indicates that he thought entering the NAS at Portland allowed him to avoid security screening at Logan.

February 4, 2010

Published a second article under “Framework for Analysis”;  “9-11: The Battlefield; Attack, Counterattack, and Operation Noble Eagle.”  The article defines the 9-11 battlefield as the National Airspace System (NAS).

I establish that the NAS was operated by the FAA’s Air Traffic Control System Command Center (Herndon Center), commanded by the National Operations Manager, Benedict Sliney.  I further establish that the NAS was defended by NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS).

I provide details on both the attack and the counterattack and set the scene for the transition to Operation Noble Eagle, a story that will be written by Air Force historians.

January 30, 2010

Added an addendum at the end of the recent article on NORAD, should it and could it have done more.  NARA recently released a NORAD post-facto study which considered the what-ifs if NORAD and the nation had retained a more robust air defense posture from the past.  The study’s conclusions are consistent with the what-if analysis in my initial article.

January 26, 2010

Added a link to the Moussaoui trial documents

January 25, 2010

Published a personal comment article on AA 77 and the Pentagon.  I state that the ASCE Pentagon Building Performance Report is conclusive.  I invite anyone with lingering questions to visit the Pentagon Memorial and sit on the bench of the youngest victim and ask them.

January 15, 2010

Reportedly, NORAD conducted a Falcon Virgo exercise in the DC area last night.  Here is the public affairs release.

“Exercise Falcon Virgo is designed to hone NORAD’s intercept and identification operations as well as procedural tests of the NCR Visual Warning System. Civil Air Patrol aircraft, Air Force F-16s and Coast Guard HH-65 Dolphin helicopters will participate in the exercise.”

Of interest is the fact that there is now a National Capital Region Visual Warning System.  It is not clear from the release whether FAA or NEADS was the controller for the “intercept and identification operations.”

January 14, 2010

Added a link on the Commission Report page to an opinion article in USA Today by Commissioners Kean and Hamilton.

January 9, 2010

Added a brief comment on the Commission Report page linking to a New York Times editorial concerning the inability of Congress to start homeland security and intelligence oversight reform on its own turf.  On the Hill, it is business as usual.

January 6, 2010

Added an insert to the recent NORAD article to account for the fact that by 9:10 AA 77 could have been tracked by NEADS, if cued by FAA.

Added a short item to the page, “Commission Report,” to document and link an Op-Ed New York Times article by Commissioner Kean and Team 8 Leader, John Farmer Jr., concerning the failed attempt to down a Northwest Airlines plane.

January 5, 2010

Published, after several months deliberation, an article “9-11: NORAD, Should It and Could It Have Done More.” The answers are ‘probably not,’ with one exception, and ‘unlikely.’  The one exception has to do with coordination, control, and communication.  Despite exercise objectives to the contrary, NORAD (and the NMCC and FAA) demonstrably did not realistically test or exercise communications protocols and procedures concerning hijackings.

Moved “times of interest” under Chaos Theory and added an article listing additional specific times–time frames actually– of interest to our discussion on Chaos Theory.  This new list complements an earlier list of linear processes that the government used or attempted to use on 9-11.  Both lists are necessary as we continue our discussion of 9-11 in terms of Chaos Theory.

January 4, 2010

Published an article: “9-11: The Andrews Fighters; standing up, not so easy.” A recent web article provided useful information on conversations leading up to the circa 9:35 effort to get the Andrews fighters airborne.  However, the author’s premise was backwards; he described the conversations as part of a “stand down.”  The conversations he referenced are an important addition, in context, to the Andrews story.  Hence this article.

Created a new page, Commission Report, to document commentary on the report.  The first item describes part of a conversation between Al Michaels and Tony Kornheiser in the aftermath of the failed terrorist attempt against a Northwest Airlines plane.  Michaels’ testimony about the Commission Report and Commissioners Hamilton and Kean is indicative of the report’s acceptance by the media