9-11 Revisited

Introduction

In the previous two articles we discussed the approach of a primary only track, AA 77, into Dulles TRACON airspace.  We established that no one at any level was aware of the looming threat.  We also established that FAA’s Eastern Region, an administrative headquarters, was directing the air traffic control search for missing aircraft.

The Region prompted the ZDC manager to call his counterpart at ZID to look  for AA 77.  The ZDC manager then briefed his area supervisors that they were looking for limited data tag planes at altitude, specifically AA 77 and UA 175.  In this short article we will show that as late as 9:30 UA 175 was a matter of concern to Eastern Region.  AA 77 was not

Eastern Region

Eastern Region had jurisdiction over two of the four FAA Air Traffic Control centers involved on 9-11, Washington (ZDC), New York (ZNY), and it worked through them and their subordinate Towers and TRACONs to gather information.  For example, instead of calling Indianapolis Center (ZID) direct, the Region had ZDC call ZID to inquire about the loss of AA 77 over Indiana.

Concurrently, Eastern Region was trying to sort out what happened in New York City and was concerned with both AA 11 and UA 175.

AA 11

Here, we return, briefly, to a discussion of the most troublesome ghost on 9-11, the apparent rebirth of AA 11.  During interview, Ron Ruggeri, the Eastern Region Quality Assurance Staff Manager, stated he took the following action:

“[He] called the watch desk at ZNY, and was informed from Bruce Barrett that the impact was a terrorist event. Barrett checked a Situational Display per Ruggeri’s request to locate AA 11, and it showed AA 11 in Whiskey 105 but on a coast track (since the computer was searching for the target, and projecting its flight path).”

The Commission Staff was never able to pin down the source of the erroneous information concerning AA 11 but estimated it was derived from conversations on the Eastern Region telecon, an unrecorded conference.  Ruggeri’s mental picture of the track of AA 11 over water south of New York City supports that estimate.

Whiskey 105 is the military training area to which the Otis fighters were first vectored after takeoff.  Lynn Spencer in Touching History described it as “a military airspace training area over the Atlantic just south of Long Island.”

UA 175

Shortly after 9:29, Ruggeri called IAD to inquire about UA 175.  The call lasted less than a minute and IAD established that it did not have a flight plan in its computer for UA 175.  That conversation can be heard at this link. 1 IAD 27 DEPARTURE DATA Ruggeri Call 175

At no time does either Eastern Region or IAD make reference to the primary only track, the “no tag,” fast approaching the nation’s capital.

Google Earth

Here is the spatial position of AA 77 at the time of the Eastern Region call.  Permit me the irony to note that AA 77 flew just south of the ongoing construction of FAA’s Potomac TRACON facility; a new facility to solve known obsolescence and traffic control issues in the greater Washington DC area.

Location of AA 77 when Eastern Region called IAD about UA 175

Summation

The time is now 9:30 and we have established that the primary only track later determined to be AA 77 is rapidly approaching the nation’s capital and no one has recognized the threat.  We have established that FAA’s Eastern Region is collecting information. There is no evidence of awareness at any level, including the White House that AA 77 is a looming threat.  At 9:30, AA 77 is  34 miles from the Pentagon, according to Google Earth.

A Preview of What’s up next

We will establish in a later article that, according to a second call to IAD, Eastern Region was in direct, near real-time contact with FAA Headquarters and was passing information along as it was received at Eastern Region.  We will also establish that AA 77 is not mentioned until after Danielle O’Brien and her supervisor sound the alarm.

Addendum March 22, 2010

The purpose of this addendum is to insert an audio clip of a conversation shortly after 9:25 between Herndon Center and Indianapolis Center (ZID).  Herndon initiated the call to learn whatever it could about the loss of AA 77.

Indianapolis reported that the aircraft was off radar and presumed lost.  ZID assessed that AA 77 was not involved in the World Trade Center events because the time of loss was at the same time as events in New York.

The Herndon Center caller assessed, based on time and distance factors that the most likely target in danger was the Sears Tower in Chicago.  The conversation can be heard here.  092506 Herndon and ZID discuss AA77

My Assessment

This conversation is clear evidence that FAA Herndon Center and, by extension, FAA Headquarters did not know that AA 77 was bearing down on the nation’s capital.  It is further evidence that Norman Mineta was clearly mistaken in his recall of events that morning.  There is no reasonable way that he could have known about AA 77.

At that time, 9:25, no one above the scope level at Dulles TRACON had any information whatsoever about AA 77.  Although two controllers spotted a “no tag” they had no idea what they had seen and information available at Dulles TRACON did not become actionable until 8 minutes later when the general alarm was sounded.

Original Article

In part one  we established that Washington Center, ZDC, was not looking for AA 77 as a primary-only target and never detected the plane.  Moreover, its conversation with Indianapolis Center about AA77 and its internal conference among area supervisors were not shared with Dulles TRACON, IAD.  In this article we continue the track of AA 77 and relate it to IAD using primary sources–air traffic control conversations, the flight data recorder, and radar files.  And we start with IAD, itself.

Dulles TRACON, IAD

Dulles TRACON no longer existed by the time the Commission began its work.  In December, 2002, FAA commissioned  a consolidated facility, Potomac TRACON, which assumed the responsibilities of the TRACONs at Dulles, National, and Baltimore airports and Andrews Airfield to solve known air traffic inefficiencies and obsolescence issues as detailed in the linked document.

The Commission Staff toured both Dulles and National Towers and TRACONS.  Concerning the latter, we simply saw empty rooms at both locations.  To interview participants of the day we had to track them down wherever they were; several at Potomac TRACON, which we twice visited.

We determined that around 9:25 IAD did see, but did not recognize the threat posed by AA 77.  This is the IAD story and we begin with the first known primary source evidence.

See that no tag?

In the 9:25 timeframe a controller at the IAD South Departure position said: “see that no tag, there?”  A co-worker responded, “I do.”  The controller then said, “I’ll just flash him on to Wash or Center,whatever.”  The co-worker responded, OK.  That short six second exchange can be heard here No Tag.

It is speculative, but probable, that the controllers were seeing the track that was AA 77.  It is also possible that they were referring to something else entirely.  Given that it was AA 77 they did not recognize it as a threat and there is no evidence that the information was shared internally to IAD or that “Wash or Center” saw the flash.

According to the flight data recorder readout AA 77 was at 18,000 feet, technically just entering Class E airspace.  Whatever the technical division of air space responsibility no FAA facility recognized the threat.  Further, no one cued NEADS to look for that “no tag.”

FAA did acknowledge that early spotting of a “no tag” in its secondary source documents provided to the Commission.  We will consider those documents but first we need to talk about a second opportunity to see the AA 77 primary only track, this one by IAD South Departure and two ZDC Sectors, separately.

A Second IAD opportunity

In my Commission work I identified one plane that might have caused IAD (or ZDC) to recognize the approach of AA 77.  A graphic of the track of that plane, labeled M3 1531, is part of a series of slides concerning the approach of AA 77 and is inserted here, updated.

M3 1531 and AA 77

The two aircraft were separated vertically by more than 6000 feet.  AA 77 was just passing through 10,000 feet altitude into IAD designated airspace.  The point of spatial intersection was just West of Warrenton, Virginia.

In air traffic communications we first hear about M3 1531 around 9:26.  Dulles South Departure attempted a manual hand off of the southwesterly transiting aircraft to ZDC Casanova Sector.  That controller exchange can be heard at this link. M3 1531 Casanova Tape 19 side 1.

In a second attempt a minute later a different ZDC controller acknowledged “not that VFR guy.”  “VFR” in this context is not a reference to AA 77; it is a reference to a transponding aircraft.  IAD successfully handed M3 1531, who was VFR, off to ZDC, Azalea Sector.

At no time does any controller notice or comment on a primary only aircraft headed east. Here is the relevant conversation.   M3 1531 Azalea Tape 19 side 1 and M3 1531 Azalea Tape 19 side 2 It is in two parts because the transmission occurred at the end of one cassette tape and the beginning of another, as provided to the Commission and as archived by NARA.

Here is a Google Earth plot of the spatial intersection of AA77 and M3 1531 just West of Warrenton, Virginia.  As established earlier the two aircraft were 6000 feet apart in vertical separation.

Spatial Intersection of AA 77 and M3 1531

I know of no other primary source air traffic control transmissions which relate in any way to the approach of AA 77.  To see how FAA treated this information we next turn to a discussion of FAA assessments in the aftermath.

FAA Assessments

To sumarize, FAA established a time of 9:25 in its early assessments.  That assessment held at least through September 18, 2001, as memorialized in the Administrator’s Briefing Book.

In later assessments, including a March 2002 draft report, the 9:25 time no longer appeared.  By then FAA had settled on a time that equated to IAD sounding the alarm to National TRACON/Tower and to the White House/Secret Service.

Retrospectively, FAA established that IAD controllers may have seen the primary only track as early as 9:25, but there is no evidence that IAD recognized the threat any earlier than 9:32.

A  FAA “Chronology of Events“, unattributed, but fax time-stamped “6:18AM SEP 12, 2001″ demonstrates the confusion within FAA as to what happened.  A 9:25 entry states: “AAL77 Lost at 9:25AM York Kentucky.”  A 9:33 entry states: “DCA notified check Hotline activated; primary 3 miles south, now 1 mile.”  No mention is made of anyone noticing the track that would later be identified as AA 77.

The next day, in an internal summary prepared at 9:00 on September 13, 2001, FAA’s AAT-20 documented this information: “0856 Radar contact is lost.  No Further contact with aircraft.  Dulles ATCT [IAD] (bolding in original) 0925 (estimate) Controller observes primary target at high-speed transitioning west to east toward DC.  0933 Controller informs Operational Supervisor, whom in turns advises Washington National (DCA).”

That is an accurate statement, based on primary source information.  As we have established, a controller saw a “no tag” at 9:25 and did not recognized it as a threat.  The use of the word “controller,” singular, morphed into “controllers,” plural, as FAA prepared its Administrator for Congressional hearings.

That morphing from singular to plural was likely based on individual controller statements taken as part of FAA’s accident package preparation for submission to NTSB.  Retrospectively, individual controllers may have recalled that they did see the primary only track.

The fact remains, however, that none of them saw it as a threat and none of them alerted their supervisors.  That alert did not come until Danielle O’Brien recognized a problem; we will discuss that in a subsequent article.

The Administrator’s Briefing Book

As of September 18, 2001, at 5:20 PM the Administrator’s Briefing Book for Congressional hearings contained the following entries.  “0925:00 Between 0925:00 and 0930:00 (time is approximate based on personnel statements) – Several controllers at Dulles TRACON observe a primary radar target (unidentified but later confirmed to be AAL 77).”  “0933:00 (Time is approximate based on personnel statements – Dulles TRACON advises…Secret Service of an unknown aircraft heading in the direction of the White House…”

This version of the briefing book is the day after the White House meeting to discuss the events of the day and is likely the same version used by FAA representatives at that meeting.

The acknowledgment that the controller’s 9:25 observation may have correlated to AA 77 was dropped in subsequent FAA summaries.  An undated “Chronolgical Events at Dulles Tower on September 11, 2001,” contains this entry: “1332;20 (time approximate) Controller at Dulles Tower working the Final West position informs the other controllers in the radar room about the target observed moving estbound.”

Months later, in its 21 March 2002 draft report “The Air Traffic Organization’s Response,” the first mention of AA 77 as a threat is the 9:33 alert.

A Personal Comment

This look at FAA staff work in some detail does indicate that FAA was aware of all the relevant air traffic control tapes.  They went into the White House meeting with accurate primary source information.  I extrapolate from this that they knew, from their perspective, the actual notification times to the military.

I estimate they must have know the centrality of NEADS to the military equation.  They certainly knew there was no 9:24 notification time to NORAD concerning AA 77.  Whatever their position, it was subsumed at the White House meeting.

The Commission Report

The Staff wrote: “At 9:32, controllers at the Dulles Terminal Radar Approach Control “observed a primary radar target tracking eastbound at a high rate of speed.” This was later determined to have been Flight 77.”

At one time we considered a time of 9:25 but the convergence of information dictated a later time.  We concluded that 9:32 was the earliest time that situational awareness developed at IAD; they processed what they were seeing and then sounded the alarm.

Next Up

Before we turn to the awareness and subsequent alarm we will briefly examine a phone call between FAA’s Eastern Region and IAD in the 9:29 time frame.  Recall that we established that Eastern Region, an administrative headquarters, was dictating the exchange of information.  As a preview of the next article, Eastern Region called to inquire not about AA 77 but about UA 175.

After that we will turn to Danielle O’Brien and the actions she and her supervisor took.

Addendum added Nov 20, 2009

Here is a slide version of this  article.  Slides are timed and will advance automatically.  Included are screen prints of a Google Earth plot and data from the FDR, as well as a brief summary slide.  Embedded audio not yet active; working on it.

American Air Flight 77 ZDC ZID Slide Show

Original article

In my original “Transponders and Ghosts” article I wrote: “Plane by hijacked plane, each transponder manipulation presented a different problem set to air traffic control, to managers of the National Airspace System and ultimately, to the National Command Authority.”

To briefly summarize, the four transponders on the hijacked airplanes were each manipulated differently.  Three were turned off at distinctly different times in the flight paths of those planes and a fourth, the transponder on UA175, was changed to a different code.

We now have more insight into the problem that latter manipulation caused.  I hasten to add that we have no direct knowledge of the hijacker tactics concerning the transponders; what we do know is that retrospectively the tactics, planned or serendipitous, were effective.

AA77, itself a ghost

At 9:18 the Operations Supervisor at Washington Center, ZDC, Cary Johnson, called Indianapolis Center, ZID.  The call can be heard at this link. ThomasJohnson He reported that he had observed on TSD (Traffic Situation Display) that AA 77 was a ghost somewhere over Indiana and asked if ZID was working the aircraft.  The Operations Supervisor at ZID, John Thomas, told Johnson that AA 77 had been reported lost but may have turned around and was heading somewhere else.

During the course of the conversation the two managers established that they were looking for an aircraft at last altitude of 35,000 feet, and that ZID had initiated rescue procedures.

ZDC

After concluding the ZID call Thomas convened a conference call with his Area Supervisors; that conversation began shortly before 9:22 and lasted less than one minute.  The call can be heard at this link.  johnsonarea They agreed they were looking for an aircraft with a limited data tag and one with a transponder code change.  The reference was to AA 77 at 35K feet and UA 175 over New Jersey at 31K feet.

UA 175

In the “Ghosts” article we established that concurrent with the impact of AA 11 into the North Tower the transponder code on UA 175 was changed, and then changed again.  The code was first changed to 3020 and then to 3321.  There is a logical explanation for that sequence.

When the Commission Staff visited the “Companies,” American and United Airlines, we were provided in-cabin and in-cockpit orientations on both B757 and B767 aircraft at each Company.  While in the B767 cockpit with the United senior pilot I had him show me the transponder and change the code.  His technique was a two-step sequence.  On the first step he changed the first and third digits, the second and fourth defaulted to zero.  On the second step he changed the second and fourth digits.

At the time, United transponders had four knobs in two stacks of two each.  The American transponders had four separate knobs.  In retrospect, that is my best explanation for why the transponder code on UA 175 changed, and then changed again.

Among others,  FAA’s Eastern Region knew of the code change and it was Eastern Region, not Herndon Center that was advising the air traffic control operations managers.  We will return to that point later, but first back to ZDC.

ZDC, Continued

At no time did ZDC managers and supervisors discuss or did Johnson direct activating the primary switches on their scopes.  ZDC never looked for and never recognized a primary only target approaching the nation’s capital from the west.  By then, it was too late.  The time was approaching 9:23 and a very real ghost, AA 77 was upon them and had begun a descent, not from flight level 35, but from flight level 25.

AA 77, Flight Data Recorder

According to the flight data recorder, a primary source,  AA 77 left 35000 feet altitude at 9:01 soon after the hijackers took over.  By 9: 14 it was at flight level 25,000 and remained there during the course of the air traffic control conversations between ZDC and ZID and among the area supervisors at ZDC.  About 9:22 it began its final descent and by 9:29 it was below 10,000 feet altitude.

Given that primary source data and given the instructions the ZDC operations manager passed to his area supervisors, ZDC had no chance to detect AA77.  Moreover, it was quickly moving into IAD (Dulles Tracon) air space as we shall see by considering another primary source, radar files from the 84th RADES.

AA 77, radar track.

NEADS radar reacquired AA 77 shortly before 9:10, but as a primary only track.  Moreover, as opposed to the situation with AA 11 where NEADS could have determined altitude it could only have done so for AA 77 during the period 9:16 and 9:27 while the Oceana Radar was acquiring the aircraft.  Thereafter, the  radar feed was coming from The Plains, Virginia, the only radar in the Joint Surveillance System that could not provide altitude information on a primary only track.  Shown here is  a Google Earth plot of 84th RADES files from The Plains radar for the period 9:18 to 9:28.

According to the plot, AA 77 was just approaching Virginia, west of Harrisonburg, while Thomas and Johnson were conversing, and was passing north of Harrisonburg and crossing I81 while Johnson was conversing with his area supervisors.  At the same time, after crossing the mountains, Hani Hanjour began the descent from flight level 25 headed for air space controlled by Dulles TRACON, IAD.

We will address the IAD story later in a separate article.  For now we need to document what is and is not happening in the hunt for AA 77.

Observables in real time

First,  at no time do either Thomas or Johnson talk about or consider NEADS or military assistance.

Second, they are not taking their cues from or responding to Herndon Center.  ZDC is responding to FAA’s Eastern Region, an administrative headquarters.  Recall that we established in a previous article that the two entities fighting the battle (second article at link)  that morning were NEADS and Herndon Center.

Third, at no time do Johnson and his Area Supervisors mention Dulles TRACON; they are concentrating on their mission which is handling transponding aircraft at high altitude.

Finally, ZDC does not turn on the primary switches on its scopes; instead they are looking for a limited data block, as was the case with UA 175.  I made a separate, final trip to ZDC on the very point of primary switches to confirm that they did not turn them on.  They did not.

A personal comment

We will likely never know the attack plan, in detail.  What we do know is the Atta and al Shehhi had extended periods of quality time together, measured in days, weeks, even months, to discuss ‘what-ifs’, do research, and speculate what might and what might not work as they finalized the battle plan.

Certainly they had sufficient time and the means to determine that a transponder turned off over West Virginia might cause problems; to determine that a transponder changing codes might also cause problems; and that a low level approach to the nation’s capital might escape detection.

Given the primary source information, including the flight data recorder data, we can reverse engineer Hanjour’s actions and make some informed observations.  First, Hanjour immediately changed altitude after takeover and turn around.  Second, he flew erratically for several minutes after reaching his new altitude of 25,000 feet.

That erratic flight reinforces the belief by some that Hanjour and the other hijack pilots were unskilled.  Conversely, it also reinforces the belief by others that the plot was planned in detail and was sophisticated.  It is plausible that Hanjour flew erratically to encourage the passengers to stay seated and belted.  Either way, Hanjour did level the plane and it flew smoothly at flight level 25 until it came time to descend.

It is a technicality of course, but during the period 09:24 to 09:27, AA77 was in Class E airspace, between 18,000 and 10,000 feet, airspace that ‘belonged’ to neither ZDC nor Dulles TRACON.  Even so, Dulles TRACON controllers did ’see’, but did not recognize the significance of a ‘no tag’ approaching during that time.  And that’s the next story to be told.

Future articles

As mentioned, I will continue the primary source analysis of the approach of AA 77 through Dulles TRACON airspace and will establish using primary source information the earliest that the NCA would know it had an immediate problem.

It is also appropriate that we now queue up a discussion of Norman Mineta and his testimony.  It is clear from this article that as of 9:20, no one knew where AA77 was or that it was approaching the nation’s capital; not ZID, not ZDC, not IAD, not Herndon, not the FAA Eastern Region and, above all, not FAA Headquarters, NEADS/NORAD, the NMCC, Richard Clarke, Norman Mineta, the Secret Service or the Vice President and President.

It will be the initiative of one person, Danielle O’Brien, that anyone, anywhere, will have actionable information.  By that time, AA77 will be “inside the Beltway,”  a term that used to enjoy a certain cachet.