The purpose of this article is to provide an online location for audio clips of interest, ones that have not been integrated into a formal article.
March 3, 2014
This is an important conversation between Sergeant Powell, the Senior Director Technician at Huntress (NEADS) and Colin Scoggins, the Military Operations Specialist at Boston Center (ZBW).
Powell initiated the call to inform ZBW that they would control the Otis fighters, once airborne. Scoggins thought the call was in reference to AA11. The conversation sorted itself out and turned to AA11. Scoggins was still looking for altitude on the missing aircraft advising that they had lost it on radar.
The important point is that as of 8:52 EDT the latest data that Huntress had was that AA11 was 20 miles south of JFK. This explains why the Senior Director sent the Otis fighters to a holding pattern in a military training area well south of New York City.
Once airborne, the Otis fighters learned that their target was gone and were asked by air traffic control what they wanted to do. They advised they would check with NEADS. At NEADS, the Mission Crew Commander directed they fly to New York, still a go. His reference was not to the city but to the holding pattern south of the city.
NEW! Secret Service requests fighter support, added December 4, 2012
Primary source audio files from Andrews Tower establish that the Secret Service request to Andrews for fighter support occurred after the Pentagon was struck and was made to support the return of Air Force One. Specifically, the request was for fighter support over the White House. There is no evidence that the actual request came before that time and that it had anything to do with the approach of the fast moving unknown that was AA 77.
0948 0950 Secret Service request for fighter coverage
According to the audio file, the Secret Service had called FAA Headquarters and Andrews was now being alerted to the requirement. At 0950 EDT, Andrews Tower stated that they would call the Secret Service to get the requirement direct.
I have provided the two relevant conversations as a continuous, near-three minute file with considerable dead time. I do this to show that events on 9/11, in real time, occurred in measurable time. It is not possible to retrospectively compress time and make events appear to have occurred more quickly than they did.
AA77 over Missouri on ETMS [TSD] 1030 EDT
This clip comes from the open line between John White at Herndon Center and Doug Davis at FAA HQ. FAA was still confused about UA175 and about the possibility that one of the tower collapses was, in fact, yet a 3d aircraft into the WTC. In macabre tone, Davis observed, “the top of the tower collapsed, I hope.” What he meant was that he hoped that what they saw was not the inpact of another hijacked aircraft.
Thereafter, John White turned his attention to the status of AA77 and asked, “have we found that American? That was AA 77, right? How do we get the ETMS [TSD] tracking him over Missouri? That was a filled in target a little while ago.” This observation by White documents that AA77, notionally, ‘continued’ on its original flight plan in the Traffic Display System. 1030 AA77 over Missouri NTMO East Line 4530
Secret Service false report concerning F-16s
At about 1020 EDT, FAA HQ asked Herndon Center about a report from Secret Service trying to confirm that F-16s had intercepted a 767 en route Washington from JFK. I provide this clip to establish the degree of uncertainty that faced the Andrews pilots before they launched later that morning.
The Secret Service was in direct contact with the FAA via National TRACON. FAA HQ was in direct contact with the White House via the SVTS (secure video teleconference system) conference and was also in communication with the Secretary of Transportation, Norman Mineta, who by that time was in the PEOC (President’s Emergency Operations Center) with the Vice President. Mineta was in communication with Monte Belger who was in direct contact with Jeff Griffith. Griffith was being fed information by Doug Davis who was on an open line with John White at Herdon Center, as recorded on the East NTMO admiinistrative telephone line.
An important point, as established in this clip, is that between Herndon Center and FAA HQ (Griffith) all aircraft were resolved except UA175. The UA93 impact site had previously been established by coordinates passed to FAA HQ. Those coordinates were obtained by the Falcon private jet that circled the crash site at the request of Cleveland Center.
It is my assessment that the false report from the Secret Service, one of many that morning, was a belated garble of the report that AA11 was still airborne and headed for Washington D.C. It is also my assessment that FAA HQ knew and, by extension, the Secret Service, the PEOC, and the Vice President knew that UA93 was down. Nevertheless, individuals at several locations, including the PEOC, were convinced that the notional path of UA93 as established in a new flight plan entered by Cleveland Center, represented a real threat. It was on that basis that the Secret Service/PEOC directed Andrews fighters to respond. They did so under the assumption they were hunting UA93.
I provide all this information and this clip as a precursor to reassessing the Andrews story. Here is the clip. 1020 Secret Service False Report
ZNY Military Desk call to NEADS
I post this call as an example of the time it takes to complete even a short call. The military desk at New York Center (ZNY) was tasked to find a number and person to call so that ZNY managers could request fighter assistance for AA 11. The military operations specialist initiated a dial tone at approximately 084906. It took him 28 seconds to complete the dialing process even though the electronic record suggests he had a speed dial number.
NEADS answered at 084942, on the second ring, a delay of just eight seconds. The call was completed at 085033, a total elapsed time of one minute and 27 seconds. The caller asked for and received precise information, a number to call and a desk to contact, the ID section at NEADS.
By that time, UA175 had been hijacked, but ZNY controllers were not yet aware they had a problem. That awareness came within a minute or two of the completion of the call to NEADS. Ironically, a ZNY official had contacted the very desk at NEADS responsible for finding any and all information concerning unknown targets, to include potential hijacks.
On another level, this call demonstrates the near complete mastery of the skies by the hijacker pilots. Consistently, the hijackers operated within the decision cycle of their opponent, a position of superiority striven for by military tacticians throughout the ages, but not often achieved. The hijacker’s edge was sufficient to overcome a significant delay in the takeoff of United 93. That plane took off just minutes before the ZNY ground stop. A subsequent ACARS message from United to the cockpit nearly eliminated the tactical advantage, but not quite.
Routines and procedures performed with all due speed still take time. And time was not what the defense had on 9/11. The actual battle of 9/11, from the moment of first physical action, lasted just one hour and 49 minutes (0814-1003)
Here is the ZNY-NEADS call. 0849 ZNY Military call to Huntress ID
New York TRACON, AA11 and WTC
This series of three clips documents the knowledge at and reaction of New York TRACON in the immediate aftermath of the impact of AA 11 into the World Trade Center, North Tower. The phone line recorded was the Traffic Manager Director, Traffic Management Unit (TMU TMD).
At 0852 TRACON called New York Center and asked if they had a “track on the American.” The Center said they lost the track and had learned from Kennedy Tower that they didn’t see anything and lost the target “20 west of Kennedy.” That location will later be passed to NEADS by Colin Scoggins at Boston Center. Even though American 11 is mentioned the Center is uncertain. “Who’s saying an airplane hit it?” TRACON responded, “that’s what the news is sayin’.” This clip establishes the source of the “twenty west of Kennedy” report as Kennedy Tower. 0852 twenty west of Kennedy
At 0854 TRACON called Newark Tower to ask if they saw anything at the Trade Center. Newark responded, “yeah, a lot of smoke.” In the exchange of information it was established that New York Center had been working a hijacked airplane which they lost on radar. The issue of uncertainty was whether or not the hijack was “high altitude.” They did not know. The issue of altitude persisted during the tracking of AA 11 by both New York and Boston Centers. It is the reason that Colin Scoggins got involved in the information exchanges with the Northeast Air Defense Sector. Scoggins told Commisison staff during interview that he was the only person at Boston Center that knew that NEADS was capable of determining altitude on a search (primary only) target. 0854 Uncertainty over high altitude
Beginning 0858, TRACON called its “majors” (Kennedy, La Guardia, Newark) to stop departures. In addition, Teeterboro was also called. By 0900 all departures in the New York TRACON area of responsibility had been stopped with one exception. A plane that was rolling at Teeterboro was allowed to continue. 0858 Stop all Departures
0942 EDT DCA Eagle One airborne before Eagle Two
Eagle One and Eagle Two were Park Police helicopters that took off from the “Eagles Nest.” This conversation recorded at Reagan National, Local Control position, establishes that Eagle One was in the air first. 0942 Eagle One launched before Eagle Two
0948 Venus 77 was aircraft over P56
The so-called “mystery plane,” was clearly identified as Venus 77 by Reagan National, Local Control position at 0948 EDT. In a conversation with Park Police helicopters, Eagle One and Eagle Two, the controller was asked, “we have a jet over top of P56 (restricted area over the White House and Capitol), are you talkin’ to him?” The controller responded: “That’s Venus 77, it’s a military aircraft, just departed Andrews.” That exchange is conclusive that there was no mystery plane that morning. The plane, seen by observers on the ground and filmed by CNN and BBC was the E4B, Venus 77, an airborne command post. Venus 77 originally declared for Offut AFB and then turned back East over Rock Creek Park and proceeded to establish a north-south, race track orbit centered on Richmond, Virginia, and positioned to support the return of Air Force One to Washington, D.C. 0947 Eagle One Eagle Two Venus 77
0857 EDT NY TRACON clarifies ZNY comment
This is an important set of audio clips concerning the possible conflation of information concerning UA 175 and AA 11. Conceivably, this contributed to the later erroneous report that American 11 was still airborne. At a minimum, it contributed to the general confusion and lack of situational awareness at all levels in FAA. A background Dave Bottiglia reference was to a target, a mode 3 squawking intruder, code 3321.” Mike McCormick, the ZNY manager, in his conversation with NY TRACON, however, reported that they were tracking a “primary” target, a clear reference to American 11.
Here are those two conversations. The situation was that American 11 was hijacked, something had hit the World Trade Center and the first general warning concerning UA 175 was being announced within New York Center. Moreover, and unbeknownst to anyone, AA77 was being hijacked several hundred miles to the west.
At 0853, New York Center manager, Mike McCormick, told NY TRACON that they “might have two things going on here.” The timing of that conversation implied that McCormick might be referring to AA11 and UA 175. Bob Burch, NY TRACON manager, asked if the one they were tracking was “American 11?” McCormick responded, “We’ve got a primary target we’re also tracking, and appears to be the American, but be careful, don’t make assumptions.
There may have been a conflation of information on McCormick’s part. In real time seconds earlier, Bruce Barrett left a microphone open so that McCormick could here Dave Bottiglia say, “you see that target, I don’t know what he’s doing, but he’s not answering me right now.” The time of that floor announcement by Bottiglia, a clear reference to the target that was UA 175, was approximately 0852:30 EDT. I amplified the Bottiglia announcement in this cut. 085204 AA11 McCormick TRACON Two Things Going On
Here is the 0857 interpretation of the McCormick comment as recorded at NY TRACON. The speaker is Bob Burch, the Air Traffic Manager in Charge. 0857 Burch relays McCormick report Burch confirmed that McCormick said they might have “multiple terrorist activity.” He immediately clarified that McCormick reported that an airplane hit the World Trade Center and that they may “be tracking that American Eleven.” Of note, Burch used the language, “that American may still be (pause) an aircraft that’s (pause) but they lost the target on him, so don’t assume anything. We don’t know if he [AA11] was involved in that or he is still flying around.” This is a possible source, in part, for the later report that American 11 was still flying. My assessment is that this awareness of understanding at NY TRACON was simply part of the confusion in the aftermath of the events at the World Trade Center.
1035 EDT NORAD and NMCC not on FAA TACNET
At 1035 the FAA’s Air Traffic Services Cell (ATSC) at the Air Traffic Control System Command Center (Herndon Center) called on the TACNET to the operations floor at Herndon asking if NORAD was up on the bridge. Position 15 responded that it had not heard NORAD on the bridge and then asked FAA Headquarters. Headquarters advised that neither NORAD nor the NMCC (National Military Command Center) was on the bridge. The ATSC took the action to get connected to NORAD and the NMCC. Here is that conversation. 1035 NORAD NMCC not on bridge
This is the end result of an initiative began an hour earlier by the FAA Representative at NEADS, Steve Culbertson, to get a secure phone line out from NEADS to the millitary. The ATSC, co-located with the CARF (Central Altitude Reservations Facility), ultimately deferred to the CARF since it had a STU-III (secure phone) capability. The CARF was the FAA entity on the NMCC’s Air Threat Conference.
The essential point is that at no time during the battle and immediate aftermath that morning did the FAA and NORAD/NMCC communicate directly, headquarters to headquarters.
NY TRACON locates AA11
In a previous clip article I had reported that NY TRACON was unable to locate AA11, based on information provided by Boston Center. Shortly thereafter, at 0843, New York Center (ZNY) provided specific, real-time, locational data and NY TRACON searched and responded, “oh, I see the lad.” As of that time, ZNY confirmed to NY TRACON that AA11 was at flight level two nine zero and it looked like was “not going to go to Kennedy.” That specific information three minutes before AA11 impacted the north tower may have contributed to the later notion that AA11 was still airborne as incorrectly reported to NEADS. Here is the clip containing the TRACON/ZNY conversation. 0843 NY TRACON locates AA 11
Langley Fighters “spike” Andrews Fighters
The DCA (Reagan National TRACON) Krant position, Commission tape 1DCA99Krant 1430-1600) captures the most contentious moment in the merge of the Langley fighters into a coordinated combat air patrol (CAP) over the nation’s capital with the Andrews fighters. The time is 1115 EDT.
For background, the Langley fighters had been in a high (23-25K) CAP over the capital since 1000 EDT. The first pair of Andrews fighters, Caps 1 and 2 were airborne nearly 45 minutes later. The second pair of Andrews fighters, Wild 1 and 2, followed nearly 20 minutes later. The Andrews fighters were attempting to establish a low CAP centered on DCA as a bullseye.
As we pick up the story Wild 1, airborne for five minutes reported fast moving unknowns at alitude to DCA TRACON. TRACON identified the planes as a pair of KC-10 tankers. As all concerned worked to position the tankers Caps one cautioned to be aware of a decoy maneuver, a bait and switch tactic.
Shortly thereafter, Wild 1 informed Caps 1 “spike,” (that he had been illuminated by an air-air radar) and asked if there were other fighters in the area. TRACON broke in to inform him of the presence of the Langley fighters coming off of a tanker. Wild 1’s response was explicit, “tell’ em to stop spiking me.”
Here are those communications as they actually occurred. 1115 Stop spiking me
Airphone Call from UA 93
Great Lakes Region called FAA Headquarters at 1004 to report an airphone 911 call to Oakbrook, Illinois police from a passenger reporting to be on United 93. Of interest is that a background voice is heard passing the information along as a “cell phone” call. This is secondary, near real-time reporting of an airphone call from one of the hijacked aircraft. It is primary source evidence that FAA Headquarters immediately misinterpreted the source as a cell phone. The report said the passenger broke off contact. That was the probable time frame that United 93 was in extremis. 1004 Air Phone Call from United 93 (Source: FAA file 5DCC 1912 Ops phone 5115 Position 15 1315-1415, as provided to the Commission)
Those who speculate that there were no calls from the hijacked airplanes on September 11, 2001, are simply wrong, if not intellectually dishonest, in their analysis.
The UA 175 impact in context.
Of all the audio clips in the “Audio Monograph” posted by Rutgers Law Review the one of most interest appears to be the reaction to the sighting of UA 175 in its final moments to impact. I have found the entire conversation from which I derived the segment included in the “Monograph.“
130039 AA11A Discussion UA175 Impact (2)
Newark Tower, Bob, called New York TRACON, Carl, to discuss the aftermath of the impact of AA 11. The discussion centered on Teeterboro. In the course of that conversation TRACON asked Tower to look out the window to see if they could spot what TRACON was seeing on radar.
There are at least two important sub-elements to that call, other than the visual sighting of UA 175. First, a call to “Center” was referenced. That reference is to New York Center, ZNY . That establishes that both entities were air traffic control facilities with a common bond to ZNY.
Second, in that context, ZNY “said that an American eleven alfa had terrorist activity on it.” That is conclusive primary source evidence that, as the Commission was told, a new track, AA 11A, was entered into the system for the primary-only, south-bound AA 11. The original flight plan was left in the system and AA 11 “landed” at Los Angeles later that day. That continuation is verified in a 0928 call from Herndon Center to Cleveland Center asking if they were tracking an AA 11 that was “just crossing over the boundary?” That call was a background conversation recorded on line 5154 at Herndon. The call was concurrent with the word to “ground stop everything.” 0928 Do you have AA 11
The flight track change was made at an air traffic control facility for the convenience of controllers. Separately, American Airlines requested a change to the flight number in the ASD (Aircraft Situation Display). Here is a clip of a background conversation on tape at Herndon Center, line 5134, shortly before 0941. Jim McDonald, Flight Dispatch, American Airlines asked Wanda at the command center to change the flight number on the ASD. They did not want it going out to CNN because, “they had a drop on it.” 0841 AA request to change flight number of AA11
Genesis of the FAA’s quest to hook up with the NMCC
At 0934 a voice asked if Ian Sanderson was on the operations floor; he was. Steve Culbertson, the FAA representative, wanted to used Sanderson’s STU (secure telephone) and his office. Sanderson immediately said yes. Lt Col Sanderson was the administrative supervisor of the NEADS twenty-four operations center . He supervised all activities concerning the day-day operations at that facility. Culbertson was at NEADS Headquarters, a separate building several hundred yards away. According to our staff interview with Culbertson, his task was to get FAA and NORAD connected. He estimated that task was completed around 1015. According to Culbertson that connection ended up being the DEN (Defense Event Network) line, in the days and months to follow. 0934 Culbertson Sanderson
NEADS tracks fast-moving unknown, later determined to be AA 77
NEADS reacted immediately to a report from Boston Center of a fast moving target east of the White House. Boston quickly corrected that report to be west of the White House. We know, retrospective, from the radar files of the 84th RADES that NEADS did establish a track on that unknown, track B032. The track faded before it could be forward told to CONR and NORAD and quickly became bad data, the track was lost. The track was established approximately 0936:45, faded by 0938:00 and was determined lost at 0938:45, “zero velocity to that zero three two.” 0937 Track B032
Herndon Center estimates Chicago as the target of AA77
As of 0925 EDT Herdon Center estimated Chicago to be the target of AA77. The Center initiated a call to Indianapolis Center to find out the latest concerning AA77. The Herndon caller was thinking the Sears Tower was the target, based on the last known location of AA77. His reasoning was that AA77 was the same proximity to Chicago as was the proximity of AA11 to New York earlier. That was a reasonable inference, given there was no other actionable information available to him.
The important point is that Herdon Center and Indianapolis Center were sharing information just as Dulles TRACON controllers were picking up a “no tag” unaware of its significance. No higher echelon had the time or the means of assessing that the threat was not to Chicago but to Washington DC.
Further, there is simply no way that actionable information concerning the approach of AA77 was available to the PEOC, as Secretary Mineta testified. The approach of the hijacked plane was not reported by anyone at any level until Danielle O’Brien sounded the alarm a few minutes later.
Here is the Herdon/Indianapolis conversation as recorded on Ops phone 5134, Position 34, Tape number 5DCC 1927, 1315-1415 UTC. ATCSCC estimates Chicago as AA77 target
Canada East resolves the unknown from Canada headed toward Washington
At about 1010 EDT, Canada East reported that the report of an unknown from Canada headed south was actually an estimate from their “Int,” (intelligence officer) that there might be such a threat. There was no actual aircraft and no actual threat. Here is the clip providing the resolution. 0911134145 Canada unknown resolution
ZNY calls NEADS at 0849 EDT for good number for hijack support
At 0849, soon after UA175 was hijacked, but before New York Center knew they had a problem, the ZNY military desk called Sgt Watson on behalf of his supervisor to get a good phone number to request hijack support. Even though the call was in regards to AA11 the irony is that New York Center was in contact with NEADS after UA175 was hijacked and obtained a phone number to call for support. That call did not come until 0903 EDT, concurrent with the impact of UA175 into the World Trade Center, south tower. Here is that exchange with Sgt Watson. 0911122917 ZNY to Watson re hijack support
NEADS still looking for AA11 at 1002 EDT
MSGT Dooley asks a technician to call Washington/BWI still looking for AA11, thinking it might have impacted the Pentagon. 133639 Still Looking for AA11
New York TRACON can’t find AA11
Shortly after 0840 EDT, Boston Center asked Herndon Center to link to New York TRACON to give them a heads up about AA 11. TRACON, looking at the radar picture and looking for primary returns could not locate the flight. Herndon Center could see the flight on TSD (Traffic Situation Display). Here is a clip from Herndon Center tape 5DCC 1912 Ops Phone 5115, position 15. The relevant call begins at 08:40:23 and as of 08:41:40 New York TRACON advises, “I’m just looking at the real raw radar here and I just don’t see anything out there.” NY TRACON difficulty finding AA11
ZNY asks about contact with military
Shortly after 8:49, ZNY p0sed the questions to the Command Center and Boston Center if anyone had contacted the military? Boston said they were trying Atlantic City. The Command Center advised that the Supervisor was going to the CARF (Central Altitude Reservation Facility). Here is the audio clip. Supervisor going to CARF unit I wrote about the CARF and the associated Air Traffic Services Cell (ATSC) in the Scott Trilogy.
That Herndon initiative is understandable, the CARF/ATSC represented a military presence, one that dealt with military use of the National Airspace System. In my estimation, that military contact by Herndon Center was considered military notification and satisfied any responsibility they had concerning the existing hijack protocol.
Secret Service going to start shooting
AT 10:04:43 Herdon Tape 5DCC 1927 ops phone 5134 position 34 1315-1415 UTC provides the genesis of the periodic warning by Andrews Tower that aircraft in Class B airspace would be shot down. Washington Approach at Reagan National (DCA) called Herndon Center and advised: “make sure that the Center does not have anything above our airspace…the Secret Service is going to start shooting at anything in the air.” Herndon Center immediately passed that information to the Traffic Management Unit dest at Washington Center (ZDC) Here is that call. 0911100443 Secret Service going to start shooting
Unknown over the White House, negative clearance to shoot.
On DRM 1, Channel 2 at 1007 EDT, the MCC was faced with two concurrent situations, the initial report of UA 93 with a bomb on board and a report of an unknown over the White House. This clip clearly reveals that the two actions overlapped and that the MCC’s strong language about “identify by type and tail,” and “negative clearance to fire” was directly related to the White House situation. That was a false report and NEADS ultimately determined that they had intercepted themselves. 0911125834 Aircraft over the White House
Here is a partial transcript of only those MCC statements pertaining to the White House unknown.
FOX: Intercept?
MCC: Intercept
MCC: Intercept and divert that aircraft away from there
MCC: OK, you got that?
MCC: You hear that, aircraft over the White House, what’s the word?
MCC: Intercept and what else?
MCC: [slowly] aircraft over the White House
MCC: How close are you to intercept?
MCC: What is it? Type?
MCC: They’re going in right now.
MCC: Yes
MCC: You have any squawks, any squawks or anything, squawks anything like that
MCC: Jaime, any words? Jaime?
MCC: That might be that fifth airplance [reference to the unknown from Canada]
MCC: How close are you?
MCC: Negative, negative clearance to shoot
MCC: Jaime? God Dammit, Foxy?
MCC: Fuck the code words, that’s perishable information
MCC: Negative clearance to fire, identify type tail
That conversation between Nasypany and both Major Fox and the Battle Cab lasted for four minutes from approximately 1007 to 1011 EDT
Unknown from Canada, 5th possible hijack
On DRM1, Channel 2, at 1002 EDT, the MCC learned of a possible 5th hijacked aircraft headed south from Canada. He briefed that possibility to the Battle Cab. 0911125834 5th airplane south from Canada
The notification of UA 93 five minutes later brought the running total at NEADS to six potential hijacked aircraft. That was the total at the end of the battle that morning.
NORAD (Cheyenne Mountain) requested termination of all exercise traffic.
On DRM 1, Channel 15, at 1014 EDT, Sergeant Richmond received a call to terminate all exercise traffic. NEADS had previously, at MCC direction, terminated the exercise feed to SOCC scopes when it started up for the morning. This call was NORAD catching up. The call continued intermittently for several minutes as the Cheyenne Mountain called attempted to complete a roll call of all sectors, CONR, CANR (Canada), and Alaska. 0991134342 CMOC Terminate all exercise traffic
NEADS status of potential hijacked aircraft
On DRM1, Channel 15 at 0951 EDT, Sgt Richmond, the AST, was recorded providing a status. He stated there were four not where they were supposed to be. The fourth was “that Western guy,” [Delta 1989], possibly headed for the Sears Tower in Chicago. Richmond also stated that his surveillance technician manning was OK, for now.
The complete audio cut captured, in background, Sgt Rose counting out the tracking of Delta 1989. This clip is explicit primary source information that as late as 0951, and later, NEADS knew of just four potential hijacked aircraft. They had not yet been notified of UA 93. 091132616 We have four
Later, at 1035 EDT, Richmond summarized that the only “guy” they ever had as a target was Cleveland [Delta 1989] That is consistent with what NORAD briefed to the Air Threat Conference Call, as established in the Commission Report. Richmond’s summary discounted the brief track B32 [AA 77] which was not forward told to NORAD. 0911134342 Only target Cleveland guy
Tail Number for UA 175
NEADS received from Boston Center (Scoggins) and logged the tail number for UA 175 at 0916 EDT. It is that log entry that was misread to be a reference to UA 93 by NORAD/CONR/NEAD staff who prepared Generals McKinley and Arnold and Colonel Scott for their testimony before the Commission on May 23, 2003. 0911125341 Tail Number for UA 175 0916 EDT. I have also included the subsequent conversation between Colin Scoggins and Major Nasypany which was the precursor to Scoggins informing NEADS about the rebirth of AA 11 a few minutes later.
DCA Gofer 06
There has been some misinterpretation of what Lt Col O’Brien, the pilot of the Minnesota Air National Guard C-130, Gofer 06, saw and reported on 9-11. He reported the plane he saw as simply a 757; he did not report that it was an American Airlines plane. Here is a sequence of three clips from the audio master file I created in 2004 to support a Team 8 Audio Monograph, unpublished. The clips provide the definitive primary source evidence of what O’Brien saw, did, and reported. 0911093607 Gofer 06 identifies a 757 0911093641 Gofer 06 vectored for traffic 0911093800 aircraft crashed into Pentagon
NEADS
1237Z Phone Rings, Boston Calling
Here is the call from Joe Cooper, Boston Center, to NEADS, Sergeant Powell. I have amplified Powell’s reaction as he alerted the SOCC floor 0911121716 Phone Rings Boston Calling
1238Z ID Section Reaction
Here is the immediate reaction by Sergeant Watson at the ID position 0911121746 The ID Reaction
1238Z, MCC/T Position Audio after ZBW Cooper Call
This clip is the first two and one/half minutes at the MCC/T position after Sergeant Powell alerted the NEADS SOCC floor and went looking for an MCC. Within 45 seconds, in sequence, Sergeant McCain put out an immediate call for Major Nasypany and then took a call from Sergeant Kelly, Otis AFB, reporting the hijack, and Sergeant Watson called Colin Scoggins at Boston Center. Her conversation with Scoggins is intermingled with the concurrent conversation of Major Deskin’s answer of the call from Joe Cooper, also at Boston Center. I have amplified those background conversations using Adobe Audition to highlight the real time conflation of the two calls, each distinct and separate. The background voices were suppressed when Major Nasypany plugged in to listen to Deskins shortly after 0840 EDT. The important point for researchers and historians is that NEADS was concurrently talking to and receiving information from two different positions at Boston Center, the Traffic Management Unit (TMU), Cooper, and the military desk, Scoggins. 0911121800 MCCT Position
1255Z, Richmond calls ZNY. At 0855 EDT, Sergeant Richmond, the AST (Air Surveillance Technician) called his technical point of contact (POC) at New York Center to request that the Riverhead radar site settings be held as they were. His POC informed him they were having an emergency ( a probably reference to both AA 11 and UA 175). Richmond responded that he knew about it (a reference to AA 11) and that they were responding. 0911122912 Richmond ZNY Phone Call (DRM2, Channel 15, cut 122912)
This cross communication was an opportunity for NEADS to learn about UA 175, eight minutes before it impacted the World Trade Center South Tower. However, the frame of reference for the brief, 22 second, conversation was radar settings. There was—and should be in hindsight—no expectation that Richmond and his POC would exchange operational information apart from the radar settings.
1300Z, Nasypany, where was I? At 0900 EDT, Major Nasypany announced where he was when he was summoned to the SOCC floor. He was, in Michael Bronner’s elegant words, “taking his morning constitutional.” Nasypany’s reflection, captured on DRM1 Ch2, cut 121800 at NEADS was earthy and explicit, he was “on the shitter.” 09121800 Where Was I
1305Z, hunt for UA 175. By this time the surveillance loop had three trackers. They were informed of a second hijack out of Boston and looked for a squawk and didn’t see one because UA 175 had ceased to exist. One voice said, “They have smart terrorists today, they don’t give them a chance to squawk.” 124427 Smart terrorists today. (DRM2 Ch2 cut124427)
1315Z, call to Langley SOF. At 0915, Major Anderson, acting as MCC, placed a call to Detachment One, Langley, asking how many birds and how many pilots they had. The answer from Sergeant Johnson was 4 and 3. Capt Borgstrom, the Supervisor of Flying (SOF), got on the line and informed Major Anderson that only two of the birds were “hot.” This is conclusive a priori primary source information that one of the Langley fighters took off with guns only, no armament. 0911125357 Call to Langley SOF (DRM1 Ch 19 cut 125357)
1323Z, AA 11 reborn. At 0923, a NEADS Weapons Director verbalized that a 3d aircraft was headed toward DC, an American airliner. He then stated that the second hijacked aircraft was UA 175 and that the third one was “American One One.” Concurrently, in background, Major Fox can be heard directing the Langley scramble, specifying that NORAD wanted them to CAP and hold over BWI. 0911125357 AA 11 Reborn (DRM1 Ch 19 cut 125357)
Shortly thereafter, Major Fox, again in background, explicitly equated AA 11 to be tail number N334AA, just as it was logged in the MCC/T log, the official NEADS documenting activities of the day. 0911125357 AA 11 N334AA (DRM 1 Ch 19 cut 125357)
This is primary source information that was available to NEADS and NORAD when they constructed their timeline released on Sep 18, 2001. It is information that should have been available to General McKinley, General Arnold, and Colonel Scott when they testified on May 23, 2003. It is information that should have been made available to FAA to prepare Administrator Garvey and Secretary Mineta for their testimony before the Commission.
There is no excuse for NEADS/NORAD conflating this information to be AA 77 and deriving a notification time from FAA of 0924. These audio files, alone, are explicit and conclusive evidence that NEADS/NORAD failed to properly consider available information when working with FAA to establish a timeline of events on 9-11.
1346Z. A few months ago someone made the uninformed and incomplete speculation that Delta 89 and Delta 1989 were two separate aircraft of interest and that one of the two was exercise related. At all times, in the work of the Commission and on the NEADS SOCC floor, any reference to “Delta 89” is a shorthand reference to Delta 1989. And as was established in the Vigilant Guardian audio files the exercise was not active.
Following is the audio clip in which the NEADS ID Technicians, in real time, establish the fact of Delta 1989 to Cleveland Center. Ironically, the time was 1046 0946 EDT (corrected on Dec 10, 2011) and Cleveland Center knew about UA 93 but did not mention it to NEADS when NEADS called to warn them about Delta 1989. 0911130504 Delta 1989 vs Delta 89
1431Z. The issue was use of Langley fighters that belonged to the Air Combat Command (ACC). NEADS weapons controllers thought that a “First, flight of four” had been launched from Langley AFB, but they never showed up. ACC put a stop to that because the wing (not the air defense detachment) at Langley was subordinate to ACC. In this clip the issue came to a head at the Colonel (Langley)/Lt Colonel (NEADS) level. Both agreed to work the issue and that NORAD needed to call the “three star” at ACC. 0911141128 NORAD ACC conflict re Langley
1636Z. Master Sergeant Joe McCain, one of the Mission Crew Commander Technicians, commented to someone that he was just trying to maintain situational awareness. McCain was the focal point for many calls, administrative and operational, into NEADS. He then mused that he wanted to know where the Intel Community was in all this. The time was 1236 EDT. 0911161431 Where Was Intel Community
1650Z. The Air Force Rescue Coordination Center called the NEADS MCC position at 1250 EDT to confirm that the plane that hit the Pentagon was AA77. 0911162006 AFRCC Confirms AA77 Pentagon