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9-11: 9:40-9:47; fleeting window of opportunity, where was everyone?

Saturday, December 19th, 2009

Why this article

While working on part 1 of the UA 93 trilogy, the controller story at Cleveland Center, I drafted a summary of what else was going when the transponder on UA 93 was turned off. The summary deserves its own time slot; it is filed under “Times of Interest.”

Recall that the transponders were manipulated differently in each of the hijacked aircraft and each manipulation presented a different problem in the National Airspace System. Aboard UA 93 the transponder was turned off after the turn back to the east.

In this article we draw extensively on two sources; previous articles on Chaos Theory and the 84th RADES radar files. In one article I specified that the attack that morning was a battle in a larger war and that the Battle Commanders were Ben Sliney at FAA’s Herndon Center and Colonel Bob Marr at NEADS. We established that they were not talking to each other and that the Battle Managers, General Arnold and Jeff Griffith, the next higher echelon, had neither the information nor the wherewithall to make that happen. We also established that higher echelons were irrelevant and properly so. Their job was to manage a war, not fight a battle.

Here is a Google Earth screen print depicting the seven minutes between transponder off to loss of coverage by the Joint Surveillance System radars supporting NEADS.

The situation

The UA 93 transponder was turned off at 9:40:30. NEADS will have a seven minute window to establish a track. UA drops out of NEADS radar coverage at 9:47:30. It will not reappear until moments before it plummets to ground at 10:03. At 9:47:30 UA 93 is just approaching the Ohio/West Virginia/Pennsylvania tri-border area.

Sliney and Marr are not in communication and cannot exploit the window of opportunity. NEADS does not know about UA 93 and will not until after it plummets to earth.

NEADS did establish a track on Delta 1989 and forward told that track to CONR and NORAD. A few minutes earlier NEADS briefly established a track for AA 77 which it did not have time to forward tell. Even earlier, it had learned about the rebirth of AA 11, as reported by Boston Center. That fortuitous mis-report actually triggered the Langley scramble, which went astray.

At 9:40 the Langley fighters are under AFIO (Authority for Intercept Operations) and have been redirected toward the nation’s capital. One of the three planes will fly directly over the Pentagon at 10:00. Two of them will be captured on BBC video footage as they turn west over the nation’s capital to begin a combat air patrol.

Who was doing what

23,000 feet directly below the Langley fighter the NMCC is in an Air Threat Conference which it convened as the Pentagon was being struck. The NMCC knows little of the approach of the Langley fighters, in itself a bizarre state of affairs. They know nothing of the window of opportunity to track UA 93

The key agency, FAA, is not on the Air Threat Conference. Concurrently, the NMCC is a participant in a CIA-convened NOIWON along with the FAA security watch seven stories below the FAA’s Washington Operations Center at FAA Headquarters. No real-time information is available on that link

However, seven stories higher the FAA WOC is getting near real time information concerning UA 93. That information is not being shared on FAA’s primary net because that net, activated at 9:20 to include the NMCC, was still born. (I will speak to the primary net in a future article.)

Concurrently, Administrator Garvey, as of 9:40 is a participant in a just-beginning, closed-system SVTS conference with Richard Clarke. She is disconnected from the WOC and is not aware of the near real-time information being passed by Cleveland Center via Herndon Center to the WOC.

No one at levels above Clarke is effectively engaged. Secretary Rumsfeld has left his office for the Pentagon crash site. General Myers has departed Senator Cleland’s office and is en route the Pentagon. The Vice President is on his way to the PEOC at the insistence of the Secret Service. Secretary Mineta is out of pocket en route the White House to join the Vice President.

At 9:40, the President is on his way to board Air Force One; he departs at 9:55. It is his intention to return to the nation’s capital. Concurrent with the arrival of the Langley fighters to protect the capital the President’s advisors and protectors recommend he not return. At 10:10, with the nation’s capital protected, Air Force One turns west and heads for Barksdale Air Force Base.

During the fleeting window of opportunity for others to act, the passengers and cabin crew aboard UA 93 learn of the fate of other hijacked aircraft and of their own certain fate. They take matters into their own hands. They will do what no one else at any level can accomplish; they counter-attack, successfully for the nation, tragically for themselves.

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9-11: NEADS MCC/T Log; a definitive secondary source

Monday, December 14th, 2009

In previous articles we discussed the Mission Crew Commander/Technician (MCC/T) log kept at NEADS. The purpose of this article is to provide historians, researchers, and other interested persons additional information about that important document.

It is the definitive secondary source document of the day to establish what NEADS knew and when they knew it. Why definitive? Because it is validated and verified by definitive primary sources, the NEADS and FAA tapes.

Explanation of copies of the log

My estimate is that the Commission Staff archived as many as three copies of the MCC/T log. I archived one and it is likely that the New York office archived an additional copy. Dana Hyde archived a third, unannotated copy. The copy I linked in an earlier article was annotated by either Geoff Brown or John Azarrello while we were at NEADS; that is not my handwriting.

I note that we must have discussed the log with the several non-commissioned officers who performed the MCC/T duty that morning. We established who made what entries via the handwriting. For example, “Sgt Bianchi” made the 1324 entry. Sgt Bianchi’s entries begin at 1240, the initial call from Boston Center. He turned over the log to Sgt Perry sometime between 1401 and 1407.

A master copy of the log, as forwarded to the Commission via DoD, will ultimately be available when NARA uploads the Commission’s master paper files. In the interim, the copy archived by Dana Hyde is an accurate rendition of the original log book, less redactions made by NARA.

The original log book, a general purpose ledger available in any office supply store, was and likely still is maintained in a safe at NEADS. Each morning during our visits the NEADS staff would deliver the original to us for use during interviews; it was returned to them at the end of each day. The approximate one-inch thick ledger was difficult to copy. Readers familiar with the process will note that the book was opened to the relevant pages and copied under pressure to flatten the pages as much as possible.

Helpful background

Much work on the NEADS floor was accomplished by trained, experienced non-commissioned officers. Each of the two key officers, the MCC, Major Nasypany, and the Senior Director, Major Fox, had such senior non-commissioned officers to constantly assist them.

For example, those familiar with the NEADS tapes will recognize that every scramble order that morning was broadcast by Sgt Powell, the SD/T. Major Nasypany had three MCC/T on duty at various times, Sgt Bianchi, Sgt Perry, and Sgt McCain.

It is worth noting that McCain, Powell, Fox, and the Commander, Colonel Bob Marr, were all on duty the day of the Lufthansa hijacking a decade earlier. This was an experienced crew, they knew what they were doing.

MCC/T log accuracy

Each critical entry was accurately posted, probably no longer than a minute or two after the fact. For example, consider the first notification of the day, the call from Boston Center concerning AA 11. That call was picked up by Sgt Powell a few seconds before 9:38. It took a minute or two to gain actionable information. We do not know when Sgt Bianchi actually made the log entry, but we do know that he determined the entry to be 8:40.

That pattern of accurate log entries by Sgt Bianchi continued. He established the notification time for UA 175 as 9:05 and the notification time for AA 77 as 9:34; both consistent with the primary source audio files. That pattern continued with Sgt Perry who recorded a notification time for UA 93 as 10:07.

Serious researchers, writers, and historians will appreciate and accept the work done by the non-commissioned officers, the ‘Technicians,’ at NEADS.

A key document thrice misinterpreted.

NEADS staff misread the MCC/T log in their initial review and established a notification time for AA 77 as 9:24, despite primary and secondary source information to the contrary.

NEADS staff again misread the MCC/T log five days later under questioning by CONR and failed to accurately inform General Moore about the AA 77 notification as he was consulting with FAA, which knew the 9:24 time was not supportable.

NEADS staff, together with Col Scott, again misread the MCC/T log in preparation for the May 23, 2003 air defense hearing before the Commission. It is then that an erroneous hijack time of 9:16 for UA93 was entered into the public record by NORAD.

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9-11: NEADS tapes and logs; an update

Thursday, December 10th, 2009

This update provides additional information concerning NEADS primary source information, the NEADS tapes, and secondary source information, the NEADS logs. Specifically it addresses the question of whether NORAD/CONR/NEADS reviewed relevant documents prior to the White House meeting on September 17, 2001 and the subsequent release of the NORAD timeline on September 18, 2001. The answer is yes they did.

The Moore email and response

John Farmer in The Ground Truth wrote that “the Commission staff obtained the e-mail…sent late in the evening of September 16, 2001, from Brigadier General Doug Moore at CONR, under General Arnold’s command, to NEADS.” That email exchange is available at the History Commons Scribd web site.

Moore was asking for additional clarification to pass to FAA to use “to brief the White House tomorrow.” The night Director of Operations (DO) at NEADS, Clark Speicher, did the research and provided the answer. At the time, Col Clark Speicher was the Deputy Commander, NEADS. He reported directly to the NEADS Commander, Col Bob Marr.

AA 77 notification time to NEADS

Moore posed this question: “AA 77 1324Z, Which FAA organization passes notification of ‘a possible track heading to DC’?” Clearly, CONR/NORAD wanted that pinned down. Speicher responded, citing , in part, his research: “I have reviewed the crew MCC log book…The MCC log reveled (sic) the following: “1st question: AA 77, 1342Z: (emphasis added) Boston FAA says another A/c is missing AA77 flight to LA lost unable to contact.” However, my notes taken directly from the MCC/T log book reflect that the time was actually 13:34 (9:34), as recorded at NEADS. Col Speicher and NEADS got the entry right, but not the time.

Further, the MCC/T log book never mentioned AA 77 at 9:24 and Speicher did not confirm to Moore a 9:24 entry concerning the tail number of AA 11 which NEADS originally conflated to be AA 77. That original conflation is what Moore was now questioning. He did not get a direct answer to his original question.

In the rush of the moment NEADS and CONR made two errors. First, Col Speicher provided an incorrect time to Col Moore which appeared to simply transpose two digits. Second, Col Moore was in contact with FAA and knew that they could not support a notification time of 9:24, as we have discussed in recent articles concerning AA 77. Moore stayed with the original time of 9:24; he was not given a true reading of the accurate 1334 (9:34) entry. FAA apparently did not force the issue.

Additional information concerning the NEADS tapes

Col Speicher provided this additional information on the NEADS review. First, he established that NEADS did review the tapes. “…one of our MCC’s and I reviewed the audio tapes to answer your questions.”

Second, he detailed the difficulty and complexity of the tape review process. “We spent six hours trying to retrieve data from the voice tapes but the system has 24 channels recording two postions each channel and four tapes total from the llth.” He further elaborated: “the system is complex…it is rather cumbersome so analyzing the information is difficult to say the least.”

In the latter part of September, 2001, NEADS brought in a technician to try and transcribe the tapes. It is his work that became the NEADS partial transcript provided to the Commission. During his work one of the tapes was thought to be accidentally erased and his task was terminated and never completed.

Additional information about NORAD preparation for the May 2003 air defense hearing

A detailed radar review was accomplished by NORAD Headquarters to assist General McKinley, General Arnold, and, specifically, Col Scott in preparation for their May 23, 2003, testimony. Graphics related to that review have been made available by NARA.

Two things are noteworthy. First the FAA notification time for AA 77 continued to be 9:24. Second, accurate paths for the Otis and Langley fighters were provided to Col Scott. He blurred them as I wrote in a previous article.

My perspective

I told both Michael Bronner and Phil Shenon during interview that my personal estimate was that the NORAD Generals were victims of shoddy staff work. That remains my perspective. The Colonels let the Generals down. The Generals did not put the Colonels ‘through the hoops,’ they trusted them to get it right.

Posted in 9-11, NEADS Files | No Comments »

9-11: Teaching History; California, two different approaches, an update

Saturday, December 5th, 2009

On December 5, 2009 the article at this link popped up in my 9-11 Google alert emails.

I don’t see any particular connection to Pat Buchanan; the article was written by Carl Herman in the “LA County Examiner.”

Mr. Herman continues to take an educational approach to events of 9-11 that bears watching.

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9-11: SVTS; a cold war system, warmed over

Friday, December 4th, 2009

This is one of a continuing series of articles about the linear management processes used by the government on 9-11. I use the term ‘linear’ deliberately. My overall construct for analysis is chaos theory. Chaos is non-linear and my point about linear processes is that they were ill-suited to the task at hand. SVTS, Secure Video Teleconference System, pronounced by many as ‘civ its’ is one such linear process.

Key Points

There are two key things to know about SVTS. First, it was–and likely still is–a closed system. It was immune to new information in real time.

Second, it was the management process of choice for Richard Clarke; he had others as we shall discuss. Clarke wrote in Against All Enemies; “…I want the highest-level person in Washington from each agency on-screen now, especially FAA…” ‘On-screen meant SVTS.

In fairness to Clarke, I can’t say that I or anyone else would have reacted differently at the time. It was an available secure means of communication.

SVTS Background

I personally watched the establishment of the SVTS system. One node was built in my office spaces in the 1987 time frame. I watched the building of that closed system daily as each succeeding layer of security was added, layer, by layer, by layer…you get the idea.

I then operated that node for several years and was familiar with its inner workings. I’m sure the workings have changed over the years, but my observation while on both the Joint Inquiry and 9-11 Commission staffs was that it was little changed by 2001.

Once inside a node participants had no access to their staff or to real-time information. They were stuck with whatever staff they had brought with them and with the information they had brought to the table. Moreover, the layers of security were such that if a door opened at any node the conference came to a screeching halt while the identity of the entering person was established.

The operating principle was one of cold war paranoia. It was important that everyone at every node know exactly who was privy to the subject at hand. It was also important that there be no separate electronic inputs and that the SVTS conference, itself, not be electronically exportable.

So, when Clarke then wrote in response to a Condi Rice question; “We’re putting together a secure teleconference to manage the crisis…I’d like to get the highest-ranking official from each department,” he effectively decapitated each agency at a critical time.

Commission staff notes from our interview with Commander Gardner at the NMCC are a good summary of the situation. According to our notes; “re SVTS, we lost principals thruout day to SVTS, no runners to SVTS other than what Principals brought back.” In comparison with the Air Threat Conference our notes have Gardner saying, “re ATCC & SVTS, They were competing venues for C&C [command and control] & decisonmaking (sic).”

Activation vs Convening a Conference

Once staffs were alerted to bring up a secure conference the activation process took time. SVTS was not a 24-hour operation so the key in the ignition had to be turned, so to speak. Staff woud then work to make sure everything was functioning and that all nodes were up on the line. That was not instantaneous, Concurrently the principals had to be summoned from wherever they were and logged in and accounted for. My recall is that the whole process of bringing a conference on-line took a while, on the order of 15-30 minutes.

I have read Clarke’s description of the conference and my sense is that it conflates information.

The conference was activated at 9:25 and convened at 9:40. Here is what the Commission Report says: “At the White House, the video teleconference was conducted from the Situation Room by Richard Clarke, a special assistant to the president long involved in counterterrorism. Logs indicate that it began at 9:25 and included the CIA; the FBI; the departments of State, Justice, and Defense; the FAA; and the White House shelter. The FAA and CIA joined at 9:40.”

That means it took 25 minutes to bring the conference on line. Clarke wrote, “Okay, Let’s start with the facts. FAA, FAA, go.” That keynote statement was made no earlier than 9:40, according to information available to the Commission Staff.

What else was available?

First, we have established that a NOIWON conference was convened at 9:20 which linked together the NMCC, the White House Situation Room and the FAA. The problem was that the phones were manned primarily by analysts, no principals and, in the case of FAA, those analysts were on the third floor, seven floors below the FAA’s operation center. I am also familiar with NOIWON and my estimate is that it was not suited for the operational need at hand.

Second, Clarke, himself, acknowledges that an Air Threat Conference had convened. “On my way …[the] Situation Room deputy director, grabbed me. ‘We’re on the line with NORAD, on an air threat conference call.” As we know, FAA was never effectively on that conference until well after 10:00. It, too, was unsuited for the purpose at hand.

Third, the FAA activated its primary net at 9:20 and secondary source information shows that the NMCC link worked. However, as the Commission Staff learned that link was still born; it was never used.

Retrospective Comments

With the clarity of hindsight we can conclude that the FAA’s primary net was a better vehicle for Clarke to use. He apparently didn’t know about it and Jane Garvey apparently did not suggest it.

So, at 9:45 clock-time on 9-11, we can link to other articles and categories and summarize what is happening. Herndon Center has just ordered an airborne inventory and is accumulating information about possible wayward flights, to include UA 93 and AA 77. Garvey reports to Clarke on AA 11 and UA 175, only. She reports there are eleven other potential problems but she does not have the specificity that is rapidly being accumulated by Herndon because of the order for an air inventory.

Mineta, according to Clarke is not yet in the loop. “Jane, where’s Norm?” Langley fighters are rapidly approaching the DC area and will be directly overhead by 10:00. The President is en route Air Force One and will take off at 9:55 for the nation’s capital.

None of the real time information concerning the airborne inventory or the Langley fighters, or UA 93 and AA 77 is finding its way into the SVTS conference. The only way to communicate with SVTS participants is, according to Commander Gardner, via runners, which they didn’t have. So they waited for the principals to return with news.

On 9-11 a cold war-conceived closed system was immune to current information via electronics, semaphore, or smoke signals. SVTS was a convenient venue to manage a crisis, it was not the right venue

Posted in Linear Processes | 1 Comment »

Chaos Theory: 9-11; Ghostbusters, Herndon Center takes charge

Tuesday, December 1st, 2009

Introduction

In separate articles we have established three things that now converge. First, we established that Chaos Theory, metaphorically, can be used to analyze events on 9-11. Second, we established that AA 77 approached the nation’s capital undetected and that FAA’s Eastern Region was chasing ghosts. Third, we established that the battle commanders that day were Colonel Bob Marr at NEADS and Ben Sliney at Herndon Center and that they weren’t talking to each other. In this article we begin to explore two things, the convergence of events and the convergence of my separate analytical threads.

Eastern Region, ZDC and IAD

In the immediate aftermath of the first tower strike Eastern Region established a teleconference and continued to try and figure out what happened in New York City. That task became unmanageable when UA 175 struck the second tower.

Nevertheless, Eastern Region kept trying to establish a body of information concerning past events and was trying to determine what happened to the towers and to locate AA 11 and UA 175. It was by no means established in the immediate aftermath of the impact of UA 175 what had in fact happened to either tower. Individual FAA managers and controllers intuitively knew the fate of both planes but that was not a corporate understanding.

We will learn in a later article that Eastern Region had reached an erroneous estimate of the situation. As they tried to give one update to FAA Headquarters, a traffic management officer at Herndon broke in and set the record straight. That stark contrast between what Eastern Region knew and what Herndon Center knew will reveal how conflicted FAA was in its management of the battle. But that is a later story.

At this point in our research Eastern Region is reaching backward in time and is making skip-echelon calls to Centers, Towers and TRACONS to sort out what had already happened. We have documented two of those calls, one to ZDC asking about AA 77 and another to IAD asking about UA 175.

Concurrent with that second call Herndon Center, taking a completely different tack, called all the air traffic control centers to pass on specific guidance to fight the tactical battle still ahead. Herndon Center took that action at 9:30, effectively shoving aside Eastern Region. Ben Sliney, on his first day at work in his new job was learning quickly and he made, in short order, two critical decisions.

First, at 9:25 he culminated a series of local ground stops by ordering that all traffic nationwide on the ground stay on the ground. Second, he ordered an inventory of all aircraft in the air; the subject of a 9:30 call by one of Sliney’s traffic managers that can be heard at this link. Ghostbusters Call Herdon to all Centers

Herndon Center and Managing Chaos

Chaos is deterministic; it is bounded randomness; it is self organizing. In order to combat the chaos of the morning someone had to got a grip on the bounds; and that someone was Ben Sliney. His two key actions, a ground stop and an airborne inventory, were belated but each singularly effective in damping down the chaotic nature of the double bifurcated attack. His actions assured the attack would not further bifurcate, even though that was not in the terrorist attack plan. But he did not know that.

The nationwide ground stop assured that no more problematic airliners would enter the National Air Space. The airborne inventory gave specific actionable orders to all air traffic control centers to let Herdon know immediately of any problems. Cleveland Center responded within seconds.

Cleveland Center

Immediately, Cleveland Center, ZOB, reported what it knew about UA 93. That call can be heard at this link. UA 93 First Reported to Herndon Center.

This call establishes the fact that FAA knew about UA 93 at some level above an air traffic control center soon after 9:30. FAA also knew that AA 77 was lost but neither ZID or ZDC had yet provided any specificity to Herndon Center. They did not do so because they did not know where the plane was.

Readers will recall that in the original Transponders and Ghosts article we established that each transponder manipulation presented a different problem to air traffic control. We will never know why Ziad Jarrah waited until well after the turn back to turn off UA 93’s transponder, except that it was a fourth variation on a theme. Whatever the reason, ZOB was able to effectively follow and report on UA 93.

What is happening and what isn’t happening

The most obvious point is that only one of the battle commanders, Sliney, has actionable information. No one has shared critical information with Colonel Marr at NEADS. No one has recognized that Marr and Sliney needed to be in contact. We do know that NEADS was able to effectively follow D 1989. Demonstrably, we know that they would also have been able to follow UA 93, but they were never cued to do so.

Herndon Center has now exerted itself and will do so more forcefully as the minutes go by. Specifically, it will set the record straight at FAA Headquarters. Even so, that accurate information will not find its way to the NCA or to NEADS.

By 9:42, Jane Garvey will be the captive of an SVTS conference and will not know what air traffic controls knows or what air traffic control has passed to FAA Headquarters. At the same time, Norman Mineta is en route the White House, a fact established by Richard Clarke who convened the SVTS.

As John Farmer wrote in The Ground Truth, “Thus, years later, Richard Clarke could still believe that his high-level videoconference had been the nerve center of the nation’s response; no one had done the thoroughgoing analysis that would have exposed the reality that national leadership was irrelevant during thos critical moments.”

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9-11: UA 93; an air traffic control trilogy, part 2

Tuesday, December 1st, 2009

Addendum, December 1, 2009.

Here is a Google Earth plot of the final radar returns from UA 93 as received at The Plains radar site and provided by 84th RADES.

UA93 Final Radar Returns

The blue pins depict primary returns. The green pin depicts the first recording of the transponder back on. Green represents a reinforced return, radar and beacon (transponder). The red pin depicts the second and final transponder return, beacon only.

This is the air traffic control story of UA 93, told in the primary source voices of the day, and we begin with part 2, the Herndon Command Center story. The next two articles will tell the same story from the Cleveland Center (ZOB) perspective, Part 1, Then, in Part 3, we will the FAA’s Washington Operations Center story, as told to them by air traffic control. There will be at least one additional article to tell the story after it leaves the domain of air traffic control.

First notice to Herndon

The story begins at 09:49 when Margaret at the Herndon Severe Weather position convenes a conference with Washington Center, ZDC, at the request of Cleveland and Chicago. The purpose is to address the issue of the Attorney General’s return to Washington. Cleveland breaks in to tell Chicago about Delta 1989. That conversation is at this link. ZDC ZOB Herndon Chicago Teleconference

The conversation immediately continues and by 9:50 Cleveland Center has also put Washington Center on alert but about a different airplance, UA 93. That continued conversation is at this link. ZOB alerts ZDC about UA 93

After a short pause ZOB estimates a UA 93 arrival in 25 minutes to Dulles (approximately 9:16). Concurrently, ZOB updates both Chicago and ZDC as to the status of both D 1989 and UA 93. That continuation is at this link. ZOB updates D 1989 and UA 93

Some researchers have speculated that FAA was treating one of the two aircraft but not the other as a hijack; that the two were somehow confused by air traffic control. It is clear from the primary source information that the two situations were distinct and clearly separated by Cleveland Center in its reporting to adjacent centers and to Herndon. There was no confusion within the system as to which was which. The status of D 1989 was never conflated with UA 93 by FAA.

Conversation continues at 09:53

The situation continues as ZOB updates all participants on the status of both airplanes. Margaret informs ZOB that Herndon knew about UA 93 but not about D 1989 and she will pass the word. That update can be heard at this link. ZOB Undates Participants at 0953

D 1989 apparently resolved

In a conversation at 9:56 Herndon determines that D 1989 is not a ‘trip,’ that he is fine and that he is going to Cleveland. In this conversation we learn that the concern about D 1989 originated with Boston Center, ZBW. That conversation can be heard at this link. ZOB D 1989 Going to Clevelend

Real time updates on UA 93

By 9:58 ZOB enters a new flight plan for UA 93 to assist ZDC. ZDC acknowledges and sees the airplane at their TMU desk. ZOB is trying as best it can to associate tracking information with the data blocks. They did not have an altitude.

The implication is that ZDC can see the plane on radar as long as it is flying and can track the flight plan on a TSD display. The exchange of information between the TMU at ZOB and the TMUat ZDC can be heard at this link. ZOB UA 93 new flight plan and alert to ZDC. I should note here that when I observed the TSD playback of 9-11 at Herndon Center the icon for UA 93 visably jumped on the screen to its new location as determined by ZOB.

Shortly thereafter, in the 9:59 time frame, ZOB did obtain altitude information on UA 93 from a VFR aircraft. That information can be heard at this link. ZOB reports altitude on UA 93 Whenever Ricky Bell at Severe Weather keeps the microphone open you can hear voices in the background. We will cover that in Part 3 when we talk about Herndon continuously updating FAA Headquarters.

Next, ZOB provides altitude and heading information in real time to Herndon. You can, again, hear voices in the background and you hear Ricky Bell repeating information as he hears it so that others at Herndon are aware. This minute long conversation segment begins approximately 10:00 and can be heard at this link. ZOB provides location and heading for UA 93

From 10:01 to 10:02 the real time updates report erratic flying. That near one minute conversation segment can be heard at this link. ZOB reports erratic flying

UA 93 transponder back on

The UA 93 transponder did come back on, briefly for two sweeps just before 10:03. 84th RADES radar lost coverage on the plane soon after 9:47, but reacquired the aircraft near the end of its flight. Radar data from The Plains radar shows the transponder back on for just two radar returns. Based on those two returns the aircraft dropped at a significant rate. It was in extremis. The last recorded RADES radar return is at 10:02:57 at 6100 feet altitude. Location was 40 040 04N 78 55 02W.

ZOB describes the transponder event to Herndon as heard on this link. ZOB Reports Transponder Back On. The ZOB report is time consistent and altitude consistent with RADES radar. ZOB reports an altitude of 8200 feet when the transponder came back on. The RADES radar files show an altitude of 7800 feet at that time.

Here is a circa Summer 93 graphic I prepared concerning UA 93. My complete set of UA 93 powerpoint slides has been uploaded to the History Commons Scribd site; I can’t find the link for now, and is available at this link.

UA 93 Final Radar Returns

UA 93 lost by ZOB

Just before 10:03 ZOB reports losing UA 93 on radar except for one primary return. ZOB defers to ZDC as can be heard at this link. ZOB losing UA 93 on radar

A few moments later Herndon reconnects with ZOB to ask about both UA 93 and D 1989. Herndon learns that ZOB has lost UA 93; it was last headed toward Washington. Herndon also learns at the same time that D 1989 is not a hijack. That exchange can be heard at this link. ZOB advises UA 93 lost D1989 not a hijack

And, to finish off part 2 of this trilogy, at 10:10 ZOB and Herndon have a concluding converstion that reaffirms that ZOB has lost UA 93 on radar and that D 1989 is not a hijack. This conversation segment provides additional insight in how Herndon was operating and what it knew. ZOB Herndon Discusses Both Planes

Observations in real time

First, at no time at the desk level, do air traffic control personnel speak to or even mention contacting the military. That is to be expected, their job was to track and report.

Second, at no time did Herndon or ZOB conflate information concerning UA 93 and D 1989. Both planes were monitored distinctly and separately and reported that way. FAA up to the Herndon level had situation awareness in real time. Researchers who argue differently are simply wrong.

Third, separately, ZOB is learning of the fate of UA 93 and we will discuss that in Part 1 of this trilogy. For now, the embedded graphic provides useful data points. Gofer 06 soon after turning north at ZOB direction reported shortly after 10:04 that the pilot saw smoke in the direction of UA 93. The private jet, N20VF? on the graphic, was vectored by ZOB to the crash site. The Falcon circled once and provided GPS coordinates around 10:14.

Finally, at the national level. Norman Mineta is arriving at the PEOC during the final moments of UA 93. Subsequently he will receive information from Monte Belger about that aircraft, most likely as seen on a TSD display. That track, terminating at Reagan National at 10:28 is a ghost and has been since shortly after 10:03.

That begs a question. Given that Herndon had near real time information and was immediately passing that information to FAA Headquarters, how was that being passed, if at all, to the national level? We will grapple with that in Part 3. For now I would simply point out that the SVTS link was activated at 9:25 and Richard Clarke convened the conference soon after 9:40. He wrote in Against All Enemies, “Okay, I began. Let’s start with the facts. FAA, FAA, go.” Jane Garvey was at the FAA end.

What do we make of that?

I am separately publishing articles on the linear processes the government attempted to use that day. So far I have spoken to NOIWON. Once I get an Air Threat Conference article out I will then turn to SVTS. Suffice it to say for now that, as I’ve elsewhere attributed to an NMCC staff officer, the SVTS process was counter-productive.

So, I will speak to SVTS, probably before I write Part 3 of this air traffic control trilogy concerning UA 93.

At some point, of course, we will ultimately need to address the Mineta story.

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9-11 Revisited